The Future of the Power Industry: Implications for Network - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Future of the Power Industry: Implications for Network Regulation

Paul Centolella President, Paul Centolella & Associates, LLC Senior Consultant, Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich

ACCC/AER Regulatory Conference Brisbane, Queensland August 4, 2016

Overview

• Challenges and Opportunities: Common to US and Australia
• Approaches to Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Valuation and

Integration

– Planning and Administrative Valuation – Markets and Pricing

• Structuring a Market for DER: Platforms and Distribution System Operators

(DSOs)

• Grid Architecture for Networks with Significant DER
• Implications for the future of network regulation

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Challenge: Remaining Affordable

• Revenue growth is disappearing:

– “Consumption of grid-supplied

electricity is forecast to remain flat for the next 20 years, despite projected 30% growth in population”1

• Electric utilities have to invest:

– Replacing aging infrastructure: U.S. utilities need $673 Billion (USD) in new reliability investment in this decade, exceeding market cap of US investor owned electric companies2 – New requirements: Climate adaptation, Distributed resources, Physical and cyber security

• Potential for Negative Cash Flow

& Increasing Rates3

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AU Forecast Electricity Consumption to 2036

No Increase

• 60
• 40
• 20

20 40 60 80 100 120 Billion US$

U.S. Investor Owned Electric Utility Capital Spending & Free Cash Flow

Capital Expenditures Free Cash Flow

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Challenge: Ensuring Reliability and Security

• Growing dependence on reliable

electric service:

– Economy is increasingly digital – Population is increasingly urban

• Mounting weather & climate risks:

– Severe Storms – Extreme heat – Drought & fire

• Vulnerability of critical cyber /

physical systems

– Interdependence, Inherently Open System, Unregulated Supply Chain, Fragmented Control, Dynamic Threats

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Metcalf Substation

CA ISO Forecast 2020 Impact of PV: 3 Hour Ramp More than 12,000 MW

Challenge: Providing Access to New Resources

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• High penetration of variable resources impacts network operations,

ramping requirements, system costs, & conditions for price volatility

• Reported 7/7/16 price South Australia price variance: $100 to $14,000(AU$)/MWh4
• Economies of scale remain important
• Utility scale PV < Half Cost of Small Distributed PV5

~1,100MW on installed domestic PV capacity on a ~5,000MW network. In some postcodes >40%

• f customers have PV. Total energy delivered is ~

7% (1438GWh) of total usage

1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 2008-01 2008-06 2008-11 2009-04 2009-09 2010-02 2010-07 2010-12 2011-05 2011-10 2012-03 2012-08 2013-01 2013-06 2013-11 2014-04 2014-09 2015-02 2015-07 2015-12 2016-05 MW

Cumulative PV Installations

Australian PV Institute 6 7 8

Challenge: Becoming Sustainable

• Climate is a Global Problem:

– If developed economies had Zero CO2 emissions, Carbon budget for 2o C stabilization could be breached by 2050

• Low carbon technologies need to

cost less to scale globally

– While costs of low carbon power have fallen, the full cost remains above that of gas generation in most

• f the US & of coal in many growing

economies9

• Requires Innovation

– Learning by doing is insufficient to achieve timely improvements

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Onshore Wind Costs = 142% of Advanced Gas Combined Cycle With $30/T Carbon Price

(US$)

Opportunity: Integration of Digital Technology

• Expansion of affordable computation + connectivity +

data collection is producing:

– Low transaction cost and multi-sided markets – Unbundling of products and services to match consumer specific characteristics and preferences – Intelligent and high speed cyber/physical systems – Improved asset utilization and recruitment of underutilized resources – Greater precision in system controls

• Electricity sector has yet to fully realize the benefits of digital

technology

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DER Valuation: 2 Approaches

• Fundamental Approaches to Valuation:

– Planning and administrative valuation approaches (e.g. LMP +D, feed-in tariff, net metering retail rate credits) – Market based valuation via Distribution Locational Marginal Prices (DLMP)

• What is the difference?

