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Safe Harbor Statement The following is intended to outline our general product direction. It is intended for information purposes only, and may not be incorporated into any contract. It is not a commitment to deliver any material, code, or


  1. Safe Harbor Statement The following is intended to outline our general product direction. It is intended for information purposes only, and may not be incorporated into any contract. It is not a commitment to deliver any material, code, or functionality, and should not be relied upon in making purchasing decisions. The development, release, and timing of any features or functionality described for Oracle’s products remains at the sole discretion of Oracle.

  2. Mit Silicon Secured Memory Heartbleed und Co. vorbeugen Franz Haberhauer Chief Technologist Systems Sales Consulting Northern Europe

  3. Chip Advances in the Last Decade • Focus on better/faster general purpose chip • More CPU cores per chip • Memory & PCI interfaces, GPU moved on-chip • Improved pipelines, branch prediction, cache coherency, reliability, clock rates, power management etc. • New Functionality : vector processing/SIMD, virtualization, encryption – Encryption on-chip is 10X faster and frees CPU cores to do other work – Database optimizations on chip are analogous

  4. 2012 – 25 Years of SPARC Processors 1987 1988 1992 1995 1996 2000 2002 2005 2011 Sunrise: 1 st SPARC Processor UltraSPARC II UltraSPARC IIIi SPARC T4 SuperSPARC I UltraSPARC IV+ SUNRAY UltraSPARC III UltraSPARC I UltraSPARC T1 Anniversary Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKB9zV8TXuQ Infographic: http://www.oracle-downloads.com/sparc25info/

  5. SPARC @ Oracle • Silicon Secured Memory } Including • DB Query Acceleration Software in Silicon • Inline Decompression 7 Processors in 6 Years • More…. 2015 @ Hot Chips 2015 2010 2011 2013 2013 2013 SPARC M7 SPARC T3 SPARC T4 SPARC T5 SPARC M5 SPARC M6 ‘SONOMA’ 16 x 2 nd Gen cores 16 x 3 rd Gen Cores 6 x 3 rd Gen Cores 12 x 3 rd Gen Cores 32 x 4 th Gen Cores 8 x 3 rd Gen Cores 8 x 4 th Gen Cores 4MB L3 Cache 8MB L3 Cache 48MB L3 Cache 48MB L3 Cache 64MB L3 Cache IB 4MB L3 Cache 3.6 GHz 3.6 GHz 3.6 GHz 1.65 GHz 4.1 GHz 3.0 GHz Current Scale-Out T7-/M7-Servers Servers TBA.

  6. It Does not Take Much Die to Make a Difference SPARC M7 Software in Silicon: 2x-3x More 30 to 40% More Over 2x More Security in Silicon with Plus Throughput Single Thread Encryption and SQL in Silicon < 1% of Die Performance Performance Bandwidth Capacity in Silicon (16 -> 32 Cores)

  7. SPARC T7 and M7 Systems T7-1 T7-2 T7-4 M7-8 M7-16 Processors Up to 8 1 Up to 16 2 1 2 2 or 4 Max Cores 32 64 128 256 512 Max Threads 256 512 1,024 2,048 4,096 Max Memory 3 .5 TB 1 TB 2 TB 4 TB 8 TB Form Factor 2U 3U 5U Rack / 10U Rack Domaining LDOMs, PDOMs 1 LDOMs, PDOMs 2 LDOMs LDOMs LDOMs (1) Factory configured with one (up to 8 processors) or two (up to 4 processors each) static physical domains (2) 1, 2, 3 or 4 reconfigurable physical domains (3) Maximum memory capacity is based on 32 GB DIMMs http://oracle.com/m7infowall -> White Paper M7 Systems Architecture https://blogs.oracle.com/bestperf

  8. Silicon Secured Memory Application Data Integrity (ADI)

  9. Oracle M7 Silicon Secured Memory Always-On Memory Protection in Hardware • Protects data in memory Pointer “B” GO • Hidden “color” bits added to pointers (key) and content (lock) • Pointer color (key) must match content Pointer “R” color or program is aborted GO • Set on memory allocation , changed on memory free’ • Protects against access off end of Pointer “Y” structure , stale pointer access and malicious attacks M7 Processor Applications Memory

  10. Oracle M7 Silicon Secured Memory Always-On Memory Protection in Hardware • Protects data in memory Pointer “B” GO • Hidden “color” bits added to pointers (key), and content (lock) • Pointer color (key) must match content Pointer “R” color or program is aborted GO • Set on memory allocation , changed on memory free’ • Protects against access off end of Pointer “Y” structure , stale pointer access and malicious attacks • Extremely efficient for software M7 Processor Applications Memory development

