Thomas Sherlock John Gregory China and Russia: Political Values - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Thomas Sherlock John Gregory

China and Russia: Political Values and Perspectives on Sino-Russian Cooperation

SMA Presentation July 24, 2019

John Gregory US Military Academy West Point

Chinese Youth: Political Values and Perspectives on Sino-Russian Cooperation

The Chinese section of the paper for the SMA project relies primarily on 12 focus groups conducted in mid-2018 with students attending leading universities in China as well as contextualizing interviews and readings from within the PRC. Additional background and examples of PRC discourse-formation mechanisms and objectives discussed in this paper are presented in more detail in a series of three articles published by the author in The National Interest (2018), https://nationalinterest.org/profile/e-john-gregory.

1) The formation in Chinese society of preferences on foreign policy is highly influenced by the CCP’s control of information channels and aggressive social discourse formation mechanisms; 2) Chinese elite youth generally accept the Party-supported national goal that China should be rich and powerful, believe that such a goal requires China to have cultural influence in the world (discourse power), and believe that this desire has deep roots in Chinese history and culture; 3) Although very critical of US foreign policy decisions and many domestic aspects of the United States, elite Chinese students generally hold an idealistic view of the United States which they see as culturally- influential, rich, and powerful, all attributes that China is seeking; 4) Chinese elite youth are generally ambivalent and often completely uninterested in Russian culture and generally do not look to Russia as a model for anything.

China Conclusions

The CCP’s Discourse Formation Strategy

Great Power Category of Analysis

1) Largely avoids fraught category of directly asking about political values, such as democracy (although we also directly asked about those). 2) Allows triangulation of values, aspirational attributes for China’s future. 3) Current Party emphasis and incorporates long term national narrative of seeking wealth and power.

Chinese elite youth understand cultural influence to be an essential attribute of a great power along with military and economic power.

Attributes of a Great Power

Chinese elite youth not only recognize the United States as the greatest of great powers, but also hold a very idealized picture of the United States despite a barrage of CCP propaganda criticizing the United States. Notice the prominent place

• f cultural (influence) in the

word cloud. That was a common theme within the focus groups.

Contrast the view of Russia as having little cultural influence in world affairs. The primary attribute noted favorably about Russia was that its people are able to stoically endure suffering.

China-Russia: Elite Chinese Perspective on Common Values 1) China wants global cultural influence; Russia is seen to have little cultural influence outside Russia. 2) China seeks to be rich and powerful; Russia’s prospects for becoming rich and powerful are not seen by Chinese youth to be strong. 3) Chinese elite understand at some level that neither Russia nor China are really democracies. 4) Chinese youth see close proximity as both a potential benefit and as carrying significant historical territorial baggage. Tentative Conclusion from the China Focus Groups: China and Russia share neither sufficient common values nor sufficient affinity below the leadership level at the present time to forge long-term, enduring relationships akin to the United States’ traditional alliance structure. But….

Thomas Sherlock US Military Academy West Point

Russian Youth: Political Values and Perspectives on Sino-Russian Cooperation

The Russian section of this SMA paper relies primarily on 9 focus groups conducted in May 2018 with students attending leading universities in Moscow. The following slides also draw on large-N studies (2018) of the political perspectives of Russian society, particularly Russian youth. This paper is part of a book-length manuscript on state-society relations in post- Soviet Russia. Some of the issues discussed in the paper are examined at greater length in: Thomas Sherlock, “Russian Society and Foreign Policy: Mass and Elite Orientations after Crimea,” Problems of Post –Communism, published online March 2019. DOI:10.1080/10758216.2018.1561190

1) The formation in Russian society of preferences on foreign policy enjoys an important measure of autonomy from manipulation by the regime; 2) aggressive, expansionist nationalism is not a salient feature of contemporary Russian political culture or national identity, particularly among youths – most of the Russian public does not support a neo- imperial project; 3) Perceptions of external threat and the desire for great power status are less important in Russian society (and particularly among Russia youth) than concerns over mounting domestic problems. At this point, threat perception and aspirations for great power status are too weak in society (and particularly among youths) to serve as important drivers of close cooperation with China; 4) Young Russians are wary of close cooperation with China. In terms of interests and values, focus group participants were more interested in rapprochement with the West, particularly the United States, which was criticized but also viewed as a model in many respects. By contrast, China was not considered a political or socio-economic model.

