Short Paper: WifiLeaks: Underestimated Privacy Implications of the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

▶
short paper wifileaks underestimated privacy implications
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Short Paper: WifiLeaks: Underestimated Privacy Implications of the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dec 30, 2022 272 likes •720 views

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion Short Paper: WifiLeaks: Underestimated Privacy Implications of the ACCESS WIFI STATE Android Permission Jagdish Prasad Achara, Mathieu Cunche, Vincent Roca, and

slide-1
SLIDE 1

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Short Paper: WifiLeaks: Underestimated Privacy Implications

  • f the ACCESS WIFI STATE Android Permission

Jagdish Prasad Achara, Mathieu Cunche, Vincent Roca, and Aur´ elien Francillon

WiSec’14, Oxford, UK

July 25th, 2014

1 / 17

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Android Permission System

Location Internet etc. Accounts Contacts Application

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Android Permission System

Location Internet etc. Accounts Contacts Application permissions

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Android Permission System

Location Internet etc. Accounts Contacts Application permissions 145 Permissions

slide-5
SLIDE 5

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Android Permission System

Location Internet etc. Accounts Contacts Application permissions 145 Permissions Network

  • Internet
  • Access wifi
  • etc.

Location

  • Fine location
  • Mock location
  • etc.

etc. (Nature-based classification)

slide-6
SLIDE 6

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Android Permission System

Location Internet etc. Accounts Contacts Application permissions 145 Permissions Network

  • Internet
  • Access wifi
  • etc.

Location

  • Fine location
  • Mock location
  • etc.

etc. (Nature-based classification) Normal

  • Access wifi
  • Access network
  • etc.

etc. (Protection level-based classification) Dangerous

  • Fine location
  • Coarse location
  • etc.

2 / 17

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Effectiveness of Android Permission System

  • Poor understanding [Felt et. al. SOUPS’12]
  • Private Information retrieval without any permission [Zhou et. al.

CCS’13]

  • Privatae Information: Geolocation, Identity etc.

[Felt et. al. SOUPS’12] A. P. Felt, E. Ha, S. Egelman, A. Haney, E. Chin, and D. Wagner. Android permissions: User attention, comprehension, and behavior. SOUPS ’12, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM. [Zhou et. al. CCS’13] X. Zhou, S. Demetriou, D. He, M. Naveed, X. Pan, X. Wang, C. A. Gunter, and K.

  • Nahrstedt. Identity, location, disease and more: Inferring your secrets from android public resources. In ACM CCS

2013.

3 / 17

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Effectiveness of Android Permission System

  • Poor understanding [Felt et. al. SOUPS’12]
  • Private Information retrieval without any permission [Zhou et. al.

CCS’13]

  • Privatae Information: Geolocation, Identity etc.

[Felt et. al. SOUPS’12] A. P. Felt, E. Ha, S. Egelman, A. Haney, E. Chin, and D. Wagner. Android permissions: User attention, comprehension, and behavior. SOUPS ’12, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM. [Zhou et. al. CCS’13] X. Zhou, S. Demetriou, D. He, M. Naveed, X. Pan, X. Wang, C. A. Gunter, and K.

  • Nahrstedt. Identity, location, disease and more: Inferring your secrets from android public resources. In ACM CCS

2013.

3 / 17

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

The case of ACCESS WIFI STATE permission (1)

Permission description displayed to users

  • Required to access raw Wi-Fi data
  • Group [2]: ‘Network’
  • Protection level [1]: ‘Normal’

Looks innocuous at first glance!

[1] http://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission_group.html [2] http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/permission-element.html

4 / 17

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

The case of ACCESS WIFI STATE permission (2) In fact, it looks innocuous but it is not!

It is known that:

  • Raw Wi-Fi data: A source of sensitive information

1 Surrounding Wi-Fi APs → Approximate user location 2 Wi-Fi MAC address → A unique device identifier 3 Configured Wi-Fi APs → Travel history and Social links [1] 4 Connected Wi-Fi APs and time → Points of interests

[1] M. Cunche, M.-A. Kaafar, and R. Boreli. Linking wireless devices using information contained in wi-fi probe

  • requests. Pervasive and Mobile Computing, 2013.

5 / 17

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

The case of ACCESS WIFI STATE permission (2) In fact, it looks innocuous but it is not!

It is known that:

  • Raw Wi-Fi data: A source of sensitive information

1 Surrounding Wi-Fi APs → Approximate user location 2 Wi-Fi MAC address → A unique device identifier 3 Configured Wi-Fi APs → Travel history and Social links [1] 4 Connected Wi-Fi APs and time → Points of interests

[1] M. Cunche, M.-A. Kaafar, and R. Boreli. Linking wireless devices using information contained in wi-fi probe

  • requests. Pervasive and Mobile Computing, 2013.

5 / 17

slide-12
SLIDE 12

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

The case of ACCESS WIFI STATE permission (2) In fact, it looks innocuous but it is not!

It is known that:

  • Raw Wi-Fi data: A source of sensitive information

1 Surrounding Wi-Fi APs → Approximate user location 2 Wi-Fi MAC address → A unique device identifier 3 Configured Wi-Fi APs → Travel history and Social links [1] 4 Connected Wi-Fi APs and time → Points of interests

[1] M. Cunche, M.-A. Kaafar, and R. Boreli. Linking wireless devices using information contained in wi-fi probe

  • requests. Pervasive and Mobile Computing, 2013.

5 / 17

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

The case of ACCESS WIFI STATE permission (2) In fact, it looks innocuous but it is not!

It is known that:

  • Raw Wi-Fi data: A source of sensitive information

1 Surrounding Wi-Fi APs → Approximate user location 2 Wi-Fi MAC address → A unique device identifier 3 Configured Wi-Fi APs → Travel history and Social links [1] 4 Connected Wi-Fi APs and time → Points of interests

[1] M. Cunche, M.-A. Kaafar, and R. Boreli. Linking wireless devices using information contained in wi-fi probe

  • requests. Pervasive and Mobile Computing, 2013.

5 / 17

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

The case of ACCESS WIFI STATE permission (2) In fact, it looks innocuous but it is not!

It is known that:

  • Raw Wi-Fi data: A source of sensitive information

1 Surrounding Wi-Fi APs → Approximate user location 2 Wi-Fi MAC address → A unique device identifier 3 Configured Wi-Fi APs → Travel history and Social links [1] 4 Connected Wi-Fi APs and time → Points of interests

[1] M. Cunche, M.-A. Kaafar, and R. Boreli. Linking wireless devices using information contained in wi-fi probe

  • requests. Pervasive and Mobile Computing, 2013.

5 / 17

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Motivation/Goals

As this permission seems exploitable, two questions raised:

1 Do users understand the implications of this permission?

  • i.e., what is the user perception of this permission?

2 Is this permission already being exploited by Apps?

  • i.e., what is the current situation on Google PlayStore?

6 / 17

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Motivation/Goals

As this permission seems exploitable, two questions raised:

1 Do users understand the implications of this permission?

  • i.e., what is the user perception of this permission?

2 Is this permission already being exploited by Apps?

  • i.e., what is the current situation on Google PlayStore?

6 / 17

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Survey Description

  • A total of 156 users answered
  • Diffused through social media and mailing-lists
  • Composed of 12 questions divided into 3 parts:

1 Demographic info 2 User attitude towards privacy and his experience on Android 3 User perception of the ACCESS WIFI STATE permission

7 / 17

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

A digest of Survey Results

5.63 ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 6.85 CHANGE_WIFI_STATE 5.81 ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 7.86 ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 9.16 READ_CONTACTS 2 4 6 8 10

1 Less risky than other permissions (like Geoloc)! 2 Privacy implications (geolocation, travel history) are not well

understood

  • Less than half know about geolocalization!
  • Less than half know about device unique identifier!
  • Only 35% know about previously visited locations!

8 / 17

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

A digest of Survey Results

5.63 ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 6.85 CHANGE_WIFI_STATE 5.81 ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 7.86 ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 9.16 READ_CONTACTS 2 4 6 8 10

1 Less risky than other permissions (like Geoloc)! 2 Privacy implications (geolocation, travel history) are not well

understood

  • Less than half know about geolocalization!
  • Less than half know about device unique identifier!
  • Only 35% know about previously visited locations!

