Chair of Network Architectures and Services Department of Informatics Technical University of Munich
Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens for trustworthy - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens for trustworthy - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Chair of Network Architectures and Services Department of Informatics Technical University of Munich Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens for trustworthy communication in cyber-physical systems Intermediate talk for the Masters
Motivation
Problem statement by example
- Cars communicating via ad-hoc networks
- Received data impacts traffic behavior
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 2
Motivation
Problem statement by example
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 3
Solution Proposal
Integrity Token Enable vehicles, cyber-physical systems or generic entities to sign their data
- Similar to a certificate issuance process
- Attestation of integrity and trustworthiness of the entity
- Issue generic integrity token as integrity proof towards peers
- Generalize process as much as possible
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Solution Proposal
Research Questions Q1 How can multiple collaborators work together in order to verify the validity of an entity? Q2 How can the necessary data for such an attestation be exchanged in a generic and secure manner? Q3 How is the distributed integrity data maintained to have a scalable solution? Q4 How can the privacy of entities be ensured despite public verification? Q5 What can we do to ensure the integrity of the validating system itself?
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Solution Proposal
Requirements R1 Offline Integrity Check R2 Multi-Party Authorization R3 Permissioned System R4 Process Tracing R5 Privacy R6 Distributability
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Solution Proposal
Related Work
- Related work on traditional PKI utilizing DLT exists [7, 1]
- Previous work at the Chair targets two specific scenarios:
- PKI in the DFN (Deutsches Forschungsnetz, German Research Network) [3, 6]
- Configuration Management for Networked Devices [2, 5, 4]
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Solution Proposal
Related Work
- Related work on traditional PKI utilizing DLT exists [7, 1]
- Previous work at the Chair targets two specific scenarios:
- PKI in the DFN (Deutsches Forschungsnetz, German Research Network) [3, 6]
- Configuration Management for Networked Devices [2, 5, 4]
→ solutions are highly domain-specific and cannot be adapted to new environments (e.g. automotive systems) → Good: Some of the concepts can be adapted
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 7
Solution Proposal
Design
Distributed Ledger Platform
(e. g. Hyperledger Fabric) Node1 {} Node2 {} Node3 Node4 Node5 {} Entity1 Entity2 Entity3
Proxy Administration
Data Storage Approver1 Approver2 Approver3
different thesis
Signer1 Signer2 Signer3
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 8
Solution Proposal
Process
Ledger – Assets for one process run
Approvers Signers
Entity1
Proxy
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 9
Solution Proposal
Process
Ledger – Assets for one process run
Approvers Signers
Entity1
Proxy
r1
pending
event
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 9
Solution Proposal
Process
Ledger – Assets for one process run
Approvers Signers
Entity1
Proxy
r1
pending
a1
event
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 9
Solution Proposal
Process
Ledger – Assets for one process run
Approvers Signers
Entity1
Proxy
r1
pending
a1
event
enough approvals?
✗
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 9
Solution Proposal
Process
Ledger – Assets for one process run
Approvers Signers
Entity1
Proxy
r1
pending
a1 a2
event
enough approvals?
✗
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 9
Solution Proposal
Process
Ledger – Assets for one process run
Approvers Signers
Entity1
Proxy
r1
approved
a1 a2 a3
event
enough approvals!
✓
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 9
Solution Proposal
Process
Ledger – Assets for one process run
Approvers Signers
Entity1
Proxy
r1
finished
a1 a2 a3 t1
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 9
Solution Proposal
Process
Ledger – Assets for one process run
Approvers Signers
Entity1
Proxy
r1
finished
a1 a2 a3 t1
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 9
Solution Proposal
System Integrity Research questions Q5 asks what we can do to ensure the integrity of the system itself.
Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 10
Solution Proposal
System Integrity Research questions Q5 asks what we can do to ensure the integrity of the system itself.
- Analysis of attack vectors on the system
V1 Hardware or system software V2 Network communication V3 DLT framework V4 DLT participants V5 Business logic V6 External components
System Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 10
Solution Proposal
System Integrity Research questions Q5 asks what we can do to ensure the integrity of the system itself.
- Analysis of attack vectors on the system
- Suggestions for mitigations per vector
- Multi-party authorization on multiple levels
V1 Hardware or system software V2 Network communication V3 DLT framework V4 DLT participants V5 Business logic V6 External components
System Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 10
Solution Proposal
System Integrity Research questions Q5 asks what we can do to ensure the integrity of the system itself.
- Analysis of attack vectors on the system
- Suggestions for mitigations per vector
- Multi-party authorization on multiple levels
- Critical: Business Logic (Chaincode)
- Using tools for static analysis [8]
- Unit tests aiming for high coverage
- Use- and misuse-cases
V1 Hardware or system software V2 Network communication V3 DLT framework V4 DLT participants V5 Business logic V6 External components
System Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 10
Status
Current state and progress Currently in implementation phase:
- Implementation using Hyperledger Fabric
- Starting from scratch with most recent Fabric version
- done: Chaincode implementation of features for standard operation
- todo: Unit testing and other system integrity measures
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Timeline
Deadline
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Problem analysis Precise definition of requirements Studying previous and related work Design of the solution concept Setup of a test network Implementation Conducting a case study Writing the thesis
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Bibliography
[1]
- L. Axon. and M. Goldsmith.
PB-PKI: A Privacy-aware Blockchain-based PKI. In Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications – Volume 6: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2017), pages 311–318. INSTICC, SciTePress, 2017. [2]
- V. J. Hauner.
Trustworthy Configuration Management with Distributed Ledgers. Master’s thesis, Technische Universität München, 2018. [3]
- J. F. Hoops.
A Tamper-Proof Certificate Issuance Process Based on Distributed Ledger Technology. Bachelor’s thesis, Technische Universität München, 2018. [4]
- H. Kinkelin, V. Hauner, H. Niedermayer, and G. Carle.
Trustworthy configuration management for networked devices using distributed ledgers. CoRR, abs/1804.04798, 2018. [5]
- M. Müller.
Trustworthy and Tamperproof Configuration Management for Networked Devices. Masters’s thesis, Technische Universität München, 2019. [6]
- J. G. Roos.
Modelling Organizational Structures for a Distributed Ledger-Based Federated Certificate Managment System. Bachelor’s thesis, Technische Universität München, 2019. [7]
- A. Yakubov, W. M. Shbair, A. Wallbom, D. Sanda, and R. State.
A blockchain-based PKI management framework. In NOMS 2018 – 2018 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium, pages 1–6, April 2018. [8]
- K. Yamashita, Y. Nomura, E. Zhou, B. Pi, and S. Jun.
Potential Risks of Hyperledger Fabric Smart Contracts. In 2019 IEEE International Workshop on Blockchain Oriented Software Engineering (IWBOSE), pages 1–10, Feb 2019. Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 13
Discussion
Distributed Ledger Platform
(e. g. Hyperledger Fabric) Node1 {} Node2 {} Node3 Node4 Node5 {} Entity1 Entity2 Entity3
Proxy Administration
Data Storage Approver1 Approver2 Approver3
different thesis
Signer1 Signer2 Signer3 Christoph Rudolf — Tamper-resistant creation of integrity tokens 14