The Security Impact of IPv6
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love IPv6
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. jullrich@sans.edu
1
The Security Impact of IPv6 How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
The Security Impact of IPv6 How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love IPv6 Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. jullrich@sans.edu 1 Housekeeping This presentation consists of slides and audio. If you are experiencing any problems/ issues,
The Security Impact of IPv6
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love IPv6
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. jullrich@sans.edu
1
“Housekeeping”
please press the F5 key on your keyboard if you’re using W indow s, or Com m and + R if you’re on a Mac, to refresh your console, or close and re-launch the presentation. You can also view the Webcast Help Guide, by clicking on the “Help” widget in the bottom dock.
minute to click on the link and fill it out to help us improve your next webinar experience.
dock.
few days. You will receive an autom atic e-m ail notification when the recording is ready.
submitting questions. You may also use the Q&A box (and the survey at the end) to suggest topics for future webinars of interest to you.
2
including O’Reilly, Morgan Kaufmann, others
member discounts on tuition at partner institutions
Cybersecurity, Big Data, Recommender Systems, SaaS, Agile, Natural Language Processing, Parallel Programming)
Bibliographies compiled by subject experts
Centenary talks/ panels
ACM Learning Center
http: / / learning.acm.org
3
Talk Back
presentation with friends and colleagues
presentation with hashtag # ACMWebinarIPv6
– we’re reading them!
4
Why IPv6
5
IPv4 vs. Reality
IPv4 Design Today’s Reality Network Size Million’s of Hosts Billion’s Network Speed Kbit/MBit GBit RAM/System MBytes GBytes Network Use EDU/GOV COM Endpoints Servers/Workstations Mobile/Devices
6
When did we run out of Addresses
1993 (RFC 1517)
IPv4 address space
now exhausted
7
What is today’s Internet
endpoints are devices without a “user”
growth area right now is mobile devices
require more security
8
IPv6 Design Goals
– More addresses – Simpler routing
– More memory – Larger address buses in CPUs – Mobility
9
IPv6 Header
1234 5678 1234 5678 1234 5678 1234 5678
Version Traffic Class Flow Label Payload Length Next Header Hop Limit Source Address (4x32 Bits) Target Address (4x32 Bits)
10
Compare to IPv4
1234 5678 1234 5678 1234 5678 1234 5678
Version HL TOS Total Length IP ID Fragmentation TTL Protocol Header Checksum Source Address Target Address
11
Extension Headers
to extension headers
enforced
than IPv4
12
Extension Headers
13
Outline
should I care?
14
IPv6 Privacy
15
IPv6 Privacy
16
IPv6 Addresses
2001:DB8:ABCD:1234:abcd:efab:cdef:abcd
– ISP may assign you / 48, / 56 or / 64
Network
Host (Interface)
17
Interface ID
Privacy issues!
Hard to manage
Probably best “enterprise” solution.
18
Interface ID Recommendation
enhanced addresses
19
But What about NAT?
20
ULA Addresses
fdaa: bbcc: ddee: : / 48 If you really like NAT, you can still do it! (ask your Vendor)
21
NAT and IPv6 (don’t tell your kids!)
Prefix Translation
Translation)
22
Sample Network
23
Sample Network
24
Sample Network
ULA Global
25
How is this different than IPv4?
standard
networks?
26
Vendor Support
what?)
– Deep packet inspection? – Performance?
27
Router Advertisements
picks the next 64 bits
28
Fake routers
switches
“RAGuard” in a few switches
29
Router Advertisements
advertisements
ICMPv6 and ICMPv6 Type is “Router Advertisement”
30
RAGuard
(few) to detect Router Advertisements and limit them to authorized ports.
DHCP Snooping)
31
RAGuard Bypass
extension headers
may not indicate ICMPv6
32
RAGuard Bypass
to figure out if packet is a RA
the NH is not a transport header
33
But what happens if…
(one of the top 10 networking lies like: “All my critical devices are air gapped” )
34
IPv6 VPN Exfiltration
User connecting from remote location back to an internal network
35
IPv6 VPN Exfiltration
Standard Solution: IPSEC (or other) VPN: All Traffic routed via VPN!
36
IPv6 VPN Exfiltration
Standard Solution: IPSEC (or other) VPN: All IPv4 Traffic routed via VPN!
37
IPv6 VPN Exfiltration
Attacker inserts IPv6 router
IPv6 Internet
38
I nterlude: DNS6 4
Host attempts to connect to an IPv4 Server
39
IPv6 Only Host DNS Server Router AAAA IPv4.example.com
I nterlude: DNS6 4
Host attempts to connect to an IPv4 Server
40
IPv6 Only Host DNS Server Router AAAA IPv4.example.com A IPv4.example.com
I nterlude: DNS6 4
Host attempts to connect to an IPv4 Server
41
IPv6 Only Host DNS Server Router 192.0.2.1
I nterlude: DNS6 4
Host attempts to connect to an IPv4 Server
42
IPv6 Only Host DNS Server Router 64::c000:201
I nterlude: DNS6 4
Host attempts to connect to an IPv4 Server
43
IPv6 Only Host DNS Server Router 64::c000:201 192.0.2.1
IPv6 VPN Exfiltration
Attacker inserts IPv6 router + DNS64!
IPv6 Internet
44
Testing Results
VPN/ OS combinations
(uses VPN advertised DNS server
if VPN is IPv4 only)
45
TCP Session Reassembly
missing packets
sequence number (SEQ1)
number of bytes sent
Packet 1 Packet 2 Packet 3 Packet 4
SEQ1 SEQ1+len(Packet 1)
46
TCP Session Reassembly Problems
is resent
has to figure out which data is accepted and not accepted
47
TCP Complications in IPv6
to be dropped by destination (or not)
– Unknown destination options – Routing headers – Unknown routing options
48
Common Issues
copy of a sequence number, some prefer second copy
dropped after passing IDS
49
Example: Routing Header
request specific routers to be used
specified router is reached
header
50
Example
Src IP Router 1 Src IP Router 2 Src IP Final Dst
Routing Hdr Router 1 Router 2 Final Dst. Routing Hdr Router 1 Router 2 Final Dst. Routing Hdr Router 1 Router 2 Final Dst.
IP Header Routing Header
51
Summary
– It is not just a security question, it’s a business question: Do you need it? – It is not really that different than IPv4 – IPv6 offers new security options – We (YOU!) need operational experience – Learn and experiment NOW before it becomes an emergency
52
Help Us Help You
us know:
https: / / isc.sans.edu/ contact.html We will try to keep an eye on IPv6 activity
53
Thank you!
jullrich@sans.edu Twitter: johullrich
http: / / isc.sans.edu
Please Contribute
Daily Updates * Daily Podcast * Live Data Feeds
54
Resources
http: / / technet.microsoft.com/ en- us/ network/ bb530961.aspx
http: / / www.internetsociety.org/ deploy360 / ipv6
55
ACM: The Learning Continues…
http: / / learning.acm.org/ webinar
56