the macroeconomics of microfinance
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The Macroeconomics of Microfinance Francisco Buera 1 Joseph Kaboski 2 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Macroeconomics of Microfinance Francisco Buera 1 Joseph Kaboski 2 Yongseok Shin 3 1 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, UCLA & NBER 2 University of Notre Dame & NBER 3 Wash U St. Louis & St. Louis Fed January, 2012 Microfinance


  1. (Partial Equilibrium) Impact on Occupational Choice 6 4 log(a) (Wealth) 2 0 −2 z 90 z 95 z 99 z ∞ −4 −6 −8 −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0 log(z) (Entrepreneurial Ability)

  2. (Partial Equilibrium) Impact on Occupational Choice 6 4 log(a) (Wealth) 2 0 −2 z 90 z 95 z 99 z ∞ −4 −6 −8 −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0 log(z) (Entrepreneurial Ability)

  3. Objects for Stationary Competitive Equilibria • o ( a, z ) : occupational choice • G ( a, z ) : joint distribution of a , z • µ ( z ) = 1 − z − η : stationary distribution of z

  4. Definition: Stationary Competitive Equilibria G ( a, z ) , policies o ( a, z ) , c ( a, z ) , a ′ ( a, z ) , k ( a, z ) , l ( a, z ) , rental limit ¯ k ( a, z ; φ ) , and prices w and r such that: • Allocations solve individuals’ problems given prices and rental limit; • ¯ k ( a, z ; φ ) satisfies EC; • Labor and credit markets clear; • G ( a, z ) satisfies � G ( a, z ) = γ G ( d ˜ a, d ˜ z ) z<z,a ′ (˜ ˜ a, ˜ z ) ≤ a � +(1 − γ ) µ ( z ) G ( d ˜ a, d ˜ z ) . a ′ (˜ a, ˜ z ) ≤ a

  5. Empirical Strategy • Choose technology ( α, θ ) and productivity process ( η US , γ ) to match US data on size distribution and dynamics of establishments and income concentration, given φ US = 1

  6. Empirical Strategy • Choose technology ( α, θ ) and productivity process ( η US , γ ) to match US data on size distribution and dynamics of establishments and income concentration, given φ US = 1 • Choose contract enforcement and distribution of productivity ( η IND , φ IND ) to match Indian data on the size distribution and external finance to GDP

  7. Empirical Strategy • Choose technology ( α, θ ) and productivity process ( η US , γ ) to match US data on size distribution and dynamics of establishments and income concentration, given φ US = 1 • Choose contract enforcement and distribution of productivity ( η IND , φ IND ) to match Indian data on the size distribution and external finance to GDP • Evaluate impact of b MF

  8. Empirical Strategy Target US Data Model Parameter η US = 4 . 84 top 10% employment share 0.69 0.69 top 5% income share 0.30 0.30 α + θ = 0 . 79 Exit rate 0.10 0.10 γ = 0 . 89 Interest rate 0.04 0.04 β = 0 . 92 Target Indian Data Model Parameter η IND = 5 . 56 top 10% employment share 0.58 0.58 φ IND = 0 . 08 Ext. fin./GDP 0.34 0.34

  9. Relation to Microevaluations • Two recent studies evaluate interventions impact on entrepreneurial households

  10. Relation to Microevaluations • Two recent studies evaluate interventions impact on entrepreneurial households 1. Urban: India Hyderabad study (Banerjee et al, 2010)

  11. Relation to Microevaluations • Two recent studies evaluate interventions impact on entrepreneurial households 1. Urban: India Hyderabad study (Banerjee et al, 2010) 2. Rural: Thai village funds study (Kaboski and Townsend, forthcoming, 2010)

  12. Relation to Microevaluations • Two recent studies evaluate interventions impact on entrepreneurial households 1. Urban: India Hyderabad study (Banerjee et al, 2010) 2. Rural: Thai village funds study (Kaboski and Townsend, forthcoming, 2010) • We simulate similar sized intervention and compare short-run, partial equilibrium impacts

  13. Relation to Microevaluations • Two recent studies evaluate interventions impact on entrepreneurial households 1. Urban: India Hyderabad study (Banerjee et al, 2010) 2. Rural: Thai village funds study (Kaboski and Townsend, forthcoming, 2010) • We simulate similar sized intervention and compare short-run, partial equilibrium impacts • Model capture key features (heterogeneity, orders of magnitude) reasonably well

