Simulating Income Tax Reforms in the Netherlands with MICSIM - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

simulating income tax reforms in the netherlands with
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Simulating Income Tax Reforms in the Netherlands with MICSIM - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Simulating Income Tax Reforms in the Netherlands with MICSIM Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Introduction CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker 2 / 39 Simulating income


slide-1
SLIDE 1

Simulating Income Tax Reforms in the Netherlands with MICSIM

Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Introduction

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 2/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Introduction

  • Simulating tax-benefit reform is core business at CPB
  • Business has been good in recent years
  • We simulate budgetary, redistributional and employment effects
  • Our analyses play a key role during e.g. election times, for

coalition agreements and ‘everyday’ policymaking

  • The Netherlands is currently gearing up for a major tax reform

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 3/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-4
SLIDE 4

The MICSIM project

  • Goal: build an evidence based and integrated microsimulation

model for the analyses of tax-benefit reform in the Netherlands

  • Two key elements:
  • 1. Evidence based: bigger, better and more recent empirical base for

behavioural responses

  • 2. Integrated: generates all the relevant output in one run

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 4/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-5
SLIDE 5

The MICSIM model

  • MICSIM – A behavioural microsimulation model
  • Key components
  • 1. Advanced tax-benefit calculator for taxes and premiums at the

individual and household level

  • 2. Aggregation over households to get to nationwide totals
  • 3. Behavioural model for participation in persons and hours, labour

productivity and formal childcare

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 5/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-6
SLIDE 6

Output of MICSIM

  • With one push on a button we now have
  • 1. Budgetary effects ex ante
  • 2. Redistributional effects ex ante
  • 3. Effects on labour participation, in persons and hours, labour

productivity and formal childcare

  • 4. Knock-on effects for the government budget
  • Integrates previous analyses with MIMOSI and MIMIC, and with a

much better empirical base

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 6/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Outline of the talk

  • Key findings empirical analysis
  • Illustrate relevance with policy simulations
  • Lessons for tax reform

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 7/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Key findings empirical analyses

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 8/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Key findings empirical analysis

  • Labour supply responses women much lower than in the past
  • Large differences in responses across demographic groups
  • Response mostly on decision to participate, not hours per week
  • Price elasticity formal childcare higher
  • Model does a good job at predicting behavioural responses of

past reforms

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 9/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Employment-to-population rate women

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

%

Netherlands United States United Kingdom Germany France Sweden Norway Spain

Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 10/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Usual weekly hours employed women

10 20 30 40 50 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Hours per week

Netherlands United Kingdom Germany France Sweden Norway Spain

Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 11/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-12
SLIDE 12

The elasticities they are a-changin’

  • Measure responsiveness of labour participation by the so-called

labour supply elasticity

  • Labour supply elasticity = % change in hours worked / % change

in wages

  • Significant drop in labour supply elasticity of women since the ’80s

◮ Theeuwes and Woittiez (1992) studies from the ’80s: 1.0 ◮ Evers et al. (2008) studies from the ’80s and ’90s: 0.5 ◮ Jongen et al. (2014) data late ’00s: 0.10 (no kid) – 0.45 (young kids)

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 12/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-13
SLIDE 13

... continued

  • A similar pattern is observed for the US

◮ Blau and Kahn (2007): 1980 0.77-0.88, 2000 0.36-0.41 ◮ Heim (2007): finds even stronger decline

  • What to expect for the future?

◮ Blau and Kahn (2007): increase in participation levels off ◮ Euwals et al. (2014): NL same story ◮ Blau and Kahn (2007): drop elasticity levels off as well

(comparing drop 1980 → 1990 with drop 1990 → 2000)

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 13/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Large differences in behavioural responses

  • We uncover large differences between demographic groups
  • In particular for women
  • Differences between singles and couples
  • Differences between households with and without children
  • Differences by age of the youngest child

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 14/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Men in couples indeed rather unresponsive

0,00 0,05 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,25 0,30 0,35 0,40 0,45 0,50 no children 0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs 12-17 yrs 18+ yrs

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 15/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Large differences for women in couples

0,00 0,05 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,25 0,30 0,35 0,40 0,45 0,50 no children 0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs 12-17 yrs 18+ yrs

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 16/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Large differences singles and single parents

0,00 0,05 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,25 0,30 0,35 0,40 0,45 0,50 no children 0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs 12-17 yrs 18+ yrs

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 17/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Cross effect wage wife on hours husband small

  • 0,25
  • 0,20
  • 0,15
  • 0,10
  • 0,05

0,00 0,05 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,25 no children 0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs 12-17 yrs 18+ yrs

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 18/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Cross effect wage husband on hours wife large

  • 0,25
  • 0,20
  • 0,15
  • 0,10
  • 0,05

0,00 0,05 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,25 no children 0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs 12-17 yrs 18+ yrs

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 19/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Effect on participation bigger than on hours per week (example: women in couples)

0,00 0,05 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,25 0,30 0,35 0,40 0,45 0,50 no children 0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs 12-17 yrs 18+ yrs Total Participation Hours per week

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 20/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-21
SLIDE 21

Price elasticity of formal childcare higher

  • Ooms et al. (2003)

◮ Price elasticity daycare: –0.2

  • Jongen, De Boer and Dekker (2104)

◮ Price elasticity daycare: –0.4 ◮ Price elasticity out-of-school care: –0.4

  • Consistent with large drop in childcare following budget cuts
  • Substitution between formal and informal care important

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 21/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-22
SLIDE 22

Validation of the structural model

  • We estimate so-called structural models: policy invariant ’deep’

parameters of preferences over e.g. income and leisure

  • Necessary if we want to study effects of new policies
  • Natural question to ask: how well does the model predict

behavioural responses of past reforms?