– LMP+D and similar approaches are based on planning

• r administrative forecasts of average expected

“avoided costs.” For example LMP (i.e. nodal, or wholesale value, of real energy) plus D (an planning or administrative forecast of average avoided distribution system costs). – LMP+D requires more transparent distribution planning & more detailed regulatory review of distribution plans – DLMP is a granular, market measure of short run marginal cost (SRMC) at the specific time and location for the provision or use of core electric products

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LMP + D Value by Time and Location: Consolidated Edison (New York City)

• Only 22% of Consolidated

Edison’s NYC distribution networks have peaks that coincide with system peak10

– Demand response programs based

• n the needs of the bulk power

system would not address many of the needs of distribution systems

• Half of the incremental PV

installations are in ConEd’s night- peaking distribution networks

– Such PV installations may have little

• r no positive distribution (D) value

and may increase distribution costs

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LMP + D Value by Time and Location: Consolidated Edison (New York City)

• In ConEd’s mesh network

placement of distributed resources has a significant impact

– Must be placed near constrained component to be effective

• Multiplying effect: The farther DER

are from constrained component, the more DER kW are needed to provide equivalent load support

– More distributed placement is less efficient: Smaller amounts of DER at multiple node points will require even more kW than shown here

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Plan Based LMP + D Value: ConEd Brooklyn Queens Demand Management (BDQM) Project

• Targets load growth in 3

networks of Brooklyn and Queens Burroughs of NYC

• Plan to defer $1 Billion (US$)

in traditional network upgrades with $200 million (US$) incentive program

• DER procurements through
• pen RFI and structured

auctions

• Regulator treating

expenditures as 10-year regulatory assets earning base ROE + performance adder (up to 100 bp)

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Anticipated 2018 BQDM Resource Portfolio

• Energy Efficiency, Voltage Optimization, Gas-fired Generator, Fuel Cell, and

Evening Demand Response

• Supplemented with modest contributions from PV and Battery Storage

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Targeted Need

Fuel Cell & Gas DG may operate when no load relief is needed

Planning / Administrative Valuation

• Targeting DER can defer more expensive distribution investments
• Time and location have a significant impact on value
• Planning forecasts /administrative valuations won’t fully capture load and

network configurations changes or emergence of better resource options

• Scaling planning and administrative valuation to optimize high

penetrations of DER will be challenging for utilities and regulators

• Use of competitive procurements (without first disclosing avoided costs)

can contribute to savings

• Fixed output resources may defer costs in some hours and provide

unneeded and more costly power in other hours

• Option contracts that enable utility to call DER when needed may provide

a more efficient alternative

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Pricing: Core Electric Products from DER (ONLY 3!)

11

• The 3 Rs

– Real Energy – Reactive Power – Reserves

• The 3 Rs require tradeoffs

– Tradeoff between producing real versus reactive power – Tradeoff between committing now to produce real or reactive power (now and forward) and being available to provide reserves

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Granular Pricing: Time Variance

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10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

US$ / MWh

Peak Day Hourly Zonal LMPs for Selected PJM Zone

PJM Data Miner: Locational Marginal Prices Total LMP ACCC/AER Regulatory Conference

Granular Pricing: Locational Variance (RTO)

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• 600
• 400
• 200

200 400 600 800 1000 US$ / MWh

Variance in Peak Day Ave. Hourly Nodal & Zonal LMPs for Selected PJM Zone

Minimum Nodal LMP Maximum Nodal LMP Zonal LMP

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 2 3 4 5 6

12 Hours with Max LMP Variance in Zone >$50/MWh

PJM Data Miner: Locational Marginal Prices Total LMP ACCC/AER Regulatory Conference

Modeling Results: Summer Day, High DER Scenario for an Illustrative 800 Bus Commercial / Residential Distribution Feeder

Granular Pricing: Real & Reactive Power DLMPs

12

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(US$) (US$)

Price Transparency: Economic Principles

• Efficiency: “We must look at the price system as … a mechanism for

communicating information if we want to understand its real function—a function which, of course, it fulfills less perfectly as prices grow more rigid.” - Friedrich Hayek13

– By communicating marginal cost and value, prices can promote economic efficiency, enables cost savings, and incents innovation

• Non-Discrimination: Price discrimination occurs when a firm

charges different prices to different customers for reasons other than differences in costs

– Charging the same rate to customers for whom the marginal cost of service differs creates a cross-subsidy. It is not price discrimination.

• Choice: Consumers should be free to hedge price volatility or not

based on individual preferences

– Any default pricing should nudge consumers toward an efficient choice

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Price Transparency: Wholesale Markets

• In US wholesale load settlements are subject to Federal jurisdiction,

but deference to states has created a regulatory gap14

• For most consumers in US organized markets:

– Load is settled at an Average Zonal Price: Fails to recognize nodal price differences

• For example, there are only 11 Zonal prices for all of New York State and the 64 ConEd distribution

systems all see the same Zonal price

– Load is settled at an Average Hourly Price: Fails to recognize opportunities to shift demand between intervals to minimize costs – Load is often settled on Historical Average Customer Class Load Profiles: Unrelated to actual demand by the customers of load serving entities

• Lack of price transparency restricts and adds transaction costs to

DER market participation15

– Retail electric suppliers have limited or no incentive to compete based on helping customers manage demand

• To what extent does Australian Reference Bus Pricing adequately

capture network constraints and nodal price differences?

