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Safety Leadership: Safety Leadership: Lessons from healthcare and - - PDF document

Safety Leadership: Safety Leadership: Lessons from healthcare and other industries Rhona Flin Industrial Psychology Research Centre Scottish Patient Safety Research Network Scottish Patient Safety Research Network HPME, University of Toronto,


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Safety Leadership: Safety Leadership: Lessons from healthcare and other industries

Rhona Flin Industrial Psychology Research Centre Scottish Patient Safety Research Network Scottish Patient Safety Research Network

HPME, University of Toronto, 20 October, 2009

www.spsrn.ac.uk

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Welcome to the Industrial Psychology Research Centre. The centre specialises in the application

  • f psychology to high reliability workplaces.

The group has worked with the oil industry since 1986, and regularly engage in consultancy

  • projects. We are currently working with the offshore oil industry, civil aviation, nuclear power

generation, surgery, emergency services, conventional power generation and transportation. Interests of the centre include:

  • Accident analysis
  • Incident command
  • Occupational stress
  • Emergency decision making
  • Crew Resource Management

Crew Resource Management

  • Measuring and managing safety culture/ climate
  • Human factors aspects of safety management and emergency response

Clients include: Agip, AKER Offshore (Norway), AMEC, Amerada Hess, AMOCO, British Energy, BHP, BP, Brown & Root, Chevron, Civil Aviation Authority, Coflexip Stena Offshore, Conoco Phillips, Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), EC (DGTREN), First Group, Halliburton, Health & Safety Executive, KBR, Kerr McGee, National Power, NHS, Powergen, Royal College of Surgeons, Salamis SGB, Schlumberger, SCPMDE, Shell, Talisman, Texaco, Total Fina Elf, Transocean Sedco Forex, UBS Warburg & UK Nuclear Imc.

Organisational Safety

Technical Accident Causation Technical Factors (30-20%) Human Factors

Managers + Organisation Culture Worker Behaviour

= +

(+/- 80%?) (+/- 20%?) (70-80%)

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Theories of Leadership

  • Trait theories

h t i ti f l d ? – characteristics of leader?

  • Behavioural and Style theories

– what do good leaders do?

  • Situational and Contingency theories

– under given conditions, what behaviour is likely to be effective? Adaptability. be effective? Adaptability.

  • Transformational and Authentic leadership theories

– Interaction between leader and follower. Charisma, vision, inspiration. Authenticity.

Does leadership matter?

45% of organizational performance can be explained

45% of organizational performance can be explained b i l d hi (D & L d 1988) b i l d hi (D & L d 1988) by executive leadership (Day & Lord, 1988) by executive leadership (Day & Lord, 1988)

  • 60-70% of employees report that their immediate

supervisor is the most stressful aspect of their job (e.g. Fiedler)

  • Negative effects: lost productivity, absenteeism,

turnover, stress, litigation, apathy, quality of work life, job satisfaction, motivation, organisational commitment, attention, rule compliance, …safety

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Which one of these Management Levels would you focus on?

  • Senior Managers?
  • Site Managers?
  • Supervisors/ Team leaders?

(200 power generation managers

  • May 2000, Electricity Association)

Which one of these Management Levels would you focus your attention on to achieve maximum safety impact? (200 managers)

Senior Managers

  • 11

42

Senior Managers Site Managers

  • 47

Supervisors / Team Leaders

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Industrial Safety Legislation

“Top management shall take p g ultimate responsibility” …for safety and safety management systems

(OHSAS 18001:2007;Section 4.4.1)

BP Texas City explosion

“BP has not adequately established process safety as a core value…BP d f h d d executive and corporate refining management have not provided effective safety leadership.”

