SLIDE 1
@suitpossum brettscott@fastmail.com The Future accor ccording to - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
@suitpossum brettscott@fastmail.com The Future accor ccording to - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
@suitpossum brettscott@fastmail.com The Future accor ccording to Finte ding to Fintech Finte Fintech h 1: 1: Auto utoma mate the te the use user-exp xper erien ience ce lay layer er Finte Fintech h 1: 1: Auto utoma mate the
SLIDE 2
SLIDE 3
SLIDE 4
SLIDE 5
SLIDE 6
The Future… accor ccording to Finte ding to Fintech
SLIDE 7
Finte Fintech h 1: 1: Auto utoma mate the te the use user-exp xper erien ience ce lay layer er
SLIDE 8
Finte Fintech h 1: 1: Auto utoma mate the te the use user-exp xper erien ience ce lay layer er
SLIDE 9
Finte Fintech h 1: 1: Auto utoma mate the te the use user-exp xper erien ience ce lay layer er … or add new layers on top
SLIDE 10
Fin Finte tech h 2: 2: Aut utom
- mate
te finan financia cial l pr prof
- fes
ession sionals als
SLIDE 11
Fint Fintec ech h 3: 3: Fu Fuse se it it all all with with IoT IoT (non (non-hu human man age gent nts) s)
SLIDE 12
The he INTERNE INTERNET T OF OF FUL FULLY Y AUT UTOMA OMATE TED D CA CAPIT PITAL ALISM ISM Aut utoma
- mation
tion of
- f la
labo bour ur + + Aut utoma
- mation
tion of
- f ma
mana nage gemen ment t + + Aut utoma
- mation
tion of
- f e
excha hang nge
SLIDE 13
A note on hacker culture & the drive to re-decentralise or re- humanise digital infrastructures
SLIDE 14
Open Public Blockchain 1.0 A means for an open network of strangers to keep track
- f their positions relative to each other,
without a (clearly identifiable) central intermediary, Players (theoretically) possess equal rights in the system
SLIDE 15
SLIDE 16
SLIDE 17
SLIDE 18
SLIDE 19
SLIDE 20
SLIDE 21
What does decentralisation actually mean?
SLIDE 22
SLIDE 23
Open Public Blockchain 2.0 A means for an open network of strangers to keep track
- f their positions relative to each other, and to
automate certain interactions with each other (‘smart- contracts’) without a (clearly identifiable) central intermediary Players (theoretically) possess equal rights in the system
SLIDE 24
SLIDE 25
SLIDE 26
Bank Banks an s and op d open en cr crypto yptocu curren ency y syste systems ms
SLIDE 27
A digital information recording, management, coordination and contracting architecture Limited ‘fusion’ into the material world unless via 1) legal system or 2) Internet of Things integration
SLIDE 28
Closed Private Blockchains A means for a closed network of (loosely) associated parties to keep track of their positions relative to each other, and to automate certain interactions with each other, by coming together under a mutually agreed shared infrastructure rather than relying on finding ways to make their separate infrastructures interact. Potential for different or unequal rights in the system
SLIDE 29
Reducing the vision to
SLIDE 30
Fin Finte tech h 4: 4: Aut utoma
- mate
te co co-or
- rdin
dinatio tion n for
- r efficiency & cost-
saving (profit optimisation)
SLIDE 31
SLIDE 32
SLIDE 33
SLIDE 34
SLIDE 35
SLIDE 36
SLIDE 37
SLIDE 38
SLIDE 39
SLIDE 40
Open blockchain governance
SLIDE 41
SLIDE 42
SLIDE 43
Initial ‘legislation’: A pioneer group of developers propose & (collaboratively) develop an initial protocol
SLIDE 44
‘Executive branch’: The protocol is a set of rules – a hard-coded ‘bureaucracy’ – but it relies upon validators (e.g. miners) to activate it. Similarities with a ‘civil service’ who maintain the execution of the system
SLIDE 45
‘Citizens’: Non-expert users then use this infrastructure. While it might be very useful and empowering to them, they have little say in running it
SLIDE 46
‘Judiciary’ and arbitration? ‘Mathematical law’ thought impossible to break + very few initial processes for resolving disputes, or no processes
SLIDE 47
Subsequent ‘legislation’ 1: Old developers and newer developers then propose changes, using informal processes to debate, collaborate or compete
SLIDE 48
Subsequent ‘legislation’ 2: Large and small validators can act as a type of ‘technocratic parliament’, who can choose to go along with changes, or reject
- them. Larger players arguably have a ‘veto’ power
SLIDE 49
Some formalised institutions appear to mediate in this, or influence the process, but no initial written constitution that sets out powers of different parties. ‘Constitution’ is informal and established by precedent and convenience. Certain formal institutions can emerge for proposing changes
SLIDE 50
Hard-coded protocol maintained by an (uncoordinated) executive, combined with a lack of clear legislation processes results in the primary political option for users being ‘exit’: If you don’t like it you can leave
SLIDE 51
This is fine if leaving is actually a meaningful option (or if you have skills to fork the open source code), but in the context of network effects (lock-in) you risk creating user groups with no voice, dependent on a platform they have little say in. This is not unique to blockchain – we find this in centralised platforms like Uber etc.
SLIDE 52
Existing blockchain community often implicitly endorse two approaches to blockchain governance: either very rigid codified ‘civil law’ (‘incorruptible’), or a more malleable yet technocratic ‘common law’ (‘flexible’). Exemplified in the Ethereum fork debate: Ethereum Classic represents the former, and Ethereum – arguably – represents the latter
SLIDE 53