The Challenges of Homegrown Radicalisation to the Alliance Thanks - - PDF document

The Challenges of Homegrown Radicalisation to the Alliance Thanks for the invitation. My name is Raffaello Pantucci and I am Director of International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) in London. I have written a book on the history of jihadism in the UK, authored a number of policy papers and peer reviewed articles on jihadist threats, as well as numerous media articles, and have served as an advisor to a number of Alliance governments in various capacities looking at threats related to violent Islamist terrorism. Am going to focus today on the homegrown terrorist threat from violent Islamist movements like ISIS or al Qaeda to the west in particular. This may be strange to an institution like NATO which is focused very much on foreign threats, but the thread is that homegrown is almost invariably linked with abroad. While we may be seeing a growing detachment of the directed threat between what is going on in faraway countries and what we are seeing happen at home, the activity at home does not happen in a vacuum and is responsive to what is going on abroad. Events abroad will enhance the threat at home – for example, it is very difficult to predict how current events in Gaza will enhance the threat at home. What does this mean? And what does this mean for NATO? I will offer a presentation in three parts – first, an analysis of how the threat picture is evolving at home and abroad; second, some thoughts on what needs to be done to deal with these problems; and third, where NATO in particular might fit into this picture. First – we need to understand how the threat picture is evolving. At home: we continue to see radicalised young men and women seeking to take up arms against their native countries. Some seek to travel to foreign battlefields. Others stay home and launch attacks. The motivations for why these people join are for the most part quite broad and drawing on many different deeply personal motivations. WHO? The broad trends in who joins has not changed that much over time. In the main the constituency involved is young men, but what we have seen is a growth in the very young making active choices to be involved in terrorist plots, women and girls, and the phenomenon of adults actively radicalising youth in their care – either their own children in some cases, or others children over whom they have responsibility. Recent cases in Italy and the UK pointed to this particular sort of activity. WHAT MOTIVATES THEM? The rationale for why people participate in such radical activity is complicated. Repeated studies and surveys show a multiplicity of different reasons. A general perception or sense

• f injustice in the world provides the driving ideological motivation: an injustice about which

nothing is being done which the individual needs to go and do something about. This injustice is usually seen in the Muslim world, and is framed within a broader context of a clash of civilizations that is going on across our planet. We, the west, are standing idly by while oppressive regimes in the Muslim world abuse their people or care little while Muslims are dying in far flung corners of the world. You then have to dig down into individual motivations which are even harder to pry apart. Some are drawn by the millenarian narratives that groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda espouse. They truly believe what these groups are saying, and believe they are playing a part in a bigger picture building towards God’s greater glory. Some are motivated to participate in ISIS state-building activity – they see a perfect world being created and want to go and participate in it. Others are motivated by the thrill of going to a battlefield or participating in clandestine activity. Others are following relations, close friends or local leaders. Others are criminally inclined and see the terrorist group as offering them a useful cover to continue their activity. Others become involved because they meet others who are active and they are intrigued – had they never encountered the radicalised individuals they would never have been motivated to participate. In many ways one could say there are as many motivations as there are people. This is what makes it so hard to developed a uniform tailored response – there is no single motivation and sometimes across regions there are clashes in motivations. For example, those I have listed so far are for the most part drawn from mine and others research looking at the phenomenon in the west. RUSI recently undertook some research looking at the phenomenon of radicalisation amongst Central Asian labour migrants and found that monetary incentives for going to participate were a real issue. WHAT ARE THEY DOING? Going to fight – this is the aspect which has transfixed our collective attention for the past few years. The battlefield in Syria and Iraq turned what had been a fringe phenomenon into an almost mainstream activity that drew in young idealists from around the world. The numbers attracted to Syria and Iraq eclipsed previous conflicts. The ease with which people could get to the battlefield and the low threshold for entry into a group like ISIS meant that what previously was quite challenging became very easy. However, it is important to also note that this is a phenomenon which is way down – while there is still some evidence of some individuals seeking to get to Syria and Iraq, there are others seeking other battlefields (Libya, Southeast Asia most prominently, but also places like Egypt or the Horn of Africa), the numbers have fallen precipitously. Coming home – the bigger concern at the moment is the fear that some of those might be coming back home. Having been indoctrinated and joined ISIS or al Qaeda on the battlefield, they might now be sent back home with murderous intent. And while we have seen this – the Paris attacks of November 2015 being the most prominent example, the reality is that this has not emerged to the degree that might have been expected. Similarly, the flow of people back has not been as expected. Some of the women and children have sought to come home, and there has been a trickle back, but at the same time