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Price Transparency: Retail Options

• Simple approach in competitive retail markets:

– Link wholesale settlements to actual, interval-, location-specific retail customer loads – Make locational price forecasts available providing information to help schedule demand and DER operations – Allow a continuous forward market for further information disclosure – Provide customers data on their usage and encourage the development of data analytics to facilitate efficiency and demand management – Encourage retail suppliers to compete by helping customers manage their energy costs – Retail suppliers could offer choices:

• Dynamic retail price and information to assist customers
• Two part package including dynamic retail price and price or bill insurance
• Fixed price in exchange for the ability to manage a few degrees of heating and

cooling temperature flexibility

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Platform Markets

• What is a Platform? The infrastructure of a business

ecosystem that matches producers and consumers, who transact using the platform and resources provided by the ecosystem. The platform provides components and rules designed to facilitate interactions and creates value by facilitating matches and providing easy access to useful goods and services16

• Platforms combine technology and structure to

animate transactions in a larger ecosystem with the potential to produce:

– Positive network externalities – Learning effects – Ecosystem innovation

• Organized Electricity Markets are Platforms for trading

Energy Commodities in Bulk Power System

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DSO Models

ACCC/AER Regulatory Conference

Distribution System Platform (Max)

• DSO planning & operations

functions + Distribution Market Platforms (DMPs)

• Focus shifts from DSO dispatch

to market-based coordination

• Transactional DMPs:
• Real-time / Imbalance Market

with ex-post settlement based

• n actual topology and power

flows

• Forward Financial Market that

facilitates price discovery, load forecasting, and grid operations

• Services DMP: Digital platform

enables demand and DER

• ptimization, retail choice, and
• ther services

Distribution System Operator (Min/Med) Transparent Distribution Planning Integrates DER into Real-time Operations Selective DER Procurements Scheduling and Dispatch for Limited DER Potential Aggregation / TSO Coordination Conflict Potential: Operation & Dispatch DER Integrator Provides Hosting Capacity

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Transactional Market for Core Electric Products

17

• Forward market (ex ante)

– Continuous, bilateral transactions: location- and time-based bids and offers matched to form prices – Closes immediately prior to the time of simultaneous production and consumption of electricity – Efficient price formation will require information about expected grid operations

• Clearing or Balancing Market (ex post)

– Needed to clear imbalances between scheduled energy deliveries and actual energy consumed – May be used for general settlements at a distribution level – Connection to network operations: DLMP balancing market requires DSO data on actual “real time” consumption, production, power flows and distribution topology – Platform runs a mathematical load flow calculation, with the substation LMP as the reference price, to determine a clearing price for energy and reactive power at each traded distribution node.

• Market Evolution: Pricing can become more granular in phases:

– Starting at sub-zonal transmission pricing nodes – Moving to Distribution LMP (DLMP), as utilities implement measurement of real and reactive power at sufficient points to estimate distribution power flows

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Value Created: Market for DER

• Expands DER access to markets with well-defined core electric

products, transparency, and multiple buyers and sellers who can freely enter and exit

• Efficient prices that reflect the time- and location-specific value of

real energy, reactive power and reserves

• Minimizes transaction costs, friction, and cross-layer coordination

issues associated with demand response program / aggregator model

• Animates emergence of new products and services

– Combinations of products and services from DER and third parties – Value-added services: price forecasts, analytics, smart technology – Enhanced distribution efficiency: Integration of DER in local Volt / VAR control

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Services Platform

• Platform could connect customers and DER operators with an ecosystem
• f valued services, potentially including services to:

– Enable efficiency and demand management, e.g. price forecasting & building control – Enable optimization of DER operation, e.g. DER commissioning – Curate retail service options to match consumers preferences and facilitate supplier / vendor customer acquisition

• Distribution utility participation in services platform could leverage core

functions and data to enhance value and accelerate market innovation:

– Distribution system operations will rely on and have information on operational plans, load forecasts, DER performance, near-term price forecasts, load and DER price responses, that could support services to optimize demand and DER operations – Enhancing utility’s role as trusted energy advisor

• More effective stewardship of utility digital networks might provide
• pportunities to accelerate market innovation:

– Utilities might be able to develop and curate the use of secure, ubiquitous, managed networks for machine-to-machine communications, e.g. Internet of Things (IoT) connectivity for devices meeting specified standards – An additional utility service