(Baker, 2007, p. 60)

“BP has not provided effective leadership on or established appropriate

  • perational expectations regarding process safety performance at its

U.S. refineries [and] the panel believes that the lack of effective leadership is systemic, touching all levels of BP’s corporate management having responsibility for BP’s U.S. refineries (Baker, 2007 p.66). p.66). U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB, 2005, p3) urged: “corporate officials (to) exercise appropriate leadership to promote adherence to safety management systems”

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Organisational factors associated with a safety culture (HSE, 1999)

  • Senior management

Senior management commitment

  • Management style
  • Visible management
  • Good communication

between all levels of l [ t employee [management action]

  • A balance of health and safety

and production goals [management prioritisation]

Traditional safety approaches

  • Focus on :

– human fallibility/ error – how components and barriers fail – post accident analysis – minor incident reporting

  • Safety treated as an isolated phenomenon

y p

  • Insufficient attention paid to production

demands and other competing drivers of

  • rganisational and human behaviour
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Organizational Resilience

“ Organizational resilience is the characteristic

  • f managing the organisation’s activities to

anticipate and circumvent threats to its existence and primary goals. This is shown in particular in an ability to manage severe p y g pressures and conflicts between safety and the primary production or performance goals of the organization”. (Hale & Heijer, 2006, p36)

Managerial Resilience

Managerial resilience is the ability of Managerial resilience is the ability of managers and supervisors to manage severe pressures and conflicts between safety and the primary production or performance goals of the organization. (Flin, 2006).

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Gustavus Adolphus

King of Sweden King of Sweden from 1611-1632 Vasa

Erosion of managerial resilience?

‘On several occasions the Master Shipbuilder cautiously tried to dissuade the king but the cautiously tried to dissuade the king, but the king would not listen’ Master Shipbuilder died in 1627 and was replaced by new manager. Stability tests in 1628 had to be halted as ship ‘h l d i l tl ’ b t th Ad i l d id d ‘heeled violently’ – but the Admiral decided ‘not to delay the commissioning’ Vasa sinks on maiden voyage one month later

  • 50 deaths
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VASA: Accident investigation: 1628

  • Lack of external learning capability
  • Lack of external learning capability
  • Goal confusion
  • Obsession with speed
  • Feedback system failure
  • Communication barriers
  • Poor organizational memory
  • Top management meddling

(Kessler et al, 2001)

NASA Challenger (1986)

During the critical meeting on O rings and a low temperature launch, one of the engineers was asked to... “take off his engineering hat g g and put on his management hat”

(Vaughan, 1996, p398)

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NASA Challenger (1986)

During the critical meeting on O rings and a low temperature launch, one of the engineers was asked to... “take off his engineering hat g g and put on his management hat”

(Vaughan, 1996, p398)

NASA Columbia (2003)

Faster, Better, Cheaper

Schedule pressure was p creating .. “strong incentives to move forward and look askance at potential disruption to schedule.”

(Woods, 2003)

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NASA Columbia Accident report Accident was more to do with holes in

  • rganizational decision

making than holes in th i f th Sh ttl the wing of the Shuttle

(Gehman, 2003)

‘This investigation confirmed doubts … concerning the relative priority for

  • safety. ..

ProRail and the operators have effectively placed the continued smooth flow of train traffic above smooth flow of train traffic above train safety.’

Through Red at Amsterdam Central (2005)

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Middle managers’ resilience skills

  • Situation awareness

Situation awareness

– detection and recognition of threats

  • Decision making

– balancing competing pressures – ability to make ‘sacrificial decisions’ (Woods)

  • Assertiveness

– speaking up – challenging the leader

  • But needs a supportive organizational culture

The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry

  • BBC News

November 1999

  • Money came first, baby inquiry told
  • Stephen Bolsin blew the whistle at Bristol
  • The Bristol heart scandal whistleblower has told a

public inquiry that managers ignored him because they thought they might lose government cash.

  • Consultant anaesthetist Dr Stephen Bolsin said that

senior staff wanted to maintain the hospital's designation as a specialist children's heart facility.

  • He told the inquiry: "The analogy that was used was of

a train where occasional passengers were falling off, and the train had to keep moving in order to attract funding.

