secure computation why how and when
play

Secure&Computation: Why,%How%and%When Mariana Raykova Yale - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Secure&Computation: Why,%How%and%When Mariana Raykova Yale University 12/12/16 1 PMPML Predictive&Model Patient Blood+Count Heart Conditions Digestive+Track Medicine Effectiveness Arrhyt Inflamm Dyspha


  1. Secure&Computation: Why,%How%and%When Mariana Raykova Yale University 12/12/16 1 PMPML

  2. Predictive&Model Patient Blood+Count Heart Conditions Digestive+Track Medicine … Effectiveness Arrhyt Inflamm Dyspha … … … RBC WBC Murmur hmia ation gia A 3.9 10.0 0 0 0 1 1 B 5.0 4.5 1 0 1 2 1.5 C 2.5 11 0 1 1 0 2 D 4.3 5.3 2 1 0 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Given samples ( x 1 , y 1 ), ( x 2 , y 2 ), …, ( x n , y n ) • o x i �� d , y i �� Learn a function f such that f( x i ) = y i • 12/12/16 2 PMPML

  3. Linear&Regression Patient Blood+Count Heart Conditions Digestive+Track Medicine … Effectiveness Arrhyt Inflamm Dyspha … … … RBC WBC Murmur hmia ation gia A 3.9 10.0 0 0 0 1 1 B 5.0 4.5 1 0 1 2 1.5 C 2.5 11 0 1 1 0 2 D 4.3 5.3 2 1 0 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Given samples ( x 1 , y 1 ), ( x 2 , y 2 ), …, ( x n , y n ) • f is well approximated o x i �� d , y i �� by a linear map Learn a function f such that f( x i ) = y i • y i ≈ ! T x i 12/12/16 3 PMPML

  4. Distributed&Data Patient Blood+Count Heart Conditions Digestive+Track Medicine … Effectiveness Arrhyt Inflamm Dyspha … … … RBC WBC Murmur hmia ation gia A 3.9 10.0 0 0 0 1 1 B 5.0 4.5 1 0 1 2 1.5 C 2.5 11 0 1 1 0 2 D 4.3 5.3 2 1 0 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shared database - (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), …, (x n , y n ) do not • belong to the same party 12/12/16 4 PMPML

  5. Horizontally&Partitioned& Database Patient Blood+Count Heart Conditions Digestive+Track Medicine … Effectiveness Arrhyt Inflamm Dyspha … … … RBC WBC Murmur hmia ation gia A 3.9 10.0 0 0 0 1 1 B 5.0 4.5 1 0 1 2 1.5 C 2.5 11 0 1 1 0 2 D 4.3 5.3 2 1 0 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Different rows belong to different parties • o E.g., each patient has their own information 12/12/16 5 PMPML

  6. Vertically&Partitioned& Database Patient Blood+Count Heart Conditions Digestive+Track Medicine … Effectiveness Arrhyt Inflamm Dyspha … … … RBC WBC Murmur hmia ation gia A 3.9 10.0 0 0 0 1 1 B 5.0 4.5 1 0 1 2 1.5 C 2.5 11 0 1 1 0 2 D 4.3 5.3 2 1 0 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Different columns belong to different parties • o E.g., different specialized hospitals have different parts of the information for all patients 12/12/16 6 PMPML

  7. Can&the&parties&holding&the&distributed&data&construct& the&predictive&model&on&the&whole&database& while+ protecting+the+privacy+of+their+inputs? Without+sending+their+own+ data+to+other+parties Without+revealing+more+about+ their+own+inputs+ 12/12/16 7 PMPML

  8. Secure&Computation Alice&and&Bob&want&to&compute&F(X,Y)& without+revealing+their+inputs X Y 12/12/16 8 PMPML

  9. Secure&Computation Secure&computation protocol Y X m 1 m 2 F(X,Y) F(X,Y) Security: the+parties+cannot+learn+ more+than+what+is+revealed+by+the+result 12/12/16 9 PMPML

  10. Secure&Multiparty& Computation&(MPC) f (& .& , .& , .& , .& , . ) C B A f (A,+B,+C,+D,+E) D E Security: the+parties+cannot+learn+ more+than+what+is+revealed+by+the+result 12/12/16 10 PMPML

  11. Applications • Auctions: inputs: bids; output: winner, price to pay o o Sugar beet auction in Denmark, 2008 o Energy trade auctions 12/12/16 11 PMPML

  12. What&Does&and&Does&Not& MPC&Guarantee? Guarantee:+The+computation+does+not+ reveal+more+than+what+the+output+reveals. No+Guarantee: How+much+does+the+output+reveal. Differential+ Privacy 12/12/16 12 PMPML

  13. Security Real World Ideal World F(X 1 ,& … ,&X 5 ) F(X 1 ,& … ,&X 5 ) ≈ Simulator 12/12/16 13 PMPML

  14. Adversarial&Models Adversary&behavior: SemiMhonest – corrupt&parties& • follow&the&MPC&protocol Malicious – corrupt&parties& • deviate&arbitrarily&from&the& MPC&protocol Party&corruption: Static – corrupted&parties&are& • chosen&before&the&start&of&the& MPC&protocol&execution Adaptive – parties&can&be& • corrupted&during&the&execution 12/12/16 14 PMPML

