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The future is not guaranteed Th f t i t t d Catherine Donnelly - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The future is not guaranteed Th f t i t t d Catherine Donnelly Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland. http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~cd134/ November 28 2013. Outline Landscape Why buy a life annuity? y y y Alternatives


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Th f t i t t d The future is not guaranteed

Catherine Donnelly Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland. http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~cd134/ November 28 2013.

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Outline

Landscape Why buy a life annuity? y y y Alternatives

Annuity Overlay Fund Group Self-Annuitization Scheme

Comparison

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Landscape

Decline of DB schemes Cost of life annuities Annuity puzzle

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Retirement choices

Drawdown Life annuity Drawdown Life annuity

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Retirement choices

Drawdown Life annuity Drawdown Life annuity Alternatives

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Drawdown (2% p.a.)

$100 Assets $100 Consumption Assets … 65 66 67 Age 85 Consumption 65 66 67 Age 85

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Drawdown (2% p.a.)

$100 Assets $102 $100 $6 Consumption Assets $102 $6 … 65 66 67 Age 85 Consumption 65 66 67 Age 85

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Drawdown (2% p.a.)

$100 Assets $102 $98 $100 $6 $6 Consumption Assets $102 $98 $6 $6 … 65 66 67 Age 85 Consumption 65 66 67 Age 85

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Drawdown (2% p.a.)

$100 Assets $102 $98 $2 81 $100 $6 $6 … Consumption Assets $102 $98 $2.81 … $6 $6 … 65 66 67 Age 85 Consumption 65 66 67 Age 85

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Life annuity (2% p.a.)

$100 Pay insurer With 12% loading over fair value. $100 Consumption Pay insurer … 65 66 67 Age Consumption 65 66 67 Age

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Life annuity (2% p.a.)

$100 Pay insurer With 12% loading over fair value. $100 $6 $6 … >+0 Consumption Pay insurer $6 $6 … … 65 66 67 Age 65+T >+0 Consumption 65 66 67 Age 65+T

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Life annuity (2% p.a.)

$100 Pay insurer With 12% loading over fair value. Fair cost? $100 $6 $6 … Consumption Pay insurer >+0 $6 $6 … … 65 66 67 Age 65+T Consumption >+0 65 66 67 Age 65+T

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Life annuity

$100 Pay insurer Trust? $100 $6 $6 … >+O Consumption Pay insurer … 65 66 67 Age 65+T Changed your mind? Need a lump sum?

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Life annuity

Attractive for some, but not for all. Can people still benefit from sharing mortality risk without buying a life annuity?

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A it l f d Annuity overlay fund

(Donnelly, Guillén, Nielsen 2013)

Alice Bob … Casey Drew y

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Annuity overlay fund Annuity overlay fund (2% p.a.)

$100 Assets Mortality credit Consumption … 65 66 67 Age 85

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Annuity overlay fund Annuity overlay fund (2% p.a.)

$100 Assets $102 Mortality credit $0.78 $6.72 Consumption … 65 66 67 Age 85

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Annuity overlay fund Annuity overlay fund (2% p.a.)

$100 Assets $102 $97.98 $34.91 … Mortality credit $0.78 $0.87 … $6.72 … Consumption $6.72 … 65 66 67 Age 85

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Choose consumption

$100 Assets $102 $94.63 Mortality credit $0.78 $0.85 $10 $50 Consumption … 65 66 67 Age 85

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Leave when you want

$100 Assets $102 $97.98 Mortality credit $0.78 $0.87 E it ith $98 85 $6.72 Consumption Exit with $98.85 65 66 67 Age

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Mortality credit

Death Assets Proceeds Death

  • ccurs

Assets sold Proceeds shared out

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Mortality credit

Proportional to: Instantaneous probability of death x Fund value

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Mortality credit

Alice $100 Bob $300 09:00 12:00 17:00

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Mortality credit

Alice $100 >+0 Bob $300 >+0 09:00 12:00 17:00

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Mortality credit

Alice $100 >+0 q Bob $300 >+0 q 3q 09:00 12:00 17:00

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Mortality credit

Alice $100 >+0 q $10 Bob $300 >+0 q $390 3q 09:00 12:00 17:00

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Mortality credit

Alice $100 q $100 >+0 Bob $300 >+0 q $300 3q 09:00 12:00 17:00

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Mortality credit

Amount and frequency depends on the group. Mortality credit always non-negative for survivors.

