May 18, 2020 | 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed
Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Philipp Markert, Daniel V. Bailey, Maximilian Golla, Markus Dürmuth, and Adam J. Aviv
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed Analyzing the Security of Smartphone - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs Philipp Markert, Daniel V. Bailey, Maximilian Golla, Markus Drmuth, and Adam J. Aviv May 18, 2020 | 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Overview ?!
May 18, 2020 | 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Philipp Markert, Daniel V. Bailey, Maximilian Golla, Markus Dürmuth, and Adam J. Aviv
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
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User Study
Agenda Practice Priming Creation
Results Why study PINs?
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Iris
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PHOTO: Dan Seifert | The Verge (Vox Media)
Fingerprint Face
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
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This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs 4/14
[1] J. Bonneau, S. Preibusch, and R. Anderson. A Birthday Present Every Eleven Wallets? The Security of Customer-Chosen Banking PINs. FC ‘12 [2] D. Wang, Q. Gu, X. Huang, and P. Wang. Understanding Human-Chosen PINs: Characteristics, Distribution and Security. AsiaCCS ‘17
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6-digit 4-digit No Blacklist Blacklist No Blacklist Blacklist
iOS “Test effect of iOS blacklists” Blacklist:
Data-Driven (DD) “Test effect of different blacklist sizes” Blacklist:
Placebo “Test general effect of warning” Blacklist:
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Priming Consent Practice PIN Creation
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This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Priming Practice PIN Creation Followup Questionnaires Recall Demographics
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Consent
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
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This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Rank 4-digit PINs 6-digit PINs 1 1234 123456 2 0000 123123 3
⁝
2580
⁝
111111
⁝
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1 2 3
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Android iOS 10 Guesses 30s 1h 36m 0s 100 Guesses 10h 45min 30s —
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1 2 3
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Rank 4-digit PINs 6-digit PINs 1 1234 123456 2 0000 123123 3
⁝
2580
⁝
111111
⁝
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1 2 3 1 x 3
not allowed
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
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4 vs. 6
Small? Medium? Large?
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Observations:
defined attacker model
number of guesses
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This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Observations:
comparable security
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DD Large 70% iOS 15% DD Small 5%
increases the security
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
Observations:
the curve
users choose popular PINs
users choose unpopular PINs
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“Secure” “Usable”
This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs
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User Study
Agenda Practice Priming Creation
Why study PINs?
No biometric Biometric Most of the participants in our study (66%) use a PIN
Results
Security of 4- and 6-digit PINs is comparable Blacklists need to be large to have an effect Blacklisting ~10% is ideal
4 ≈ 6 XXL
philipp.markert@rub.de @philipp_markert https://this-pin-can-be-easily-guessed.github.io