The SRM Regulation: How to Make Cross-Border Resolution Effective - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

the srm regulation how to make cross border resolution
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The SRM Regulation: How to Make Cross-Border Resolution Effective - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The SRM Regulation: How to Make Cross-Border Resolution Effective Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann D.E.A. (Paris II), LL.M., J.S.D. (Columbia) Director of the Institute of Private International and Comparative Law University of Bonn, Germany


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The SRM Regulation: How to Make Cross-Border Resolution Effective

Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann

D.E.A. (Paris II), LL.M., J.S.D. (Columbia)

Director of the Institute of Private International and Comparative Law University of Bonn, Germany

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

Overview

  • A. The Conflict-of-Laws Problem
  • B. The Answer by the EU
  • C. The Need for a World-Wide Solution
  • D. Ways for Improvement
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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • A. The Conflict-of-Laws Problem
  • conflict of laws (private international law) determines the law

applicable to assets

  • looks for most significant connection
  • can be different from law of the place of the bank
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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • A. The Conflict-of-Laws Problem
  • for movables and immovables: lex rei sitae rule

country A country B

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • A. The Conflict-of-Laws Problem
  • for debt: principle of party autonomy

country A country C

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • A. The Conflict-of-Laws Problem
  • foreign law as obstacle for resolution

law A

transfer order bail-in

law C law B

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • B. The Answer by the EU
  • BRRD and SRM Regulation
  • three areas to be distinguished:
  • 1. Intra-Eurozone

– centralized decision-making by SRB (“federal model”)

  • 2. Non-Euro Member States of EU – decentralized decision-

making (“country-of-origin model”)

  • 3. Third States – no prescriptive powers of EU (“coordination

model”)

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • B. The Answer by the EU
  • 1. Resolution

measures by

  • ther

Member States: recognition, Art 66 BRRD Member State A

  • legal remedies centralized in country of origin, Art 85 BRRD

transfer order bail-in

Member State B Member State C

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • B. The Answer by the EU
  • 2. Resolution

Measures by third States: discretion, Art 94 BRRD Non-EU State

transfer order bail-in

Member State B Member State C

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • B. The Answer by the EU
  • 2. Resolution

Measures by third States: discretion, Art 94 BRRD examples of reasons for refusing recognition:

  • adverse effects on financial stability of a Member State
  • discrimination of EU creditors
  • material fiscal implications for the Member State
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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • C. The Need for a World-Wide Solution
  • banks have assets all over world
  • can be resolved only through concerted action world-wide
  • global banks should no longer die nationally
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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • C. The Need for a World-Wide Solution

the reality on the ground

  • conflicting interests:
  • 1. resolution state: use assets to recapitalize bank
  • 2. target state: ring-fence assets for local creditors
  • little incentive for recognition because
  • 1. lack of mutuality
  • 2. relative rareness of need for resolution
  • 3. hyperbolic discounting

à situation is not conducive to international cooperation

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • C. The Need for a World-Wide Solution

answer: regulatory networks

  • 1. Crisis Management Groups
  • 2. Institution-Specific Cross-Border Cooperation Agreements
  • 3. Recovery and Resolution Plans
  • 4. Resolvability Assessments
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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • C. The Need for a World-Wide Solution

“Principles for Cross-border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions”, 3 November 2015

  • 1. contractual approach:
  • temporary stay of early termination rights (see ISDA

Protocol)

  • bail-in clauses
  • 2. statutory approach:
  • domestic

rules to give effect to foreign resolution measures

  • should clearly establish: (i) the conditions for recognition,

enforcement or support actions; (ii) the grounds for refusal of such actions, which should be limited; and (iii) the process for taking such actions

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • C. The Need for a World-Wide Solution
  • but: mind the courts!
  • courts take centre-stage in resolution – regulation will often

end up in litigation

  • courts may refuse recognition
  • 1. for legitimate purposes – e.g. abuse of resolution (HETA

case, Landgericht Munich I, 8 May 2015)

  • 2. for narrow legalistic reasons and/or to protect domestic

creditors (Goldman Sachs International v Novo Bank, [2015] EWHC 2371 (Comm))

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • D. Ways for Improvement

starting point:

  • regulatory cooperation is not enough
  • courts need a secure legal basis
  • more uniformity is necessary
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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • D. Ways for Improvement
  • 1. An International Treaty on Resolution?

not workable because

  • lack of political agreement
  • high stakes; sovereignty issues
  • no credible commitment possible
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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • D. Ways for Improvement
  • 2. An International Single Point of Entry Solution?

Holding country A

subsidiary country B subsidiary country C

bail in

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • D. Ways for Improvement
  • 2. An International Single Point of Entry Solution?

disadvantages:

  • not all banks are grouped in holding structure
  • no trust in authorities of country in which holding is

established

  • does not exclude ring-fencing by countries in which

subsidiaries are established

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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • D. Ways for Improvement
  • wn suggestions:
  • 1. An International Model Law on Resolution

advantages

  • gives precise rules
  • transposition would make it binding on courts
  • deviations possible (sovereignty maintained)
  • makes deviations transparent
  • international case law can develop
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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

  • D. Ways for Improvement
  • 2. Create Resolution Colleges with Target States
  • where assets are in other State, include that State in

resolution process

  • only when major assets
  • may help securing recognition
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Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann Institute of Private International and Comparative Law

Thank you for your attention! Questions and comments: mlehmann@uni-bonn.de