  • "That was one of my concerns about the subjugation of

patient safety by reasons of funding and continued activity in high risk areas."

  • Former Bristol Royal Infirmary chief executive Dr John

Roylance, later struck off by the General Medical Council, was "dismissive" of his attempts to bring the high death rates to his attention, he said.

  • And surgeon James Wisheart, who was also banned

from practising, was angry that he had discussed the unit's performance with other doctors.

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Cultural antibodies to resilient behaviour

Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry Kennedy Report (2001) – chp22

– Powerful motives for keeping quiet – especially junior doctors and nurses j – Need for ‘a culture of openness’ – This calls for ‘significant leadership’

Measuring Resilience/ Safety Leadership

  • Safety climate (culture) surveys
  • Safety climate (culture) surveys
  • Upward appraisal of mangers’ safety

commitment; priority of production

  • Examine managerial ‘scripts’ to reveal

prioritisation of safety / production (Zohar & Luria 2004)

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UKCS Oil and Gas Industry

“Senior managers show a lack of commitment Senior managers show a lack of commitment to health and safety” - 31% do not disagree “Senior managers are genuinely concerned about H&S of the workforce - 57% agree

(Workforce Survey (Mearns, Flin et al 1998) - Aggregate data from 13 companies)

Safety Leadership - Shell Expro

  • Workshop for 70 directors / asset managers
  • Upward appraisal questionnaire on safety commitment and

safety leadership style

  • Each manager’s views plus views of five managers below him
  • Confidential, personal report to each senior manager
  • Summary data presented to whole group
  • Summary data presented to whole group
  • Frank discussion of whether senior managers communicate

consistent messages about safety commitment

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Safety Leadership - Shell Expro

  • Reflection on their own safety attitudes
  • Reflection on their own safety attitudes,

prioritisation of safety, leadership style

  • Knowledge of subordinates’ perceptions
  • Degree of match, consistency
  • Positive response from managers with actions for

h i th i b h i changing their own behaviours

  • Extended to lower levels of management
  • Tool available on Shell ‘Hearts and Minds’ website

Which Leadership Style is best for Safety?

Transformational leadership (Bass) is the strongest predictor

  • f safety in industry (Flin & Yule, 2004, Quality & Safety in Healthcare)
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Energy Institute PhD (2008-11)

Study 1 Isabella Rogers & Flin, Mearns, Hetherington

Sample: Oil industry Senior Managers & Health and Safety Experts (n=14) Interview: Semi-structured format; Open questions to elicit detailed opinions, anecdotes & descriptions Data Analysis: Transcription; Identification and coding of recurring themes Aim: Summarise expert opinion regarding characteristics of effective and ineffective safety leadership for the oil and gas industry at the senior level. Match to components of transformational and authentic leadership.

“doing safety well comprises a number

  • f things, one of them is vision. So a

fundamental belief, the ability to

Transformational Leadership

, y communicate that belief, and to get

  • ther people to agree to it.”

–Senior Manager

‘Dark Side’ of Transformational Leadership Empty charisma? “I would say a transformational style is not enough on its own”

–HSE Manager

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Authentic leadership

Characteristics: Genuine, Consistent, Trustworthy, y Hopeful, Approachable, Communicative, Fair (Avolio et al)

“speak in an authentic way, it’s very easy to know the words around (safety), but the people who really mean it and are authentic…it comes across in a much more powerful way”

  • Senior Manager

g

“the way people judge you and the way they accept the words that you issue…I think a lot of it is about just being genuine”

  • Senior Manager

Consistent and reliable…. …

Upon delivering safety messages… “really (need to be) seen by the

  • rganisation through constant word and deed to back that up”

Senior Manager “it’s important that what people say, is actually what happens. The network quickly understands if there’s a dissonance” Senior Manager “the most important thing is that managers have to not only talk the right language and set the right policies, they actually have to show by their actions that they are committed to safety” HSE Manager

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Effective safety leaders A h bl

“encourage the flow of all information”