8 / 17

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Application Analysis: Overview

First Step: Permission analysis through crawling [1]:

  • # of Apps: 2700 Apps (100 * 27 categories)
  • Results: 41% Apps request ACCESS WIFI STATE

Second Step: 998 APKs requesting this permission are downloaded for:

1 Static analysis 2 Dynamic analysis (only 88 Apps are chosen based on static analysis

results)

[1] https://github.com/egirault/googleplay-api

9 / 17

slide-21
SLIDE 21

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Application Analysis: Overview

First Step: Permission analysis through crawling [1]:

  • # of Apps: 2700 Apps (100 * 27 categories)
  • Results: 41% Apps request ACCESS WIFI STATE

Second Step: 998 APKs requesting this permission are downloaded for:

1 Static analysis 2 Dynamic analysis (only 88 Apps are chosen based on static analysis

results)

[1] https://github.com/egirault/googleplay-api

9 / 17

slide-22
SLIDE 22

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Application Analysis: Overview

First Step: Permission analysis through crawling [1]:

  • # of Apps: 2700 Apps (100 * 27 categories)
  • Results: 41% Apps request ACCESS WIFI STATE

Second Step: 998 APKs requesting this permission are downloaded for:

1 Static analysis 2 Dynamic analysis (only 88 Apps are chosen based on static analysis

results)

[1] https://github.com/egirault/googleplay-api

9 / 17

slide-23
SLIDE 23

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Static Analysis: Technique

  • Custom tool (on top of Androguard [1])
  • Analysis: Methods of WifiManager class [2]
  • 3 privacy-sensitive methods:

1 getScanResults(): List of surrounding Wi-Fi APs 2 getConnectionInfo(): Connected AP Info + Wi-Fi MAC 3 getConfiguredNetworks(): SSIDs of previously connected APs

[1] https://code.google.com/p/androguard/ [2] http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/wifi/WifiManager.html

10 / 17

slide-24
SLIDE 24

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Static Analysis: Technique

  • Custom tool (on top of Androguard [1])
  • Analysis: Methods of WifiManager class [2]
  • 3 privacy-sensitive methods:

1 getScanResults(): List of surrounding Wi-Fi APs 2 getConnectionInfo(): Connected AP Info + Wi-Fi MAC 3 getConfiguredNetworks(): SSIDs of previously connected APs

[1] https://code.google.com/p/androguard/ [2] http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/wifi/WifiManager.html

10 / 17

slide-25
SLIDE 25

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Static Analysis: Technique

  • Custom tool (on top of Androguard [1])
  • Analysis: Methods of WifiManager class [2]
  • 3 privacy-sensitive methods:

1 getScanResults(): List of surrounding Wi-Fi APs 2 getConnectionInfo(): Connected AP Info + Wi-Fi MAC 3 getConfiguredNetworks(): SSIDs of previously connected APs

[1] https://code.google.com/p/androguard/ [2] http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/wifi/WifiManager.html

10 / 17

slide-26
SLIDE 26

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Static Analysis: Technique

  • Custom tool (on top of Androguard [1])
  • Analysis: Methods of WifiManager class [2]
  • 3 privacy-sensitive methods:

1 getScanResults(): List of surrounding Wi-Fi APs 2 getConnectionInfo(): Connected AP Info + Wi-Fi MAC 3 getConfiguredNetworks(): SSIDs of previously connected APs

[1] https://code.google.com/p/androguard/ [2] http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/wifi/WifiManager.html

10 / 17

slide-27
SLIDE 27

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Static Analysis: Technique

  • Custom tool (on top of Androguard [1])
  • Analysis: Methods of WifiManager class [2]
  • 3 privacy-sensitive methods:

1 getScanResults(): List of surrounding Wi-Fi APs 2 getConnectionInfo(): Connected AP Info + Wi-Fi MAC 3 getConfiguredNetworks(): SSIDs of previously connected APs

[1] https://code.google.com/p/androguard/ [2] http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/wifi/WifiManager.html

10 / 17

slide-28
SLIDE 28

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Static Analysis: Technique

  • Custom tool (on top of Androguard [1])
  • Analysis: Methods of WifiManager class [2]
  • 3 privacy-sensitive methods:

1 getScanResults(): List of surrounding Wi-Fi APs 2 getConnectionInfo(): Connected AP Info + Wi-Fi MAC 3 getConfiguredNetworks(): SSIDs of previously connected APs

[1] https://code.google.com/p/androguard/ [2] http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/wifi/WifiManager.html

10 / 17

slide-29
SLIDE 29

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Static Analysis: Results

G A M E T O O L S A P P _ W I D G E T S C O M M U N I C A T I O N P R O D U C T I V I T Y S O C I A L E N T E R T A I N M E N T M E D I A _ A N D _ V I D E O A P P _ W A L L P A P E R M U S I C _ A N D _ A U D I O B U S I N E S S P E R S O N A L I Z A T I O N P H O T O G R A P H Y S H O P P I N G T R A V E L _ A N D _ L O C A L N E W S _ A N D _ M A G A Z I N E S B O O K S _ A N D _ R E F E R E N C E L I F E S T Y L E C O M I C S S P O R T S E D U C A T I O N L I B R A R I E S _ A N D _ D E M O M E D I C A L W E A T H E R T R A N S P O R T A T I O N H E A L T H _ A N D _ F I T N E S S F I N A N C E 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 # of Apps