Russia Conclusions

Low domestic support for current program of Russian militarization

❖ Survey question: Should Russia direct its efforts to building up its military power or supporting the economic well-being of its citizens? ➢ Well-being of its citizens: 69.9% ➢ Military power: 21.8%

➢ GEN P (18-24): 76%/16% ➢ Muscovites: 76%/18% ➢ “Rich”: 67%/27% ➢ “Poor”: 71%/19% ➢ Higher ed: 74%/19% ➢ Less than secondary ed 67%/25%

Low Domestic Support for Hybrid Warfare against Baltic States

• Scenario: Crimea/Eastern Ukraine model -- Kremlin

stirs up Russian speakers in Estonia (47%) and Latvia (37%) through media propaganda on “exploited, threatened” minority; then mobilizes troops along border to destabilize both countries. Intent: weaken NATO, which will potentially divide over whether to assist Estonia and Latvia against Russia’s hybrid attack

• Problem: need consensus in North Atlantic Council (28

members)

Russian Support for Hybrid Warfare? How Strong Support for R2P in Russia?

• Can the Kremlin muster domestic support for

pressure and/or some form of invasion or coercion of the Baltic states?

• What if the Kremlin launched a domestic

propaganda campaign condemning alleged mistreatment of Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia? Would the Russian public support an aggressive response by the Kremlin?

Weak Support for Hybrid Warfare Against Balts; or for Interference in Kazakhstan, etc.

❖Support for R2P? Survey responses overall (Levada, 9/2018):

• Russia should work toward settlement:

34.0%

• Russia should not interfere:

31.0%

• Russia should use all means to protect:

23.0% ❖ Moscow: 45.1%/26.3%/28.0% ❖ Villages: 26.0%/41.0%/20.0% ❖ Youth (18-24): 40.4%/25.6%/23.3%

The Advancing West: Should Russia Block NATO

• r EU Membership for Ukraine?

➢ Almost two-thirds of Ukrainians now support membership in NATO – dramatic rise from pre-Crimean period

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/08/two-thirds-of-ukrainians-want- to-join.html

❖ Survey question: If Ukraine decides to join NATO or the EU, what should Russia do? (Levada, 9/2018): 18-24 year old ❖ Russia should not block either decision: 42.0% ❖ Russia should block NATO membership: 20.6% ❖ Russia should block either decision: 13.6% ❖ Difficult to say: 23.8%

Weak Drivers of Sino-Russian Cooperation: Threat Perception

• Survey question: Internal problems of Russia

are now more serious than external threats: Do you agree? (18-24 years) (Levada, 9/2018) Agree + Mostly agree: 72.3% (37.9% + 34.4%) Disagree + Mostly disagree: 18.7% (3.4% + 15.3%)

Weak Drivers of Sino-Russian Cooperation: Great Power Status (1)

• In your opinion, what are the most important

tasks for Russia today? (choose NMT 3 of 15 items on a list) (18-24 years)

• #1 Improve economic welfare:

77.5%

• #7 Strength international prestige:

14.8%

• #12 Restore Russia’s military power: 12.5%

Weak Drivers of Sino-Russian Cooperation: Great Power Status (2)

• Survey Q (Levada, 9/2018)
• What do you want Russia to be first and

foremost…

• A great power respected and feared: 33.7%
• A country with a high standard of living

even if not a great power : 65.8%

Practical Patriotism

According to Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov: “When a Russian feels any foreign pressure, he will never give up his leader. Never. We will survive any hardship in the country — eat less food, use less electricity.” http://www.businessinsider.com/top-official-russians-will-eat-less-for- putin-2015-1 Survey Q (Levada 9/2018): What sacrifices are you will to bear to support Russia’s defensive capacity and its revival as a great power? “I am willing to accept…..” (18-24 years)

• Limit internet usage:

12.9%

• Increase taxes:

4.4%

• Freeze wages:

.7%

Russia’s National Identity

• Levada survey: September 2018

Russia is an Integral Part of Europe: 50.8% Russia is a unique civilization which will shift further toward the East in coming decades 36.2%

What is the best path for Russia to strengthen its economy and international position? (Levada, 9/2018) (18-24 years old)

• Closer relations with China:

31.1%

• Closer Relations with the USA:

11.7%

• Balance between China and USA:

57.2%

Conclusion

• Below the level of leadership, China and Russia share few enduring political values

that would contribute to a future alliance akin to the US Treaty Alliance Structure.

• Elite Russian and Chinese youth, however, seldom came across as diametrically
• pposed to deeper relations and expressed tepid to moderate support for deepening
• f relations.
• Unlike Russian youth, Chinese youth are more readily influenced by the CCP’s official

discourse formation machine, although Chinese youth still seem to imagine that a great power looks something like America, a key finding for American policy makers debating what emphasis to put on engagement and how to engage.