HSE M

Approachable Open Straight-forward Honest Transparent

  • HSE Manager

“a willingness to hear bad news…they need to have a kind of openness”

  • HSE Manager

“it’s my experience that it’s far better to have an honest discussion about

Transparent

to have an honest discussion about the realities, to explain what is and isn’t possible, and to discuss what we can do together”

  • Senior Manager

Ineffective safety leaders…

Promote safety insincerely Promote safety insincerely… “all kinds of negatives come from back- handed, behind-the-door conversation. And if you start getting that, and there isn’t a f y g g , cohesion about the safety message, it gets quite corrosive”

Senior Manager

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i) Rogers et al, Senior Oil Industry Managers

Effective safety leaders display qualities that are beyond the scope of the transformational leadership model. p The characteristics of effective safety leaders align closely with characteristics associated with authentic leadership models.

These preliminary data suggest that authentic leadership is a central aspect of effective safety leadership at the senior management level.

ii) Fruehn (PhD student) Mearns Kirwan & Flin ii) Fruehn (PhD student), Mearns, Kirwan & Flin Sponsored by Eurocontrol (ATM) Safety intelligence in senior managers in European centres for air traffic control

Patient safety failings - leadership

  • Senior managers prioritised fiscal performance and there was a

‘clubby’ atmosphere which prevented speaking up (Bristol - Kennedy, 2001)

  • At least 33 patents died from C. diff because senior managers

failed to follow infection advice or learn lessons from the first

  • utbreak (Stoke Mandevile, 2006)
  • Corporate manslaughter legislation (2007) covers NHS

managers who can be responsible if they are aware of problems but fail to act but fail to act

  • Joint Commission (USA) – 50% of sentinel events (2006)

involve leadership failings

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Kennedy (2006)

“Safety still struggling to be on the agenda. Strong leadership needed.”

NHS CEO study

(Flin & Yule from McKee et al NHS culture study, 2008, SDO) 8 NHS Trust CEOs from across England and their exec boards, randomly selected on performance ratings

  • Self and upward appraisal on leadership style and perceived

safety climate

– Online survey. Completed by CEO (self-perception) and Executive board (upward ratings). Survey covered Transformational/ transactional leadership style, safety climate, leadership behaviours, d i ff/ i f and action on staff/ patient safety

  • Semi-structured interview with Trust CEOs (n=7/8)

– 1 hour interview recorded and transcribed verbatim. Coding for leadership style, safety behaviours (NPSA) and values

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Transformational Leadership

CHARISMA INSPIRATION INDIVIDUALIZED CONSIDERATION INTELLECTUAL STIMULATION

+ +

Transactional Leadership

HEIGHTENED MOTIVATION TO ATTAIN DESIGNATED OUTCOMES (EXTRA EFFORT) EXPECTED EFFORT

Transactional Leadership

MANAGEMENT- BY-EXCEPTION CONTINGENT REWARD

+

PERFORMANCE BEYOND EXPECTATIONS EXPECTED PERFORMANCE Bass & Avolio (1994) Transformational Leadership

Transactional/ transformational leadership

Flin & Yule (2004). Qual Saf Health Care, 13 (supplII) ii45-ii51

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Leadership checklist for NHS CEOs

1 Build a safety culture

  • 1. Build a safety culture
  • 2. Lead and support your staff
  • 3. Integrate your risk management activity
  • 4. Promote reporting
  • 5. Involve patients and the public
  • 6. Learn and share the safety lessons

y

  • 7. Implement solutions to prevent harm

National Patient Safety Agency (2004)

Senior Managers’ Priorities

Flin, Yule et al, The Surgeon 2006

Scotland – rated by surgeons

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Interview Analysis (style)