  11. Linear Buffer Overflows • ADI is really great at detecting linear overflows • The attacker controls the size of the buffer being written, but not the starting address char *ptr; ptr = malloc(20); strcpy(ptr, argv[1]); /* argv could be bigger than 20 chars */ – The overflowed memory is adjacent to the buffer. Other live buffers, free buffers and potentially metadata may become corrupted – As long as the buffer adjacent to the one allocated for ptr has a different ADI color, any attempt to overflow will trap … prt[0] prt[1] prt[19] prt[20] prt[21] malloc’ed area: color 1 adjacent cache line: color 2

  12. A Couple of Famous Examples: Heartbleed & Venom Silicon Secured Memory Protection From Read and Write Attacks Buffer Over-Read Attack Buffer Over-Write Attack

  13. Heartbleed - Impacted Websites Using OpenSSL Heartbeat request sent Victim responds with to victim requested payload size (64K bytes) Type Payload_size Payload Type Payload_size Payload HB_REQUEST 65535 Hello HB_RESPONSE 65535 Hello ………. …………………. Payload_size does not Unauthorized data match Payload returned to requestor

  14. Venom Vulnerability - Impacted Servers Using QEMU Host System • Memory access vulnerability discovered in the open source Quick Hacker exploits Emulator hypervisor platform (QEMU) Sales Server Database Web server VENOM to VM Server VM VM escape VM • Allows malicious code inside a VM guest to execute code in the host machine’s hypervisor security context. VENOM executes Venom The code then escape the guest VM to instructions in VM Hypervisor escape gain control over the entire host hypervisor and gains control of • Caused by a buffer over-write host hardware condition that allows data to be stored Host Hardware beyond allocated buffer limits

  15. Silicon Secured Memory: Buffer Overflows Any Processor SPARC M7Processor Pointer Pointer Applications Memory Applications Memory

  16. SSM Implementation: Application Data Integrity ld … version 64Bytes • H/W compares version st … 64Bytes version address version 64Bytes pointer “ key ” version 64Bytes version 64Bytes with memory “lock” version 64Bytes version 64Bytes ld … – are 4bit numbers version 64Bytes st … – called “versions” version address • Traps if they don ’ t match – Sends SEGV or utrap (dbx) run to process signal SEGV (ADI version 13 mismatch for VA 0x4a900) in main at 0x10988 (dbx) where • H/W masks “ key ” …stack trace… before it hits the MMU

  17. ADI version numbers and coloring • version numbers use 4 bits – Valid range : 1 – 13 • 0, 14 and 15 are reserved for system usage • By default all the memory is tagged with 0 • 0 is not a valid version value for ADI checking • Adjacent area paradigm – Adjacent areas are tagged with different version numbers – 4 bits are sufficient to tag uniquely adjacent buffers (for alloc and free) – Example int *ptr = malloc(128); free(ptr); will set version as follow: ptr[offset] (int) version # (malloc) version # (free) notes 0 - 31 1 8 malloc’ed area 32 - 47 8 8 uphill adjacent cache line (the downhill adjacent cache line is not tagged)

  18. Silicon Secured Memory Support for Both Development and Deployment DEPLOYMENT : Solaris enables DEVELOPMENT : Studio provides applications to take appropriate detailed diagnostics for developers recovery actions in real-time * to find and fix memory corruptions libdiscoveradi libadimalloc Solaris Kernel (Provides syscalls for user-level applications) Application SPARC M7 hardware Solaris Studio (Enables software stack for Silicon Secured 12.4/12.5 Beta Memory checking ) * App must be coded to use ADI APIs discover tool

  19. Example Use of libadimalloc.so Demo Code • Obvious Buffer Overflow (read #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> beyond end) int main(void){ • “public” buffer is 100bytes wide char* public = (char*)malloc(sizeof(char)*100); char* secret = (char*)malloc(sizeof(char)*100); • Code reads 150bytes printf("public text -> "); scanf("%s", public); printf("secret text -> "); scanf("%s", secret); – 50bytes are read from adjacent buffer for(int ii = 0; ii < 150; ii++) printf("%c\n", public[ii]); printf("\n"); return 0; }

  20. Output of Demo On a SPARC M7 using On any system libadimalloc.so franzh@SPARC-M7,ADI>./malloc franzh@SPARC-M7,ADI> public text -> hello LD_PRELOAD=libadimalloc.so ./malloc secret text -> secret public text -> hello h secret text -> secret h e l e l l o l ---snip--- o ---snip--- s e Segmentation Fault (core dumped) c franzh@SPARC-M7,ADI> r e t ---snip--- franzh@SPARC-M7,ADI>

  21. Silicon Secured Memory Support for Both Development and Deployment DEPLOYMENT : Solaris enables DEVELOPMENT : Studio provides applications to take appropriate detailed diagnostics for developers recovery actions in real-time * to find and fix memory corruptions libdiscoveradi libadimalloc Solaris Kernel (Provides syscalls for user-level applications) Application SPARC M7 hardware Solaris Studio (Enables software stack for Silicon Secured 12.4/12.5 Beta Memory checking ) * App must be coded to use ADI APIs discover tool

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