Attempting terror attacks – directed back, yes, but limited. More instigated, inspired, self- starting with at best loose connections to organized groups. Previous waves of plotting had clear links to groups and networks – and this remains an issue, but the nature of these links has changed. The sort of plotting we saw on September 11, the London or Madrid bombings, or even the Paris attack on the Bataclan, is far less observable that what we saw in the past. Looking at the UK context alone, we are seeing many more plots now that we have in the past – both in terms of actual attempted plots or prevented ones. Of course consideration needs to be borne in mind about the fact that our security services are now looking for more plots and have more resources. This will of course have an impact on the volume that they find. In addition, the nature of the terrorist plotting we see now is so broad and simple, it means authorities find themselves having to disrupt things at an ever earlier moment. If all you need is a knife and car, both tools most of us have in their daily lives, the trip wires that authorities are looking for to disrupt plots become much harder to look out for. Similarly, what constitutes a target has gone from being very obvious, to becoming much broader and more random. Isolated individuals and large crowds at all sorts of random

• events. This means authorities will pounce earlier. This means that it can sometimes be hard

to discern a specific plot from a set of arrests. It also means disrupted plots can show up as different forms of criminal activity as the plot itself is not easily presentable in court. What are the plots we are seeing though? Broadly four primary threats that shape the terrorist activity we see at the moment:

• 1. Directed plots – this is the biggest concern. Repeated studies have shown how

terrorist plots that are directed by individuals who have attended training camps or received specific instructions in person are more menacing than other forms of

• plotting. This is security services big concern. Big plots coordinated with multiple

trained actors.

• 2. Instigated – this is the next step along in this which is something that has been

supercharged by the nature of how we all communicate these days. People form relationships online which to the individual are as intense and real as off-line

• relationships. This has been used by terrorist plotters to direct attacks remotely to

some success. A few prominent individuals in Europe were central to this activity and can be directly linked to numerous plots around the world – Rachid Kassim in the Francophone world or Junaid Hussain in the English-speaking one. Through the use

• f multiple communications platforms they manipulate and persuade people to try

to launch attacks at home. What is key here is the zero cost to the terrorist group – this is something they can do with little to no effort and can result in plots that cause death and enhance group prestige and power. It does not, however, as strategic as was once considered.

• 3. Inspired – this is the next level along where we have isolated individuals or small

cells latching on to an ideology and choosing to do something in advance of it without receiving any specific direction or instruction. In this category we see individuals who are mentally unbalanced, or individuals who have no particular clear link to a network. Often, these are people attracted by the loud and public noise that we see around ISIS or al Qaeda activity as a way of affiliating themselves to a public

cause giving their act greater meaning. It is often very unclear that they have received any direction or communication, though in some cases, they do appear on the fringes of online or offline communities.

• 4. Blocked travellers – this is a growing problem which is only going to get more

substantial as time goes on. As we prevent more people from our countries going to fight abroad, what happens to them at home. You then have people who have the ideological inclination and motivation to go and participate in foreign fighting, but at the same time are now frustrated from doing that. The ideological motivation or underlying anger does not go away, and arguably it is now enhanced. Pair this with ISIS and al Qaeda’s exhortations to launch attacks wherever you can with whatever tools you can find, and you have quite a toxic combination which can express itself in

• plots. We have a case working its way through British courts at the moment which

exactly highlights this sort of problem. Supporting others – Finally, there is the supportive activity to terrorist networks that we see people doing. This takes many different forms. It can be a case of people promoting ideologies as preachers in their local communities, or disseminating extremist material

