The Meta-structure of Knowledge and the Explanatory Gap Object, Time, Concept, Meaning, Reference and Perception José M. Matías jmmatias@uvigo.es TSC, Stockholm – May 3th, 2011 http://webs.uvigo.es/jmmatias/knowledge/knowledge.htm
Outline Our world view and some of its problems The physical side. The object The mental side. The subject The Conceptual Structure The Explanatory Gap José M. Matías – The Meta-structure of Knowledge 2
Our world view The physical side. The object The mental side. The subject The Conceptual Structure The Explanatory Gap Our world view and some of its problems We see the world as a set of objects and subjects placed in a spatio- temporal container. Objects and subjects are subject to change by the action of time Some difficult (still unanswered) questions: Which objects do exist? (simples, ordinary objects, subjects,…) How can an object/subject persist through time? How/when can an object/subject start/cease to exist? Since the origins of philosophy we have been trying to resolve the conflict between identity and change We have been considering identity as unquestionable while relegating change to a secondary role But maintaining identity through change results in complex and not wholly accepted theories Do the structure of our knowledge coincide with the structure of the world? At least, we can check the coherence of the former José M. Matías – The Meta-structure of Knowledge 3
Our world view Time The physical side. The object The Object The mental side. The subject Object and Time as decomposition of change. The Conceptual Structure The Explanatory Gap Time Two main positions about time: Presentism: only the present exists; only present things exist Eternalism: time is a dimension; the world is 4D (timeless) But we can’t experience the past or the future. Objection: we do feel the past Reply: when I remember something I am having a present sensation Thus, we should deny the existence of the time dimension And what remains of time if there is no past or future? A world with only the present is truly a timeless changing world Let’s assume this hypothesis and explore its implications: we can save ontology and in time we can rectify José M. Matías – The Meta-structure of Knowledge 4
Our world view and its problems Time The physical side. The object The Object The mental side. The subject Objects in a timeless changing world The Conceptual Structure Object and Time as decomposition of change. The Explanatory Gap The object (I) Key question. Who is the owner of change: The World: there are no objects; there is only change The Objects: endurantism (common-sense view); change is discretised into objects While change is undeniable, objects are the centre of many controversies: Problems: constitution, composition, causal redundancy, sorites paradoxes, … Positions: nihilism, ordinary objects, universalism, conceptualism, conventionalism, … If the owners of change are the objects, what is the immutable component of the object? Two main theories of identity: substrate and bundle Where does the substrate/bundle live? Have we ever experienced the substrate/bundle? Answer: yes, we perceive objects Reply: but everything we perceive about the object is subject to change (e.g. an apple) If the substrates/bundles were clear to everybody we would agree about ontology Furthermore, what happen to the substrate/bundle when the object ceases to exist? José M. Matías – The Meta-structure of Knowledge 5
Our world view and its problems Time The physical side. The object The Object The mental side. The subject Objects in a timeless changing world The Conceptual Structure Object and Time as decomposition of change. The Explanatory Gap The object (II) If we burn a table, when exactly the table ceases to be the table? We end up sifting through the meaning of the word ‘table’ to assess precisely when the table no longer met our specifications It seems that the table’s persistence is the persistence of its value ( meaning ) for us But if objects depend on a meaning, they would not exist in the world on their own We may say ‘the wave hit the beach’’ – but why consider the ocean wave to be an object? What is an object?. We could define an object as something that retains its identity through change José M. Matías – The Meta-structure of Knowledge 6
Our world view and its problems Time The physical side. The object The Object The mental side. The subject Objects in a timeless changing world The Conceptual Structure Object and Time as decomposition of change The Explanatory Gap Objects in a timeless changing world How in a timeless changing world were we able to build objects? Our interaction with the world shows areas with different rates of change; when slower than our perception system, a sense of permanence results that triggers us to mark them with an identity The object belongs to our interaction with the rest of the world, not to the world itself When interacting at new scales (with new instruments) we define different objects (ontological redundancy) And how did we manage to build time? We chose a reference object (clock) whose ( periodic ) change served to frame the change in other objects We then gradually abstracted the concept, quantified it and made it independent of the reference object to convert it into a numeric axis: the time dimension José M. Matías – The Meta-structure of Knowledge 7
Our world view and its problems Time The physical side. The object The Object The mental side. The subject Objects in a timeless changing world The Conceptual Structure Object and Time as decomposition of change The Explanatory Gap Object and time as decomposition of change Therefore, we cannot conceive time without first having conceived the object Thus there is not a problem of persistence: object comes first We segment the overall change into objects and their changes, i.e., into objects and their times Instead of recognising objects that exist in their own right, we look for value ( meaning ) in the world and record this information in our conceptual system Once established, this self-same conceptual system guides this segmentation, thereby closing the loop Note that without objects the world would look exactly the same as it does (except for our mind and our non-instinctive behaviour) José M. Matías – The Meta-structure of Knowledge 8
Our world view and its problems Persistence of the subject The physical side. The object Identity of the subject The mental side. The subject The Conceptual Structure The Explanatory Gap The mental side 1 1 Until further notice we will use the word ‘sensation’ with its everyday meaning But what about the subject? We would say that the subject shares the persistence in change in that sense, is yet another object Then, the subject could not exist unless it existed in a different world We have two options: Either the subject is really an object in a mental (not physical) world containing objects (perhaps souls) Or the subject also relies on meaning and concept The first option requires an explanation of how two worlds with different laws could come into contact or, indeed, what could be the meaning of “two worlds” (dualism) The second option suggests a problem of circularity: how could it be that my identity and my persistence rely on the meaning I have regarding myself? José M. Matías – The Meta-structure of Knowledge 9
Our world view and its problems Persistence of the subject The physical side. The object Identity of the subject The mental side. The subject The Conceptual Structure The Explanatory Gap Persistence of the subject In principle, we say that there is change on the mental side, but we also say that we very clearly feel our persistence in this change We would say that persisting in this change is, at least, our past, our history, which is immutable (incremental) and represents our persistence in change But when we remember our past, our feelings are present. Such memories are not the same feelings as the original sensations that we want to recall The former point to the latter in some way but they are not the same They can occupy the same place in our history, in our meaning, but they are not the same We easily confuse recall sensations with recalled sensations Therefore, subjects do not have the temporal space necessary to persist Even the smallest act of perception or thought requires change ( time ) The subject would be like a song: a song doesn’t exist, only the notes played in each instant José M. Matías – The Meta-structure of Knowledge 10
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