T ARGET : YOU! Theyre hacking us, the employees. LinkedIn: A - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
T ARGET : YOU! Theyre hacking us, the employees. LinkedIn: A - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Y U: T HE T ARGET Kurt Willey Beth Tinsman T ARGET : YOU! Theyre hacking us, the employees. LinkedIn: A reconnaissance map to . . . company hierarchies. Email: a way to inject a virus inside the organizaGon network, bypassing the
TARGET: YOU!
“They’re hacking us, the employees.” “LinkedIn: A reconnaissance map to . . . company hierarchies.” “Email: a way to inject a virus inside the
- rganizaGon network, bypassing the company
- firewall. Personal email at work: beKer yet.”
“Your personal gadget: A new route into corporate systems.”
A FEW TERMS
OMG I’M IN THE WRONG PRESENTATION!
- Virus
- APT (advanced
persistent threat)
- Malware
- Social Engineering
- Trojan
- Botnet
- 0 day
A FEW MORE TERMS
OMG I’M IN THE WRONG PRESENTATION!
- Hack, Hacker, Hacked
- Black Hat, White Hat
- PenetraGon TesGng
(ethical hacking)
- PCI Scan (payment
card industry): ecommerce
TARGET: YOU
Not if but when.
- Advanced persistent threat. How many here
have had credit cards replaced?
- ADacks are fast and plenty. Avoiding them
all is nearly impossible.
- Financially beneficial. Hackers keep trying
unGl successful.
TARGET: YOU
Hacking is easy.
- 80 – 90% of successful breaches of
corporate networks required only the most basic techniques.
- Styx Pack (Crimeware)
TARGET: YOU
It’s not personal. It’s business.
- Rustock botnet: 30 billion messages per day, 1
million infected computers
- Russia/Estonia - $9.4 million stolen from more
than 2,100 ATMs across at least 280 ciGes around the world in less than 12 hours
TARGET: YOU
It’s not personal. It’s business.
- Banner ads looking to
recruit malware engineers give a rate of between $2,000 and $5,000 a month.
COUNTRY
- MIN. ANNUAL
WAGES, 2012 Estonia $4,923 Brazil $4,172 Russia $1,794 Moldova $595
WHAT DAMAGE ARE THEY DOING?
- Stealing resources, not just data
- Lily-pad and Spear Fishing
– Davenport Schools
- Espionage
– Closed bids hacked by compeGtor
- Id
Iden enGty Th y Thef ef
- Fin
Finan ancial cial Crime Crime
WHAT DAMAGE ARE THEY DOING?
- Na\onal examples
- Local examples
– UMB (insider threats) – Stolen bank credenGals via a – Schnuck’s trojan/keylogger – Marshall’s – Proxy server – Sony – Spam botnet – EMC
- Virus
- Valid credenGals
– Payroll informaGon
MORE ABOUT WHO
Profit without blame: write it and sell it
– Windows XP exploit typically sells for $50-$150k – Exploit kits: once underground, now public links
MORE ABOUT WHO
Gov’t. vs. Gov’t.
– US Chamber of Commerce (China) – Stuxnet (Iran)
MORE ABOUT WHO
Criminal Ac\vity
– Poland, Russia, the “stans” – Organized crime connecGons – IT interest and limited job opportuniGes
WHY AREN’T OUR SYSTEMS SECURE?
Time and People
– Takes Gme to implement, and technology changes quickly – Mistakes happen – Inconvenient to users – RepeGGve tasks get boring – Resistant to change
WHY AREN’T OUR SYSTEMS SECURE?
- Poli\cal not technical
– OrganizaGonal effort is required
- Expensive
– ROI - spend more than the compeGtor – TesGng and implemenGng – Difficult to measure non-occurrence
- Distributed and Diffused
WHO’S IN CHARGE?
The role of Informa\on Technologist
– Responsible for coordinaGon, evaluaGon, governance and integraGon – Backups – Support (talking the language) – Part of the team to idenGfy data, not solely responsible
WHO’S IN CHARGE?
- Data is owned by the producing department!
- IT does not have complete authority
– They have a supporGng role in how data moves through the organizaGon.
OBJECTIVES
- Security Life Cycle
– Security Analysis – Impact Analysis – Asset Exposure – Risk Analysis – Risk MiGgaGon – Security Review
STRATEGY
Security Analysis
– What do you have that is desirable? – Where is located and who has authority? – What is at risk if that informaGon falls outside the
- rganizaGon?
QUALITATIVE Risk Analysis and Safeguarding Also, classificaGon and quanGtaGve methods
TOP ACTIONS
1
Applica\on Whitelis\ng
– Built into Windows 7 (UlGmate and Enterprise) – ApplicaGon-aware firewall – Third-party applicaGons
- Bundle with your AnG-Virus
TOP ACTIONS
2/3 Patch and Stay Up to Date (counts as two!)
– 75% of aKacks use publicly known vulnerabiliGes in commercial sofware that could be prevented by regular patching – Systems – Sofware
TOP ACTIONS
Restrict administra\ve privileges
4
TOP ACTIONS: CHALLENGES
Applica\on Whitelis\ng
– Webinars – Once/year or single use apps – New technology – Slows systems – False posiGves
TOP ACTIONS: CHALLENGES
Keeping Up To Date
– Systems – Sofware
- Maintenance windows
- ApplicaGons may fail to run post-patch
- Time
- Expensive
TOP 4 ACTIONS: CHALLENGES
Restrict administra\ve privileges
– Restricts customizaGon – No new applicaGons – Support
GOVERNANCE
- If you can’t measure it you can’t manage it!
– StaGsGcs – Training – Outliers, Logs, Reports, Baselines, Audits
- low and high
- one-offs
- Policy
- 85% of breaches took months to be discovered
– the average Gme is five months
ACTIONS IN-DEPTH
- Know your data, systems,
and sohware – Inventory, risks, responsible parGes
- Control admin access
- Log
– Web – File access – System event logs – System process logs
- Filter
– Web (in and out) – Email – ApplicaGon control
- Training
ACTIONS IN-DEPTH
- An\virus
- Two factor authen\ca\on
- Automa\on and Reports
- Intrusion Preven\on
- DLP
- Security Assessment (at
the end) to validate – aka “audit”(self, CPA, IT companies) – Password audits – Wireless audits – Social Engineering
ACTIONS RESOURCES
- SANS 20 CriGcal Security Controls
- Australian Government Department of Defense
Top 35 MiGgaGon Strategies
- NIST SP 800-53; Recommended Security
Controls for Federal InformaGon Systems and OrganizaGons
ACTIONS RESOURCES
- What to do if you’ve been hacked?
– Call in the pro’s (your IT staff, us, etc.) – Keep a chain of custody – Find out if the breach is sGll open – Stop the bleeding – Find out what they stole – Figure out who you must tell
Qu QuesG esGon
- ns?