ConnectionInfo ScanResults ConfiguredNetworks

App category wise distribution

11 / 17

slide-30
SLIDE 30

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Static Analysis: Results

G A M E T O O L S A P P _ W I D G E T S C O M M U N I C A T I O N P R O D U C T I V I T Y S O C I A L E N T E R T A I N M E N T M E D I A _ A N D _ V I D E O A P P _ W A L L P A P E R M U S I C _ A N D _ A U D I O B U S I N E S S P E R S O N A L I Z A T I O N P H O T O G R A P H Y S H O P P I N G T R A V E L _ A N D _ L O C A L N E W S _ A N D _ M A G A Z I N E S B O O K S _ A N D _ R E F E R E N C E L I F E S T Y L E C O M I C S S P O R T S E D U C A T I O N L I B R A R I E S _ A N D _ D E M O M E D I C A L W E A T H E R T R A N S P O R T A T I O N H E A L T H _ A N D _ F I T N E S S F I N A N C E 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 # of Apps

ConnectionInfo ScanResults ConfiguredNetworks

App category wise distribution

11 / 17

slide-31
SLIDE 31

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Static Analysis: Results

able 3: Top 5 third-parties in each category and their corresponding number of applicati ConnectionInfo ScanResults ConfiguredNetworks Third-party # Apps Third-party # Apps Third-party # Apps inmobi.com 74 inmobi.com 9 google.com 10 chartboost.com 55 domob.cn 9 mobiletag.com 4 tapjoy.com 49 mologiq.com 6 lechucksoftware.com 2 vungle.com 47 tencent.com 5 android.com 2 jirbo.com 43 skyhookwireless.com 4 Unibail.com 1

Top 5 third-parties accessing various methods Notions adopted:

  • First-party: App developer,

Third-party: Included libraries

  • class package name != main package name =

⇒ third party

12 / 17

slide-32
SLIDE 32

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Dynamic Analysis: Technique

  • Modification of Android OS to log interesting events...
  • The modification includes methods from:

1 WiFiManager and WifiInfo class 2 Network stack (clear-text or ssl) 3 Data modification APIs (hashes and encryption)

  • Logged events are further analyzed automatically

13 / 17

slide-33
SLIDE 33

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Dynamic Analysis: Results

Info Third-parties First-parties MAC Address appsflyer.com (SSL), revmob.com (SSL), adsmogo.mobi (plain-text), adsmogo.org (plain-text), vungle.com (plain-text), supersonicads.com (plain-text), trademob.net (SSL), sponsorpay.com (SSL), beintoo.com (SSL), adsmogo.com (plain-text), 115.182.31.2/3/4 (plain-text)7, tapjoyads.com (SSL) Not found (B)SSID of connected AP inmobi.com (SSL), 93.184.219.82 (plain-text) Not found Wi-Fi Scan Info inmobi.com (SSL), fastly.net (SSL) badoo.com (SSL), foursquare.com(SSL)

235

Data collection and transmission to third-parties is a reality!

  • MAC Address transmission to third-parties (even in CLEAR!)
  • Wi-Fi Scan info transmission to both first and third-parties

What if I turn off my location to all Apps? = ⇒ Out of luck!

14 / 17

slide-34
SLIDE 34

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Dynamic Analysis: Results

Info Third-parties First-parties MAC Address appsflyer.com (SSL), revmob.com (SSL), adsmogo.mobi (plain-text), adsmogo.org (plain-text), vungle.com (plain-text), supersonicads.com (plain-text), trademob.net (SSL), sponsorpay.com (SSL), beintoo.com (SSL), adsmogo.com (plain-text), 115.182.31.2/3/4 (plain-text)7, tapjoyads.com (SSL) Not found (B)SSID of connected AP inmobi.com (SSL), 93.184.219.82 (plain-text) Not found Wi-Fi Scan Info inmobi.com (SSL), fastly.net (SSL) badoo.com (SSL), foursquare.com(SSL)

235

Data collection and transmission to third-parties is a reality!

  • MAC Address transmission to third-parties (even in CLEAR!)
  • Wi-Fi Scan info transmission to both first and third-parties

What if I turn off my location to all Apps? = ⇒ Out of luck!