• nline. It can be through fundraising, either through fake charities, fraud (in many different

forms), other criminal activity or more blatant fund raising drives. It can be in terms of providing equipment and sustenance to those who are trying to travel to foreign battlefields, or looking the other way when they see someone they know moving towards conducting terrorist activity. And much more. This constitutes often the biggest volume of terrorist activity that you see in the west, and is often what people are arrested for. Often we see that this sort of activity can constitute entryism into more dangerous terrorist

• activity. So people start in support networks and over time can be persuaded to be more

active. ABROAD Looking instead abroad and how the threat is maturing, with a specific link to how this ties back home – I will briefly provide an overview of the nature of the threat we see in different locations and try to focus on the aspect which ties it directly back to the threat in Alliance countries. The driving thrust in discussions around the threat in these foreign locations is how it might return home. I will further break this down into two broad groups – ISIS and al Qaeda. ISIS – it is still not clear whether ISIS is principally a Levantine or global threat. By which I mean it is clearly a global threat, but is it an organization that cares more about the Levant as its goal and target (as in a mostly Syrian/Iraqi motivated group) or does it specifically care about its global reach or is the global merely to enhance the prestige and draw attention to its ultimate goals in the Levant? At the moment this is still coming into focus. Levant – in the Levant, it is clearly receding to some degree. It has melted back into the civil war in Syria to be one of the actors on the ground in a tumultuous civil conflict. In Iraq, it has given up territory and gone back into the deserts and mountains – in much the same way that al Qaeda in Iraq did in the wake of the Sahwa uprising in the late 2000s. In many

ways it appears to be going dormant here waiting for the appropriate moment to step up

• nce again. The core threat from ISIS to the west will likely emanate from here given the

groups core ideology being from here, there still being numerous foreign fighters here, and an anger on the ground about the west’s failure to support the defeat of the Assad regime

• r helping an Iraqi regime perceived to be anti-Sunni.

Afghanistan – it the current foreign field of greatest concern. The ongoing conflict, ungoverned spaces and long history of militancy all mean that the group has been able to increase its presence on the ground. We have seen some foreign fighter flows heading to the country, crossing through Iran, or the Caucasus/Central Asia to reach Afghanistan, but this seems quite a limited flow at the moment. The danger is that the group might reconstitute in some form here and it become a launch pad for attacks elsewhere. Libya – from a European perspective, this has been the most alarming given the proximity. We have also seen successful attacks emanate from here – for example the Manchester bombing last year. But it seems that the group has struggled to control territory and the various factions in Libya are not always that welcoming to such a disruptive force. It is a concern, but one which maybe has not turned out to be as menacing as was expected. North Africa (Tunisia, Egypt) – the region more broadly is of equal concern, especially when we consider the numbers of foreign fighters from Tunisia who went to fight in Syria/Iraq and the numbers of attacks we have seen in the country and the flows of people going out from

• there. Similarly, what is going on in Egypt in terms of crackdown or the instability in the

Sinai continues to produce dangerous and effective attacks in Egypt and it is always worth remembering the degree to which al Qaeda was fostered from very dangerous Egyptian networks But it is not clear that this poses a threat back to the west in the same sort of way, and directed plots from there seem limited at the moment. Balkans – is a perennial concern. Left-over groups from the 1990s have provided a useful backbone for foreign fighter networks, and transit through the country was quite common in early days of the conflict. Weapons from the region continue to show up in terrorist plots. But the question is to what degree do we see a threat emanating outward from these countries – plots with links back there have been found, but is it just a refuelling and transit point, or is it the source of the threat. Thus far, it does not seem to metastasized into the source of the threat. Philippines/Southeast Asia – the incidents in Marawi last year surprised everyone and showed a threat which could abruptly surprise. But it seems very local. From a western perspective, the danger is of people travelling there, or people using relatively lax visa regimes through the countries to mask travel elsewhere. The region becoming a source of training camps is of concern, but westerners would stand out making you question the degree to which it would be useful as such a staging point. Central Asia – as the conflict in Syria/Iraq winds down, more fighters are going to return home to these regions. Local issues that drive radicalisation remain a concern, but for the most part it seems as though people head through the region to Afghanistan. While we have seen a growing number of Central Asians showing up in terrorist activity around the