  15. What&Can&We&Compute& Securely? • We can compute securely any function! [ Yao82, GMW87, CDv88, BG89, BG90, Cha90, Bea92,CvT95, CFGN96, Gol97, HM97, CDM97, FHM98, o BW98,KOR98, GRR98, FvHM99, CDD+99, HMP00, CDM00, SR00,CDD00, HM00, Kil00, FGMO01, HM01, CDN01, Lin01,FGMv02, Mau02, GIKR02, PSR02, NNP03, FHHW03, KOS03,CFIK03, Lin03c, DN03, MOR03, CKL03, Pin03, PR03, NMQO+03,Lin03b, Lin03a, Lin03d, FWW04, FHW04, Pas04, IK04,HT04, ST04, KO04, MP04, ZLX05, CDG+05, HNP05, FGMO05, GL05, HN05, DI05, JL05, Kol05, WW05, vAHL05, LT06,CC06, DFK+06, BTH06, HN06, IKLP06, DI06, FFP+06,ADGH06, Dam06, MF06, CKL06, DPSW07, Kat07b, CGOS07,HIK07, DN07, Pen07, NO07, Kat07a, IKOS07, BMQU07,HK07, LP07, Woo07, BDNP08, QT08, PR08, HNP08, GK08,GMS08, SYT08, DIK+08, PCR08, KS08, Lin08, LPS08,GHKL08, CEMY09, GP09, GK09, MPR09, ZHM09, AKL+09,Tof09, BCD+09, DGKN09, DNW09, Lin09b, PSSW09, Lin09a,CLS09, LP09, Unr10, DO10, IKP10, DIK10,GK10,…….. ] 12/12/16 15 PMPML

  16. Computation&Over&Circuits Boolean Circuits Arithmetic Circuits • Yao Gabled Circuits • BGW Construction o Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Widgerson + × × + + 12/12/16 16 PMPML

  17. Yao&Garbled&Circuits Two Party Computation 12/12/16 17 PMPML

  18. Circuit&Evaluation AND AND OR OR F OR AND AND 12/12/16 18 PMPML

  19. Circuit&Evaluation 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 AND AND OR OR 1 0 0 1 F OR AND 1 0 AND 0 12/12/16 19 PMPML

  20. Evaluation 0 1 AND In1 In2 Out 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 12/12/16 20 PMPML

  21. Yao&Garbled&Evaluation k11 k00 k01 k10 0/1 0/1 AND ENC k00 ENC k10 (k20) In1 In2 Out ENC k00 ENC k11 (k20) 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 ENC k01 ENC k10 (k20) 1 1 1 ENC k01 ENC k11 (k21) 0/1 ENC k (m)&=&m& ⨁ k k21 k20 12/12/16 21 PMPML

  22. Garbled&Evaluation 0 1 K00 K11 AND DEC k00 DEC k10 (k20) �� ct 1 In1 In2 Out K20 ← DEC k00 DEC k11 (k20) K2 0 0 0 ct 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 �� DEC k01 DEC k10 (k20) 1 1 1 ct 3 ENC k01 ENC k11 (k21) �� ct 4 0 K2 K20 12/12/16 22 PMPML

  23. Secure&Computation F+ (X alice ,Y bob ) Evaluator Garbler 0 1 12/12/16 23 PMPML

  24. Oblivious&Transfer&(OT) Receiver Sender Inputs:&b Inputs:&m 0 ,&m 1 Output:& � Output:&m b For&each&inputs&wire&corresponding&to& evaluator’s&input&execute&OT b m 0 m 1 Output:&m b 12/12/16 24 PMPML

  25. The&Evolution&Of&Garbled& Circuits Size+(x+sec.param) Garble+cost Eval cost Assumption AND+++++++++++++XOR AND+++++++++++++XOR AND+++++++++++++XOR Classical&[Yao86] large 8 5 PKE P&P&[BMR90] 4&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&4 4/8&&&&&&&&&&&&4/8 1/2&&&&&&&&&&&&1/2 hash/PRF GRR3&[NPS99] 3&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&3 4/8&&&&&&&&&&&&4/8 1/2&&&&&&&&&&&&1/2 PRF/hash Free&XOR&[KS08] 3&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&0 4&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&0 1&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&0 circ.&hash GRR2&[PSSW09] 2&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&2 4/8&&&&&&&&&&&&4/8 1/2&&&&&&&&&&&&1/2 PRF/hash FlexOR [KMR14] 2& {0,1,2} 4& {0,1,2} 1& {0,1,2} circ.&symm HalfGates [ZRE15] 2&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&0 4&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&0 2&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&0 circ.&hash Threshold&gates,&garbling&arithmetic&operations&[BMR16] Asymptotic&and&concrete&improvements • 12/12/16 25 PMPML *&Comparison&table,&thanks&Mike&Rosulek

  26. BGW&Protocol Multi Party Computation for Arithmetic Circuits 12/12/16 26 PMPML

  27. Shamir’s&Secret&Sharing tMoutMofMn sharing: secret:&f(0)& random&degree&t& polynomial share:&f(5)& t shares+reveal+ nothing+about+the+ secret share:&f(10)& t+1+shares+ interpolate+the+ secret share:&f(10)& 12/12/16 27 PMPML

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend