The Fighter Bomber in RAF service A Journey From The Western Desert - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Fighter Bomber in RAF service – A Journey From The Western Desert to Falaise

The Pre-War Doctrinal Position on CAS

RAF Tactical memorandum on air attack in direct support

• f the field force, 1938–39:
• Correctly identified that targets to be attacked were likely to be

‘mobile, small and aware’, but suggested that the light bomber was perfect for the job due to its high speed.

• Blenheim IV, had a top speed of 266 mph, which dropped to below 250

mph with a full bomb load and desert air filters, substantially lower than any of the Axis fighters in the desert.

• Extensive German light Flak, particularly 20-mm and 37-mm multiple

mountings, made light bombers prohibitively vulnerable to anti- aircraft fire below 6,000 ft.

• Light bomber crews at 6,000 ft found it impossible to identify ground

signals less than 15 ft across – how can they reliably hit small, mobile targets by level bombing from this altitude or higher.

• Report identifies correctly that close support aircraft would be

required to operate in the presence of enemy fighters. In response, it recommended light bombers operating singly rather than in formation and carrying a single rearward-firing machine-gun for defence.

Theory Doesn’t Work in Practice for Light Bombers

• Light Bombers ineffective against Afrika Corps after initial

successes against Italian Army.

• Desperately vulnerable without close fighter escort.
• During Operation Crusader – a major British offensive in

November 1941 – the average response time by bomber squadrons to calls for air support was three hours.

• Complex machines with comparatively poor reliability.
• 17 October 1941: six Blenheim IVs dropped 5,750lbs of

bombs on a ‘perfect convoy target’, destroying a grand total of two lorries and damaging an armoured car. Too inaccurate.

• RAF report on lessons learned in the Western Desert

between August 1940 and February 1941: ‘the 250 lb bomb has a poor destructive effect against solid structures and is almost useless against ammunition dumps due to low weight of explosive filling’.

• Too inaccurate for use on vehicles, too light for use against

structures and area targets.

Practice and Desperation Trump Theory for Fighters

RAF doctrine at the start of the desert campaign was clear that fighters were to be used only for gaining and maintaining air

• superiority. Prohibition(!) on ground strafing in place.
• No. 73 Squadron starts experimenting with ground strafing
• n own initiative from January 1941.
• April 1941, Air Marshal Arthur Tedder suggests that

fighters be used to machine-gun enemy transport columns in a desperate attempt to slow the Axis advance during retreat from Rommel’s advance.

• June 1941, after failure of Battleaxe RAF directive issued

reaffirming that fighters are to be used in the air superiority role and using them for ground attack is inevitably to draw them away from main issue.

• BUT RAF fighters are totally outclassed vs Bf-109-E7 and F

series until Spitfires arrive in Mid-1942 except at low altitudes.

• First Hurricane squadron fitted with bomb racks Nov 1941.
• Battlefield situation forces Coningham’s hand…

Fighter-Bomber Comes of Age in the Nick of Time

• On 28 May 1942, as the fighting around Gazala intensified,

Coningham orders all his fighters to fly below 6,000 ft and concentrate on close air support and interdiction.

• Coningham wrote privately that he thought ‘asking fighter-

pilots to fly below 6,000 ft and submit to unmolested attack from above is asking a very great deal’.

• But later writes that loss rates and morale levels in fighter-

bomber squadrons were much better than he expected and that ‘the success of the fighter-bomber has been quite phenomenal’.

• Post Gazala, Coningham asks that all Hurricanes be

permanently fitted with bomb-racks and more to be sent from Britain, despite their obsolescence.

• He also demanded that all Kittyhawks be equipped with

bomb-racks that could be fitted or discarded quickly between sorties, depending on the task required.

• July 1942, Middle East Headquarters: ‘conservative

estimates, based on the experience of the last month’ that a squadron of twelve Kittyhawk fighter-bombers could reliably destroy around 525 motor transports per week.

A Word on Cannon-Hurricanes and Tank Busting…

Crucial Fighter-Bomber Traits

• Self Defence. Can Operate Unescorted!
• Much more responsive than bomber squadrons. Can operate

further forward, fly more sorties, can self-escort

• Interdiction to suppress enemy movement behind the lines.

Persistent presence: Germany Prisoner Microphones: “our whole unit was exhausted and at the end of our tether from RAF machine-gunning attacks”, “British aircraft seem to be able to do what they like without interruption; infantry receive no fighter support when strafed”

• Flexible.
• Forces Luftwaffe to come down and fight on RAF’s terms or allow

them to inflict unacceptable damage. ‘Functional Air Superiority’.

• Excellent use of obsolescent fighter resources.
• More efficient than light bombers.

Fighter-Bomber vs Light Bomber Efficiency (Bombs Delivered/Person/Day)

Limitations over Italy

• Italy is not primarily a campaign of

movement.

• Much more cover, both vegetation and
• terrain. Weather often awful.
• Need to attack strongpoints means much

denser AAA.

• Stronger Luftwaffe presence at times.
• Still highly effective and sought after!
• Rockets starting to be used regularly.
• Spitfire not the best fighter-bomber.

Hunting over Normandy

• Operational surprise means German

Army forced to move by day

• Less useful during Bocage actions,

but presence of smoke shells allows them to provide valuable support

• Proximity of forces makes level

bombers very dangerous instruments

• Primary effect – shutting down

German road and rail movement by

• day. Invaluable
• Typhoon an excellent platform and

a match for 109 and 190 below 15,000ft

Questions