Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds Andrew Weir University of Massachusetts Amherst aweir@linguist.umass.edu ESSLLI StuS University of Opole, August 15th 2012
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Modeling the epistemic condition Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion Introduction I investigate the properties of English some paired with singular NPs. This triggers an epistemic effect: ‘speaker doesn’t know which NP is the witness’ (1) Some file on this computer is infected, but I don’t know which one/#namely, this one here. In some cases, though, the epistemic effect is different: ‘speaker knows which NP is the witness, but not what kind of NP it is’ (2) Some plant is growing through the wall of my room. I propose a semantics for some , following Alonso-Ovalle & Men´ endez-Benito 2010b (AM)’s analysis of Spanish alg´ un as containing an ‘anti-singleton’ presupposition on its prejacent NP, to capture both these readings. Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Modeling the epistemic condition Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion (Initial) generalization A speaker uses some NP to signal that they cannot identify which member of NP is the intended referent. (3) Some file on this computer is infected, but I don’t know which one/#namely, this one here. Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Modeling the epistemic condition Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion Counterexamples Cases where you clearly can ‘point out’ the intended referent: (4) (adapted from Alonso-Ovalle & Men´ endez-Benito 2003) [We are at an after-conference social event. Suddenly, we see someone – whom we haven’t seen before, but from whose age we can guess is a professor – dancing on a table.] — Some professor is dancing the lambada on the table! You might even know the name: (5) [As above, but the professor is wearing a namebadge.] — Some professor called Thaddeus Q. Smythe is dancing the lambada on the table! Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Human/thing split Modeling the epistemic condition Differentiation condition Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion ‘Human/thing’ split Some , however, seems very sensitive to whether its NP complement is a human or a ‘thing’. (6) a. Some professor is dancing the lambada! b. I saw some guy hanging about outside. (7) a. ??Some statue is in the middle of the square. [looking at it] b. ??I saw some building on my way through the desert. c. ??There’s some letter in my mailbox. [looking at it] Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Human/thing split Modeling the epistemic condition Differentiation condition Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion About ‘knowing who/what’? There are lots of means of ‘knowing who’ (Bo¨ er & Lycan 1986, Aloni 2001): knowing a name, knowing someone’s job, knowing what they’re doing here. . . Maybe there are just many more such ways for people than for things? However, even when ‘things’ do bear more means of ‘knowing’ than are normal for ‘things’, this still seems inaccessible for ‘some’ For example, ‘don’t know the name’ can license ‘some’ for people, but this is much less easy for things, even things with names Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Human/thing split Modeling the epistemic condition Differentiation condition Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion About ‘knowing who/what’? Two diplomats from Peru are delegates to a conference you are at. One is a man and one a woman. You see them both several times, and know that they’re both from Peru, but never catch their names. (8) At dinner, I was sat across from a/some delegate from Peru. You are lost. You know the town you’re in has only two squares in it, but you don’t know their names. You keep coming across both. You can tell them apart because one has a fountain and the other doesn’t, but you can’t see any street signs. You end up in the fountainless one. Your friend phones you: (9) A: Where are you? B: I’m in a/?#some square in the city. Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Human/thing split Modeling the epistemic condition Differentiation condition Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion Epistemic conditions on some It seems as if the condition on some with things is simpler than with humans. (10) Differentiation condition on ‘some NP’ A speaker uses some NP thing to signal that she could not, if presented with the extension of NP, reliably differentiate the witness of the existential claim from everything else in the extension of NP. No claim is made in the above with respect to the names of things, or other conditions – just one’s ability to distinguish the witness of the claim from other things in the extension of NP. Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some AM: alg´ un and antisingleton constraints Modeling the epistemic condition Anti-singleton constraint in English Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion Modeling the epistemic condition Alonso-Ovalle & Men´ endez-Benito 2010b (AM)’s proposal for Spanish alg´ un (11) � alg´ un � = λ f � et , et � λ P � e , t � λ Q � e , t � : antisingleton ( f ) . ∃ x [ f ( P )( x ) & Q ( x )] A generalized quantifier which first combines with a subset selection function f (Schwarzschild 2002) f restricts the domain P to some subset AM’s suggestion: alg´ un imposes a presupposition that f may not restrict the domain to a singleton set Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some AM: alg´ un and antisingleton constraints Modeling the epistemic condition Anti-singleton constraint in English Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion Anti-singleton constraint on alg´ un (AM) (12) a. John is hiding in un room of the house (namely the kitchen). b. ∃ x . f ( � room of the house � )( x ) & � John is hiding in � ( x ) f can narrow � room of the house � down to a singleton set; compatible with the speaker knowing which room John is in. (13) a. John is hiding in alg´ un room of the house (#namely the kitchen). b. ∃ x . f ( � room of the house � )( x ) & � John is hiding in � ( x ) Presupposition: antisingleton ( f ) f cannot narrow � room of the house � down to a singleton set: by saying alg´ un , speaker signals that she cannot specify which room of the house satisfies the existential claim. Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some AM: alg´ un and antisingleton constraints Modeling the epistemic condition Anti-singleton constraint in English Some and subkinds Further work/conclusion Anti-singleton constraint in English Preliminary move: we can take over the definition of alg´ un to English some , at least when it combines with non-human NPs. (14) � some � = λ f � et , et � λ P � e , t � λ Q � e , t � : antisingleton ( f ) . ∃ x [ f ( P )( x ) & Q ( x )] Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Data Modeling the epistemic condition Extending the analysis Some and subkinds Unitary definition for some Further work/conclusion But what about these examples? (15) a. I saw some contraption in the copy room this morning. b. I came home to find some plant growing through a hole in my wall. c. [What’s in that bottle?] Some adhesive that John uses to put his models together. In all of these cases, the differentiation condition is satisfied; you would be able to distinguish the contraption, plant, adhesive that is the witness of the claim. Why is some licensed in the above examples? Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Data Modeling the epistemic condition Extending the analysis Some and subkinds Unitary definition for some Further work/conclusion Subkinds Intuitively, the lack-of-knowledge being signaled in this examples concerns the subkind in question. (16) a. I saw some kind of contraption. . . b. I found some kind of plant . . . c. It’s some kind of adhesive . . . . . . but I don’t know what kind. Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
Introduction Epistemic conditions on some Data Modeling the epistemic condition Extending the analysis Some and subkinds Unitary definition for some Further work/conclusion Modeling the epistemic condition on subkinds If the ‘differentiation’ condition on subkinds is the same as with things, then we can model it with the same antisingleton constraint. (17) A speaker says some NP subkind to signal that she cannot restrict to a singleton the set of subkinds within the extension of NP to which the witness of the existential claim belongs. Andrew Weir Some , speaker knowledge, and subkinds
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