T f ti l (I t ll t l “I lik t f ilit t I lik l t t Coded leadership style/ value Interview data Transformational (Intellectual Stimulation) “I like to facilitate, I like people to come to their own conclusions rather than say ‘right, this is my idea’…” Transactional (Contingent reward) “I tend to want to set clear goals and I expect people to achieve them” Transactional (Management by exception) “…need to be able to move into a command and control mode to ensure things are delivered.” Organizational value “Our culture is based on a principle that we need to learn from incidents” Personal value “We’ll continue to strive to hit it (the Healthcare Commission target) but I won’t compromise patient care as a consequence”

Leadership interview analysis

NPSA guidance category CEO leadership behaviour from the interview analysis (n=7)

1 B ild f l S i h CEO’ l bj i h i

  • 1. Build a safety culture

Setting out the CEO’s clear objectives on the intranet and newsletters

  • 2. Lead and support staff

Providing clarity and unambiguous messages to staff regarding the future of the Trust

  • 3. Integrate risk

management Including systems failures and cost of drug errors in long-term financial strategy

  • 4. Promote reporting

Demonstrate to staff that action happens and things change as a result of safety reports change as a result of safety reports

  • 5. Involve patients and the

public Speaking to patients on the ward and asking them what it is like in the hospital

  • 6. Learn and share

Sending senior staff on patient safety training courses

  • 7. Implementing solutions

Providing resources to support the handwashing policy and removing barriers to implementation

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The Joint Commission (USA) (Aug 2009)

  • Regularly measure leadership’s commitment to safety

g y p y using climate surveys and upward appraisal techniques (in which staff review or appraise their managers and leaders).(14,25)

  • When leaders assess managers during the annual

performance review, make sure they ask about the safety issues the manager encountered, how they were handled, and the impact their actions had on reducing unsafe conditions conditions.

  • Communicate to staff when their work improves safety.

Reward and recognize those whose efforts contribute to safety.

The Joint Commission (Aug 2009)

  • Leadership is a critical function in promoting high quality, safe health

h l h i i l d hi i id d b h

  • care. In health care organizations, leadership is provided by the

governing body, the chief executive and senior managers, and the leaders of the clinical staff. When a sentinel event occurs in a health care organization, inadequate or ineffective leadership is often one of the contributing factors. In fact, inadequate leadership was a contributing factor in 50 percent of the sentinel events reported to The Joint Commission in 2006. Research shows that leadership makes a major difference in the quality and safety of patient care.

  • “Leaders must recognize that all sentinel events involve a failure in the

t d hi h l d t th t ” J ff S lb CEO systems and processes which led to the event,” says Jeff Selberg, CEO

  • f Exempla Healthcare. “As leaders, we are accountable for those

systems and processes which provide the framework for the clinical environment our staff works within. My first priority is to understand how we improve our clinical environment to reduce the possibility of doing harm.”

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Safety leadership at an operational level Non-technical skills

Sarah Parker (PhD student 2008-11) & Yule, Flin, McKinley i i l d hi Surgeons’ intra-operative leadership Reader, Flin & Cuthbertson Consultants’ ‘floor’ leadership in the ICU (Manuscript under review).

NOTSS skills taxonomy

C t i El t Categories Elements Situation Awareness

Gathering information Understanding information Projecting and anticipating future state

Decision Making

Considering options Selecting and communicating option Implementing and reviewing decisions

Communication

Exchanging information

Communication and Teamwork

Exchanging information Establishing a shared understanding Co-ordinating team activities

Leadership

Setting and maintaining standards Coping with pressure Supporting others

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Health Committee patient safety report for NHS England (July, 2009)

“The NHS lags unacceptably behind

  • ther safety-critical industries, such

as aviation, in recognising the importance of effective team working and other non-technical skills.” (p5) “There are serious deficiencies in the undergraduate medical curriculum .. which are detrimental to patient safety which are detrimental to patient safety, in respect of training in:

  • ..
  • non-technical skills
  • ..” (p6)
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Further information

Further information Further information r.flin@abdn.ac.uk

  • www.abdn.ac.uk/iprc

lists of projects and papers and reports Scottish Patient Safety Research Network

  • www.spsrn.ac.uk