14 / 17

slide-35
SLIDE 35

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Dynamic Analysis: Results

Info Third-parties First-parties MAC Address appsflyer.com (SSL), revmob.com (SSL), adsmogo.mobi (plain-text), adsmogo.org (plain-text), vungle.com (plain-text), supersonicads.com (plain-text), trademob.net (SSL), sponsorpay.com (SSL), beintoo.com (SSL), adsmogo.com (plain-text), 115.182.31.2/3/4 (plain-text)7, tapjoyads.com (SSL) Not found (B)SSID of connected AP inmobi.com (SSL), 93.184.219.82 (plain-text) Not found Wi-Fi Scan Info inmobi.com (SSL), fastly.net (SSL) badoo.com (SSL), foursquare.com(SSL)

235

Data collection and transmission to third-parties is a reality!

  • MAC Address transmission to third-parties (even in CLEAR!)
  • Wi-Fi Scan info transmission to both first and third-parties

What if I turn off my location to all Apps? = ⇒ Out of luck!

14 / 17

slide-36
SLIDE 36

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Dynamic Analysis: Results

Info Third-parties First-parties MAC Address appsflyer.com (SSL), revmob.com (SSL), adsmogo.mobi (plain-text), adsmogo.org (plain-text), vungle.com (plain-text), supersonicads.com (plain-text), trademob.net (SSL), sponsorpay.com (SSL), beintoo.com (SSL), adsmogo.com (plain-text), 115.182.31.2/3/4 (plain-text)7, tapjoyads.com (SSL) Not found (B)SSID of connected AP inmobi.com (SSL), 93.184.219.82 (plain-text) Not found Wi-Fi Scan Info inmobi.com (SSL), fastly.net (SSL) badoo.com (SSL), foursquare.com(SSL)

235

Data collection and transmission to third-parties is a reality!

  • MAC Address transmission to third-parties (even in CLEAR!)
  • Wi-Fi Scan info transmission to both first and third-parties

What if I turn off my location to all Apps? = ⇒ Out of luck!

14 / 17

slide-37
SLIDE 37

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Potential Solution

1 Protection of Wi-Fi scan results with location permissions

  • It is currently the case with neighboring cell towers

2 Change of protection level: From ‘Normal’ to ‘Dangerous’ 3 Modification of Permission description

  • Proposal for Improvement: “Allows the app to view information

about Wi-Fi networking. MAC address can be used for user tracking and the list of configured Wi-Fi APs may reveal travel history.”

15 / 17

slide-38
SLIDE 38

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Potential Solution

1 Protection of Wi-Fi scan results with location permissions

  • It is currently the case with neighboring cell towers

2 Change of protection level: From ‘Normal’ to ‘Dangerous’ 3 Modification of Permission description

  • Proposal for Improvement: “Allows the app to view information

about Wi-Fi networking. MAC address can be used for user tracking and the list of configured Wi-Fi APs may reveal travel history.”

15 / 17

slide-39
SLIDE 39

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Potential Solution

1 Protection of Wi-Fi scan results with location permissions

  • It is currently the case with neighboring cell towers

2 Change of protection level: From ‘Normal’ to ‘Dangerous’ 3 Modification of Permission description

  • Proposal for Improvement: “Allows the app to view information

about Wi-Fi networking. MAC address can be used for user tracking and the list of configured Wi-Fi APs may reveal travel history.”

15 / 17

slide-40
SLIDE 40

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Conclusion

  • ACCESS WIFI STATE permission: A source of various user PII
  • Privacy implications of the permission are not well understood
  • 41% applications request this permission
  • Permission exploitation already started:
  • Getting user location without dedicated location permissions
  • For tracking purposes
  • To know users’ points of interests

Solution exists!

16 / 17

slide-41
SLIDE 41

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Conclusion

  • ACCESS WIFI STATE permission: A source of various user PII
  • Privacy implications of the permission are not well understood
  • 41% applications request this permission
  • Permission exploitation already started:
  • Getting user location without dedicated location permissions
  • For tracking purposes
  • To know users’ points of interests

Solution exists!

16 / 17

slide-42
SLIDE 42

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Conclusion

  • ACCESS WIFI STATE permission: A source of various user PII
  • Privacy implications of the permission are not well understood
  • 41% applications request this permission
  • Permission exploitation already started:
  • Getting user location without dedicated location permissions
  • For tracking purposes
  • To know users’ points of interests

Solution exists!

16 / 17

slide-43
SLIDE 43

Introduction User Survey Application Analysis Potential Solution and Conclusion

Thanks for your attention! Questions?

17 / 17