world (Stockholm, Istanbul, New York, St Petersburg) it is not clear how much this is linked to Central Asia, rather than Central Asians being involved in international networks – and also it is not always clear that these individuals have recent links back to Central Asia proper. Horn of Africa (Somalia) – finally, ISIS here seems a very ill-formed being which is struggling to distinguish itself from al Shabaab or others in the region. The reason to highlight is that there are a few foreigners who are involved with this group – German and British networks have links with a number of prominent individuals here. This all means it is a threat to be aware of, rather than necessarily being a huge focus of attention. Online world – the issue here is ISIS fostering enough of an identity in the online space to be able to supplant its failures in the offline space. In other words, the ideology can continue to live and grow online while the group fails in the offline world, but when it is able to rebuild in the offline world, it use its online footprint to magnify this once again and once again abruptly grow. However, repeated offline failures will start to complicate the shelf-life of this world. Al Qaeda – the group’s main interest at the moment seems to be focusing on rebuilding its brand and focusing on its efforts abroad. Plots linked to al Qaeda in the west have been more limited than what we have seen before. The effort seems focused on reconstituting itself with a substantial footprint in Pakistan (where it is still hiding), South Asia more generally – with a particular effort to reclaim the conflict in Kashmir. On the battlefield in Syria it is struggling to control its narrative, losing an ability to control groups there while they continue to focus on the battlefield. In Yemen it continues to be player with significant

• capability. And finally in East and West Africa it has substantial networks and prominent

individuals who are able to project local threats with great menace. Very little evidence of targeted efforts against the west at the moment though. Finally – worth bearing in mind that there are countries which may be further destabilized

• r abruptly shocked by events. Turkey stands out of potential concern (backflow or off-flow

from the conflict in Syria), but worry about some Gulf powers. The Arab Spring took everyone by surprise, and arguably the problems that fostered it have not gone away. Egypt could take a turn for the worst and surprise everyone. Second – what do we need to do about this? Counter-Terrorism Building up and improving coordination amongst security forces. Intelligence is still complicated and we need better coordination. Improving local capacity in third countries along the way – countries do not always have a history of dealing with such problems, so getting police forces stood up to respond effectively.

Spreading understanding of the problem amongst a broader range of actors – if we are seeing more people with mental health issues showing up in plots, maybe we need to increase awareness of the problem amongst mental health workers and invest more in mental health. But need to be careful of securitization (very understandable push back from education or mental health practitioners). Countering Violent Extremism Identifying causes and drivers on the ground and formulating a response that is context

• specific. Understand the milieu in which radicalisation in taking place.

Focusing on the governance issues which often underlie the problems and how to address

• them. This is very difficult as you are often judging countries – but the reality is that an
• verly aggressive and oppressive security response can make the problem worse.

Understand better the mobilization process in different contexts and focus on disrupting

• that. Either through strategic communications, more active disruption or steering people off

dangerous paths. Third – what is NATO’s potential role? Focus on battlefields already engaged in – Afghanistan, Somalia, etc. Rather than leap to new ones. They are already very complicated – focus limited resources on what are already doing, and boosting its effectiveness. Stay consistent and engaged. Help re-build institutions. They are often the root of the problem. Spread training and thinking about CVE in locations where have privileged relationships (Balkans, etc). Advance best practice in coordination – the Alliance has a strong history of sharing intelligence and information to some degree and creating fusion cells and joint commands. Help bring this best practice around the coalition and maybe some lessons learned for non- military forces. Push for greater collection and dissemination of data – battlefield threats, people, methodologies, always useful for security services. Man on trial now in UK whose fingerprints were found on an IED in Afghanistan. Conclusion  Threat is becoming more diffuse.  Threat in the west is becoming more homegrown.  Threats abroad are not going away – may just be taking time down. Long time horizon these groups have, we need to consider that while also striking a balance against making sure we do not warp our societies in response.