  14. Impacts on Marginal Ability Entrepreneurs 1 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 8 0 . 1 Income Consumption 0 . 6 Take-up Rate MF/Ext. Fin. 0 0 . 4 − 0 . 1 0 . 2 − 0 . 2 0 . 00 0 . 60 0 . 70 0 . 80 0 . 90 1 . 00 0 . 60 0 . 70 0 . 80 0 . 90 1 . 00 Ability Percentile Ability Percentile

  15. Table: Comparison Summary Model India Thailand Max Loan/Exp per Cap 1 1-2 1 Credit/Exp per Cap 0.1 0.1 0.1 Microfinance/Total Credit 29% 44% 33% Entrepreneurship +4 pp +2 pp +1 pp Investment +46% +16/128% +30% (prob). Consumption +1% +16/0% +15%

  16. More on Thai Study • Rural Thailand vs. Urban India and Model

  17. More on Thai Study • Rural Thailand vs. Urban India and Model • Stronger evidence for consumption increase

  18. More on Thai Study • Rural Thailand vs. Urban India and Model • Stronger evidence for consumption increase • Weaker evidence for entrepreneurship, investment increase

  19. More on Thai Study • Rural Thailand vs. Urban India and Model • Stronger evidence for consumption increase • Weaker evidence for entrepreneurship, investment increase • only seen in larger samples

  20. More on Thai Study • Rural Thailand vs. Urban India and Model • Stronger evidence for consumption increase • Weaker evidence for entrepreneurship, investment increase • only seen in larger samples • Rural villages likely to have segmented markets, 7 percent overall wage increase

  21. More on Thai Study • Rural Thailand vs. Urban India and Model • Stronger evidence for consumption increase • Weaker evidence for entrepreneurship, investment increase • only seen in larger samples • Rural villages likely to have segmented markets, 7 percent overall wage increase • concentrated in low-skilled labor in the village

  22. Aggregate Implications 1 . 2 1 . 2 0 . 00 1 . 1 1 . 1 − 0 . 01 1 . 0 1 . 0 − 0 . 02 Wage (left) 0 . 9 0 . 9 − 0 . 03 Interest Rate (right) Output Capital − 0 . 04 0 . 8 0 . 8 TFP − 0 . 05 0 . 7 0 . 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 b MF /w (0) b MF /w (0)

  23. Aggregate Implications: Short-Run vs. Long-Run 1 . 2 1 . 2 0 . 00 1 . 1 1 . 1 − 0 . 01 1 . 0 1 . 0 − 0 . 02 Wage (left) 0 . 9 0 . 9 − 0 . 03 Interest Rate (right) Output Capital − 0 . 04 0 . 8 0 . 8 TFP − 0 . 05 0 . 7 0 . 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 b MF /w (0) b MF /w (0)

  24. Aggregate Implications: Role of Occupational Choice 1 . 2 1 . 2 0 . 00 1 . 1 1 . 1 − 0 . 01 1 . 0 1 . 0 − 0 . 02 Wage (left) 0 . 9 0 . 9 − 0 . 03 Interest Rate (right) Output Capital − 0 . 04 0 . 8 0 . 8 TFP − 0 . 05 0 . 7 0 . 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 b MF /w (0) b MF /w (0)

  25. Explaining Aggregate Effects • Why does TFP increase?

  26. Explaining Aggregate Effects • Why does TFP increase? • Microfinance allows entrepreneurs with high marginal product of capital to invest more

  27. Explaining Aggregate Effects • Why does TFP increase? • Microfinance allows entrepreneurs with high marginal product of capital to invest more • Why does capital fall?

  28. Explaining Aggregate Effects • Why does TFP increase? • Microfinance allows entrepreneurs with high marginal product of capital to invest more • Why does capital fall? • Microfinance redistributes income from talented (high saving) to untalented (low saving) individuals

  29. Understanding TFP 1 . 3 1 . 3 0 . 30 TFP Efficient k Efficient z 1 . 2 1 . 2 0 . 20 1 . 1 1 . 1 0 . 10 Avg. z (left) Entre. frac. (right) 0 . 90 0 . 90 0 . 00 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 b MF /w (0) b MF /w (0) details

  30. Understanding Capital Accumulation Aggregate savings rate, S/Y , is an (income) weighted average of individual savings:

  31. Understanding Capital Accumulation Aggregate savings rate, S/Y , is an (income) weighted average of individual savings: Y = Y ( z low ) S Y ( z low ) + Y ( z high ) S ( z low ) S ( z high ) Y Y Y ( z high )

  32. Understanding Capital Accumulation 0 . 6 0 . 5 Saving z 100 95 (left) 0 . 4 0 . 4 Income z 100 95 (right) 0 . 2 0 . 3 Saving z 95 0 0 (left) − 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 b MF /w (0)

  33. Distribution of Welfare Gains

  34. Distribution of Welfare Gains fraction of permanent consumption 0 . 20 0 . 20 0 . 10 0 . 10 0 0 − 0 . 10 − 0 . 10 0 . 8 0 . 9 1 . 0 0 . 8 0 . 9 1 . 0 Ability percentile Wealth percentile

  35. How does GE affect results? 1. More redistribution

  36. How does GE affect results? 1. More redistribution • bigger welfare gains for low ability, low wealth

  37. How does GE affect results? 1. More redistribution • bigger welfare gains for low ability, low wealth 2. Smaller positive aggregate impacts

  38. How does GE affect results? 1. More redistribution • bigger welfare gains for low ability, low wealth 2. Smaller positive aggregate impacts • lower TFP (less entry, talented guys get less resources)

  39. How does GE affect results? 1. More redistribution • bigger welfare gains for low ability, low wealth 2. Smaller positive aggregate impacts • lower TFP (less entry, talented guys get less resources) • less capital (wages redistribute to low savers)

  40. More Redistribution in GE 0 . 20 0 . 20 GE PE 0 . 10 0 . 10 0 0 − 0 . 10 − 0 . 10 0 . 8 0 . 9 1 . 0 0 . 8 0 . 9 1 . 0 Ability percentile Wealth percentile

  41. Smaller Aggregate Impacts in GE General Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium 2 . 2 2 . 2 Output Capital 1 . 7 1 . 7 TFP 1 . 2 1 . 2 0 . 7 0 . 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 b MF /w (0) b MF /w (0)

  42. Smaller Aggregate Impacts in GE vs PE short-run General Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium, Short-Run 2 . 2 2 . 2 Output Capital 1 . 7 1 . 7 TFP 1 . 2 1 . 2 0 . 7 0 . 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 b MF /w (0) b MF /w (0)

  43. Smaller Aggregate Impacts in GE vs PE short-run TFP Decomposition General Equilibrium Partial Equilibrium, Short-Run 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 0 1 . 0 TFP Efficient k 0 . 9 0 . 9 Efficient z 0 . 8 0 . 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 b MF /w (0) b MF /w (0)

  44. Extensions • Small open economy Ext1 (capturing capital supplied by foreign donors)

  45. Extensions • Small open economy Ext1 (capturing capital supplied by foreign donors) • Capital demand still falls: lower wealth accumulation

  46. Extensions • Small open economy Ext1 (capturing capital supplied by foreign donors) • Capital demand still falls: lower wealth accumulation • Smaller TFP gains with r constant

  47. Extensions • Small open economy Ext1 (capturing capital supplied by foreign donors) • Capital demand still falls: lower wealth accumulation • Smaller TFP gains with r constant • Zero labor shock Ext2 (capturing poor, low ability entrepreneurs)

  48. Extensions • Small open economy Ext1 (capturing capital supplied by foreign donors) • Capital demand still falls: lower wealth accumulation • Smaller TFP gains with r constant • Zero labor shock Ext2 (capturing poor, low ability entrepreneurs) • Lower TFP , capital accumulation -> wages fall

  49. Extensions • Small open economy Ext1 (capturing capital supplied by foreign donors) • Capital demand still falls: lower wealth accumulation • Smaller TFP gains with r constant • Zero labor shock Ext2 (capturing poor, low ability entrepreneurs) • Lower TFP , capital accumulation -> wages fall • Self-employed benefit relative to workers

  50. Extensions • Small open economy Ext1 (capturing capital supplied by foreign donors) • Capital demand still falls: lower wealth accumulation • Smaller TFP gains with r constant • Zero labor shock Ext2 (capturing poor, low ability entrepreneurs) • Lower TFP , capital accumulation -> wages fall • Self-employed benefit relative to workers • Two-sector model with fixed costs Ext3 (capturing additional GE effect on relative price)

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