The Forgotten Art of Anonymous Digital Cash Jonathan Smuggler Logan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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The Forgotten Art of Anonymous Digital Cash Jonathan Smuggler Logan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Forgotten Art of Anonymous Digital Cash Jonathan Smuggler Logan Before the Chains Blockchain currencies were not the first digital non-government money The past is widely forgotten Im here from the past or from


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SLIDE 1

The Forgotten Art of Anonymous Digital Cash

Jonathan “Smuggler” Logan

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SLIDE 2

Before the Chains

  • Blockchain currencies were not the first digital

non-government money

  • The past is widely forgotten
  • I’m here from the past – or from alternative

reality

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SLIDE 3

Speaking of Money

  • VTS
  • Value
  • Transfer
  • Storage
  • Many moneys of one currency (later...)
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SLIDE 4

System Risks of Digital Money

  • Third party theft, technical / operational risks
  • Lock-in, monoculture
  • Theft by issuer: Account manipulation and
  • verissue
  • Fungibility
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SLIDE 5

Killer Risks

  • Government
  • “Privacy” risks
  • Market

System design is about risks and...

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SLIDE 6

… Function

  • Store of Value vs Settlement / Transfer
  • Many moneys of one currency: Depository, giro,

debt…

  • Movement between functions
  • Blockchain is storage over transfer
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SLIDE 7

DBCs: Transfer Over Storage

  • WHAT??????
  • Digital Bearer Certificates
  • Authority certifies properties
  • Properties: Owner, expiry, amount, currency
  • Like a cheque
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SLIDE 8

DBC Functions

  • Private: Issue. Create new DBC
  • Private: Spend. Destroy DBC (record spent)
  • Public: Reissue. Spend + Issue
  • Public Extras: Split, combine
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SLIDE 9

It’s Easy

  • Properties encoded as string
  • Signed by digital signature algorithm
  • Problem I: Double spend
  • Problem II: Privacy
  • Problem III: Single issuer fraud
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SLIDE 10

Double Spend

  • Record spent DBCs in database, bloom filter,
  • ther probabilistic datastructure
  • Prune storage on signing key rotation
  • Cheap, high throughput, trivial
  • Alternatives: probabilistic reveal, reveal identity
  • n double spend
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SLIDE 11

Privacy

  • Blind unlinkable signatures
  • Signer does not know content of signed message
  • Signer cannot link signed message to signing event
  • Problem: Signer does not know which properties he certifies
  • Solution: Encode properties in signing key
  • Alternative: Probabilistic unblinding
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SLIDE 12

Single Issuer Fraud

  • Meet SCRIT, a Berlin Cryptoanarchist TAZ project
  • Another example of completely over-engineering

the solution for a trivial problem (pay for toilet)

  • Solves the single issuer fraud problem by

distributed, unsynchronized issuers

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SLIDE 13

SCRIT: Spendbook

  • Transaction: (In-DBCs, blind Out-DBCs), Owner-

Signatures, Mint-Signature(s), Blinding parameters

  • E[n] = H(E[n-1]), H(Tx[n])
  • H(In-DBC) → E[n]
  • H(Blinding parameter) → E[n]
  • Result: Idempotent interface, 280 bytes per DBC
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SLIDE 14

SCRIT: Signing

  • Simple rules:

– Reissue iff:

  • DBC unknown or Tx – Hash matched records
  • Signed by self or signed by quorum
  • Quorum: 8 out of 10
  • Issuers only contribute a signature
  • Issuers do not have to synchronize
  • Money creation: Possible only by quorum
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SLIDE 15

SCRIT: Properties

  • No issuers can defraud under quorum
  • Issuers do not have to be synchronized
  • Issuers are self organized by CodeChain
  • FAST: 2k Tx/s (quad core i7), linear scalability
  • CHEAP: 280 bytes storage per DBC, shardable
  • EFFICIENT: Each issuer adds 33 bytes to DBC
  • ANONYMOUS: Unlinkable, untraceable. Anonset is all Tx of signing key
  • HALF OFFLINE: Only one party (or none) needs to be online
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SCRIT: Future

  • Access control language: Atomic swaps, DBC swaps,

deterministic owner generations

  • Super cheap hardware wallets: USB stick on steroids
  • Distributed automated renewal with deterministic access

control

  • Distributed “smart” secret contracts
  • Craaazy…
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SLIDE 17

Crazy: Cypherpunk Dream Come True

  • Trusted computing hardware
  • Remote anonymous attestation
  • Encrypted RAM
  • Verifiable software
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SLIDE 18

Remote anonymous attestation

  • Demonstrate that a remote system is of a

certain type and in a certain state

  • Demonstration is anonymous
  • Currently relies on manufacturer trust
  • Assurance that a remote system is trustworthy
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SLIDE 19

Encrypted RAM

  • All memory is encrypted by a processor

generated ephemeral key

  • Prevents bus sniffing
  • Local secrets are secure against physical

attackers

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SLIDE 20

Verifiable software

  • Mathematic proof of implementation behavior
  • Matches model to implementation
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SLIDE 21

Crazy

  • Verify that a remote host runs exactly one

specific program

  • Verify that local secrets of a remote host are

protected

  • Allows distribution of any software over

anonymous remote hosts

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SLIDE 22

Crazy

  • The future of distributed secure systems might

be much more powerful, innovative, and unpredictable than envisioned today

  • Imagine: Trustworthy cloud backed by DBC
  • micropayments. Anonymous, untracable, fast,

cheap, simple, mobile.

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SLIDE 23

Thank you

  • Twitshit: @TheRealSmuggler
  • Personal: https://opaque.link https://anarplex.net
  • Sponsored by: https://select.cryptohippie.com
  • Send me coins :)
  • Shoutouts: Tatjana Adamov, Frank Braun, Frank

Rieger, Paul Rosenberg