  • Check key behavioural responses with treatment–control studies
  • 1. Reform of childcare and in-work benefits for parents
  • 2. Reform of in-work tax credit for single parents
  • 3. Changes in marginal tax rates of the 2001 reform
  • Model predicts behavioural changes very well!

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 22/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-23
SLIDE 23

Back to MICSIM

  • We put all of this knowlegde in our simulation model
  • We then simulate all the relevant output of counterfactual policies
  • Show you some results next
  • But good to make a few remarks on what MICSIM is not first

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 23/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-24
SLIDE 24

What MICSIM is not

  • Not a lifecycle model (need additional data and dynamic model)
  • Not a general equilibrium model (small open economy, long run)
  • No explicit modelling of frictions

◮ De Boer (2014): explicitly accounts for involuntary unemployment ◮ Makes little difference, when unemployment is close to the long

run value (not now)

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 24/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-25
SLIDE 25

Policy simulations

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 25/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-26
SLIDE 26

Policy simulations

  • Illustrate relevance empirical findings with some policy simulations
  • 1. Small effects of marginal tax rates
  • 2. Larger effects of welfare benefits and in-work tax credits
  • 3. Large effects subsidies for working young mothers
  • 4. But beware the knock-on effects for childcare subsidies
  • Present simulation results for 2014
  • However: results should be interpreted as long run responses!
  • Some key numbers on slides, see Jongen et al. (2014) for details

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 26/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-27
SLIDE 27

Small effects of reducing marginal tax rates

  • Example: reduce the third bracket rate
  • For 1.5 billion euro we get just ≈ +4 thousand FTE
  • Why?

◮ Increases mostly incentive for men in couples to work more hours,

but they are rather unresponsive, especially in hours per week

◮ Cross-effect on the wife: work less when the household gets richer

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 27/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-28
SLIDE 28

Larger effects welfare benefits & in-work tax credits

  • Reducing welfare benefits (Bijstand) has a large effect
  • Cutting benefits by 0.5 bln euro we get ≈ +40 thousand FTE
  • Why?

◮ Targets the participation decision ◮ Targets the responsive group of single parents

  • Note: recall that these are long run responses

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 28/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-29
SLIDE 29

Larger effects welfare benefits & in-work tax credits

  • Increase the in-work tax credit (Arbeidskorting) for workers up to

40 thousand euro

  • For 1.5 billion euro we get ≈ +10 thousand FTE
  • In between 3rd bracket and welfare benefits, why?

◮ Also targets the participation decision ◮ But many people work, and less targeted at single parents

  • Note: increases participation of low productive workers

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 29/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-30
SLIDE 30

Large effects for income dependent in-work tax credit for young mothers

  • Increase the in-work tax credit for secondary earners and single

parents with children up to 12 years of age (ICK)

  • Increase in-work tax credit more for those that earn more
  • For 0.5 bln euro we get ≈ +11 thousand FTE
  • Large effect, why?

◮ Targets the elastic group of young mothers ◮ Also gives incentives to work more days per week

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 30/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-31
SLIDE 31

Beware the knock-on effects of childcare subsidies

  • Increase childcare subsidies, proportional drop in parental fee
  • For 0.5 bln euro we get ≈ +13 thousand FTE
  • Large effect, why?

◮ Also targets the elastic group of young mothers ◮ And also gives incentives to work more days per week

  • Catch: substitution to formal care drives up budgetary costs

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 31/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-32
SLIDE 32

Overview

Simulation Third Welfare In-work IWTC Childcare bracket benefits tax credit ‘mothers’ subsidies Impulse (bln euro) + 1.5 –0.5 +1.5 +0.5 +0.5 Inequality (Gini)

∆ %

+0.63 +0.56 –0.30 –0.01 –0.01 FTE (x1000)

+4 +40 +10 +11 +13 Labour product.

∆ %

+0.02 –0.10 –0.09 –0.04 –0.03 Knock-on effect % imp. +7 +132 +1 +7 –60

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 32/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-33
SLIDE 33

Lessons for tax reform

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 33/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-34
SLIDE 34

No unique optimal tax system

  • There is no unique optimal tax system
  • Depends on your social preferences for

◮ Vertical equity ◮ Horizontal equity ◮ Labour participation in persons or hours ◮ Labour participation by skill type

  • But for given social preferences interesting to consider which

elements you really need and how you have to set the parameters to maximize social welfare

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 34/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-35
SLIDE 35

Suppose that we want to stimulate LS in hours

  • Reducing marginal tax rates will only have a small effect
  • Reducing the participation tax via lower benefits or higher in-work

tax credits more promising

  • Study the most effective phase-in and phase-out of in-work tax

credits for hours worked and the government budget

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 35/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-36
SLIDE 36

Income support for families with children

  • Interesting to study the efficient income support for single parents

(what will the 2015 reform do?)

  • Dito for couples with children
  • The role of tagging by age of the youngest child

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 36/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-37
SLIDE 37

A big thank you!

Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 37/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-38
SLIDE 38

Many thanks also go to!

  • The scientific sounding board
  • The policymakers sounding board
  • Statistics Netherlands for constructing the dataset
  • The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for co-financing

the construction of the dataset and the empirical research

  • The Ministry of Finance for hosting this workshop!

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 38/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014

slide-39
SLIDE 39

The shop is open for business again

Thank you for your attention!

Questions or comments: E.L.W.Jongen@cpb.nl

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 39/39 Egbert Jongen Henk-Wim de Boer Peter Dekker Simulating income tax reform | MICSIM Workshop, November 2014