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Value Created: Flexible Demand & Enhanced Asset Utilization

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Flexible Demand Potential: CA Residential Loads19

Peak Demand Average Demand

1oC 2oC 4oC Flex Range

• Power system average asset

utilization is below 50% - Far below

• ther capital intensive industries
• Most commercial & residential

demand can be shifted in time providing inexpensive virtual storage

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Using Commercial Building Thermal Inertia Can Cut Peak 20-50%18

Architecture for a Grid with Significant DER

• Principles of Grid Architecture can help define the structure and attributes
• f complex interactions needed in a network with high levels of DER:20

– Layered structural decomposition of functions with defined boundaries and interfaces – Coordination of large numbers of autonomous elements, in a Transactive model = Markets – Defining local objectives and constraints that integrate into overall solution – Aligning locally selfish optimizations – Extensibility so as to grow incrementally

• Architecture must reflect the complexity of distribution operations and

the essential exchanges of information DSO operations and DLMP markets, e.g. on a typical day:

– Maintenance may require multiple changes in distribution topology – Load and DER have dynamic effects on voltage and phase balance, which can create distribution level constraints that impact operations and markets – DSO may exercise options for the operation selected DER to ensure reliability – Actual topology and power flows needed to calculate balancing market DLMPs

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Architecture for a Grid with Significant DER

• Bulk power system control is not readily applicable to distribution

– Distribution systems are more complex, variable, and may not be accurately represented in existing plans and models – The security constrained dispatch model is not computationally tractable in distribution network with high levels of DER and responsive demand – Most responsive demand and many behind the meter generators will shift net load to lower cost intervals and find participation in a dispatchable DR program unattractive

• In a network with high levels of DER:

– Control vs. Market-based Coordination – Centralized vs. Decentralized Are NOT choices – Both will be required

• Architecture of such a network is likely to combine:

– Continued TSO security constrained dispatch of large bulk power resources – DSO dispatch of a limited subset of distributed resources needed to provide local reserves and ensure distribution reliability – Coordination through increasingly granular markets with transparent price signals that

• ptimize toward real-time markets based on actual power flows

– Grid edge sub-cycle controls to minimize local disturbances

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Sub-cycle Grid Edge Control: Reactive Power

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Assumption

Volts Distance

Allowed ANSI voltage band

Actual Distribution Feeder

Volts

Actual Feeder with Grid Edge Control

Source: Varentec21 Controlling at the point of volatility:

• Equalizes voltage end node to substation
• Eliminates technical losses
• Can reduce in generation requirement 5%+
• Enables 50%+ PV penetrations

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Grid Edge Control: Enabling Queensland PV Penetration

30

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Regulatory Fundamentals: Objectives and Challenges

“The single most widely accepted rule for the governance of the regulated industries is regulate them in such a way as to produce the same results as would be produced by effective competition, if it were feasible.“ - Dr. Alfred Kahn22

• Traditional objective: Ensuring utilities do not use monopoly power to

charge unreasonable or discriminatory rates, while ensuring adequate service – Static Efficiency

• Increasingly important objective: Producing net value for customers,

enabling innovation, matching the effects of competition – Dynamic Efficiency

• Challenge – Asymmetric Information: Regulator never has complete

information regarding the utility’s efficient costs or opportunities for enhancing customer value

• An effective regulator treats all regulation as incentive regulation
• Challenge – Provide a structure and incentives that support innovation and

create Net Value for Customers

• Competitive firms earn economic profits by providing net value to customers

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Australia’s Unconventional Wisdom

• Avoiding ineffective Cost of Service regulatory model23: Overall design of

“Better Regulation” is more consistent with fundamental regulatory

• bjectives and challenges

– Results-based combination of five year forward revenue determination, balanced Capex / Opex efficiency incentive, earnings sharing, and output performance incentives

• Statutory National Electricity Objective: Promotes economic efficiency and

long-term consumer interests

– Address affordability by promoting efficient prices and consumers’ long-term interests – Avoids specifying a standard of quality, safety, reliability, or security – Appears to leave the environment to other branches of government, except to the extent long-term interests of consumers may require consideration of future costs

• Are the incentives in Australian regulation aligned with the major
• pportunities for improving system efficiency and consumer value?