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Annuity overlay fund Annuity overlay fund - features

Any heterogeneous group Contribution upon death Actuarially fair at all times

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Annuity overlay fund Annuity overlay fund - implications

Individuals retain investment control Individuals decide how much to consume Split investment from mortality: cost transparency p y

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Numerical experiments

How willing are you to accept the mortality credit volatility? Assume Black-Scholes financial market:

Risk-free interest rate r > 0. Risky asset price dynamics: dSt = μ St dt + σ St dZt

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Numerical experiments

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Numerical experiments

Small Return due to i t t i Return due to t lit i k change in wealth investment in financial market mortality risk sharing

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Numerical experiments

As number of members becomes infinite, Small Return due to i t t i Return due to t lit i k change in wealth investment in financial market mortality risk sharing

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Numerical experiments

As number of members becomes infinite, Instantaneous probability of death Instantaneous probability of death Small Return due to i t t i Return due to t lit i k change in wealth investment in financial market mortality risk sharing

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Numerical experiments

Insurer’s equivalent to infinite fund Cost Cost Small Return due to i t t i Return due to t lit change in wealth investment in financial market mortality pooling

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Numerical experiments

Finite annuity overlay fund: Insurer equivalent to infinite annuity overlay fund: su e equ v e

  • e

u y ove y u d:

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Numerical experiments

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Numerical experiments

25 30

Old Spenders Young savers

15 20 25

Wealth

5 10

W

30 40 50 60 70 80

Age in years

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Numerical experiments

Participants Total number of participants in fund Breakeven costs (% of wealth) Old Spenders 300 <0.5% p.a. Young Savers 300 <0.05% p.a. Young Savers 300 0.05% p.a. Combined portfolio 300 < 0.75% p.a.

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Practical questions

Purpose of the fund? Conditions on fund exit and/or withdrawals? Conditions on investment strategies? Determination of mortality probabilities. y p Asset sales upon death – legal issues/time. Asset valuations – e g illiquid assets Asset valuations e.g. illiquid assets.

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Group self annuitization (GSA) Group self-annuitization (GSA) scheme (Piggott, Valdez and Detzel 2005)

Purpose: provide consumption stream to participants. Similar to a life annuity, without the guarantee.

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GSA

Bob

GSA

Casey Alice

GSA fund

Drew …

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GSA – participant’s view

$100 Pay scheme $100 $6 72 … Consumption Pay scheme $6 72 >+0 $6.72 … … 65 66 67 Age 65+T Consumption $6.72 >+0 65 66 67 Age 65+T

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GSA– scheme perspective

$10 000 Assets $10 200 $9 723 $1 618 $10,000 $667 $662 … $281 Payments out Assets $10,200 $9,723 … $1,618 $667 $662 … … 65 66 67 Age 85 $281 Payments out 65 66 67 Age 85

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GSA

Share mortality risk. Same investment strategy for all participants.

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GSA calculation

For each participant, This year’s consumption payment y p p y = Last year’s consumption payment y p p y x Mortality adjustment Mortality adjustment x Investment return adjustment Investment return adjustment

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GSA calculation

For each participant, This year’s consumption payment y p p y = Last year’s consumption payment

Same

y p p y x Mortality adjustment

Same adjustment for all

Mortality adjustment x Investment return adjustment

participants

Investment return adjustment

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GSA calculation

Adjustments compare actual experience over the year to expected experience over the year

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GSA - features

Any heterogeneous group Contribution upfront: pays consumption stream Not actuarially fair but may be only significant y y y g for highly heterogeneous groups (Sabin 2010, Donnelly 2013).

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GSA - implications

Assets centrally managed Consumption calculation pre-determined Cost transparency

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Quick comparison

Life annuity contract Annuity overlay fund Group self-annuitization (GSA) scheme

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Quick comparison

Life annuity GSA Annuity overlay Who bears mortality risk? Insurer Group Group Mortality pooling?

  • (Indirect)
  • (Direct)
  • (Direct)

Mortality guarantee?

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Quick comparison

Life annuity GSA Annuity

  • verlay

Who bears investment risk? Insurer Individual Individual Investment guarantee?

  • Premium/

contribution paid Upfront Upfront Upon death

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Quick comparison

Life annuity GSA Annuity

  • verlay

Consumption stream?

  • (individual’s

choice) Lump sum

  • withdrawals?

Exit before

  • death?
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Quick comparison

Life annuity GSA Annuity

  • verlay

Costs transparent?

  • Individual

investment control

  • Actuarially fair?

?

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Conclusion

Practical implementation. Further questions: can we share investment risk across time? Challenge: construct robust, transparent, g , p , easy-to-understand pension schemes.

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References

  • Bringing cost transparency to the life annuity market.

By C. Donnelly, M. Guillén and J.P. Nielsen (2013). Working paper.

  • Actuarial fairness and solidarity in pooled annuity funds.

By C. Donnelly (2013). Working paper.

  • The simple analytics of a pooled annuity fund.

By J. Piggott, E.A. Valdez and B. Detzel (2005). Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2(3) 49 20 72(3) 497–520.

  • Fair Tontine Annuity

By M.J. Sabin (March 26, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1579932

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Th k ! Thank you!

Catherine Donnelly Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland. http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~cd134/