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Emerging Regulatory Issues

• Development and governance of a Distribution System Operator/Platform

– Addressing the essential interactions between network operations and markets

• Potential conflicts in interests at mid-stage DSO development:

– May require more transparent distribution planning and operations where DSO has an interest in distributed resources – Concern primarily arises from DSO dispatch of selected resources and topology control and may require co-development of metrics and systems – Less a concern in platform markets given incentives to create customer value and cultivate a platform ecosystem

• Options for mitigating undue market power in increasingly granular

markets:

– Price responsive demand – Expanding scope of distribution markets with grid edge Volt-VAR controls

• More efficient clean energy incentives (alternatives to: FIT, net metering):

– Pricing environmental impacts is more efficient – Research, Development & Demonstration Funding is a key climate strategy

• Developing options to support Innovation:

– Dedicated funding and competitive solicitations (U.K.) – Streamlined expert review – Office of Innovation within the regulatory commission

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References

1. EMO, 2016 National Electricity Forecasting Report (June 2016). 2. American Society of Civil Engineers, Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in Electricity Infrastructure (2011) (Hereafter: ASCE (2011)). 3. Edison Electric Institute, 2014 Financial Review: Annual Report of the U.S. Investor-owned Electric Utility Industry (2015). 4. “Aussie Senator Calls for Wind Moratorium,” Electricity Daily (July 28, 2016). 5. MIT Analysis; Barbose et al. (2015). “Tracking the Sun VIII: The Installed Price of Residential and Non-Residential Photovoltaic Systems in the United States.” LBNL (August, 2015). Bolinger & Seel (2015). “Utility Scale Solar 2014: An Empirical Analysis of Project Cost, Performance, and Pricing Trends in the United States.” LBNL (September, 2015). 6.

• M. Rothleder, Long-term Resource Adequacy Summit, California ISO (2013).

7. Australian PV Institute, Market Analysis (Data downloaded: July 21, 2016). 8.

• P. Price, Energex reflections on services customers may demand in a High-DER Future, Electricity Network Transformation Roadmap Workshop (July 7, 2016).

9.

• W. Hogan, Clean Energy Technologies: Learning by Doing and Learning by Waiting, Harvard Energy Policy Seminar (September 29, 2014).

10.

• S. Mahnovski and S. Wemple, The Role of Distributed Energy Resources in New York State, Department of Energy Electricity Advisory Committee Smart Grid

Subcommittee (June 16, 2016). 11. Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich “White Paper – Developing Competitive Electricity Markets and Pricing Structures” NYSERDA released April 2016. HTTP://www.tcr- us.com/projects.html 12. Ibid.; See also: M. Caramanis, E. Ntakou, W. Hogan, A. Chakrabortty, and J. Schoene, “Co-Optimization of Power and Reserves in Dynamic T&D Power Markets with Nondispatchable Renewable Generation and Distributed Energy Resources,” Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 104, No. 4 (April 2016). 13. Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society (1945). 14.

• P. Centolella, Comments of Paul Centolella on the Application of Interval Settlements to Load Serving Entities, Settlement Intervals and Shortage Pricing in Markets

Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, FERC Docket No. RM15-24-000 (November 2015). 15.

• P. Centolella, P. Centolella, Next Generation Demand Response: Responsive Demand through Automation and Variable Pricing (March 2015).

16. Parker, Van Alstyne, & Choudary, Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are Transforming the Economy--And How to Make Them Work for You (2016) 17. Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich “White Paper – Developing Competitive Electricity Markets and Pricing Structures” NYSERDA released April 2016. HTTP://www.tcr- us.com/projects.html 18.

• G. Pavlak, G. Henze, and V. Cushing, “Evaluating synergistic effect of optimally controlling commercial building thermal mass portfolios,” Energy, 84 (2015) 161-176.

19.

• J. Mathieu, Modeling, Analysis, and Control of Demand Response Resources, LBNL-5544E (May 2012)

20.

• J. Taft and A. Becker-Dippman, Grid Architecture, PNNL-24044 (January 2015); . Taft, Grid Architecture 2, PNNL-24044 2 (January 2016); J. Taft, Architectural Basis for

Highly Distributed Transactive Power Grids, Frameworks, Networks, and Grid Codes, PNNL – 25480 (June 2016). 21.

• D. Divan, R. Moghe, and A. Prasai. “Power Electronics at the Grid Edge,” IEEE Power Electronics Magazine (December 2014). R. Moghe, D. Tholomier, D. Divan, J

Schatz, and D. Lewis. “Grid Edge Control: A New Approach for Volt-VAR Optimization.” Proceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference (May 2016) . 22.

• A. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (1970).

23.

• D. Malkin and P. Centolella, “Results-Based Regulation: A More Dynamic Approach to Grid Modernization,” Public Utilities Fortnightly (March 2014).

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Paul Centolella President, Paul Centolella & Associates, L.L.C. Senior Consultant, Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich (614) 530-3017 centolella@gmail.com

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