Running a Bug Bounty Program What you need to know Shpend TU - - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Running a Bug Bounty Program What you need to know Shpend TU - - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Running a Bug Bounty Program What you need to know Shpend TU - Master in Software Engineering Senior AppSec Engineer & Team Lead @ Bugcrowd Bug bounty Hunter Video Games Bsides Vienna 2016 Agenda What & Why


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Running a Bug Bounty Program

What you need to know

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Shpend

  • TU - Master in Software Engineering
  • Senior AppSec Engineer & Team Lead @ Bugcrowd
  • Bug bounty Hunter
  • Video Games

Bsides Vienna 2016

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  • What & Why
  • Pre-launch
  • Post-Launch
  • Notable findings

Agenda

Bsides Vienna 2016

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Bug Bounty Programs

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Audience survey: Do you know what Bug Bounty means?

Source (Hyperbole and a Half) Bsides Vienna 2016

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The History of Bug Bounties: Abbreviated Timeline from 1995 to Present

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Why?

Bsides Vienna 2016

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Should I invite random people to hack on my systems?

Source (Hyperbole and a Half) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Benefits to running a Bug Bounty Program

  • Lots of Eyes
  • Pay for results model
  • Shows a more advanced security posture
  • Better reputation

Source (ESRB) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Case Study: Instructure

2013 (Pentest) 2014 (Bug Bounty) 2015 (Bug Bounty) Critical High 1 25 3 Medium 1 8 2 Low 2 16 5

Bsides Vienna 2016 Source (Canvas)

https://www.canvaslms.com/security

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Who are these people?

  • All ages
  • All levels of experience & skillsets
  • All over the world
  • Users and and non-users
  • Passionate about security!

Source (ESRB) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Researcher Incentive

  • Cash!
  • Reputation (Hall of Fame)
  • Ranking (platforms)
  • Passionate about security!

Source (ESRB) Bsides Vienna 2016

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The Value of Crowdsourced Testing

Source (RedTeam Pentesting) Bsides Vienna 2016

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How?

Bsides Vienna 2016

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Before and After

  • Pre-Launch as a Program Owner

○ Scope ○ Exclusions ○ Environment ○ Access

  • Post-Launch as a Program Owner

○ Handling Submissions (Manpower) ○ Communicating Effectively ○ Defining a Vulnerability Rating Taxonomy

Bsides Vienna 2016

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“Make a change, pay the researcher.”

Source (Get A Life) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Pre-Launch

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Scope

  • Define target(s).

○ Only webapp (www.example.com) ○ All subdomains (careful) (*.example.com) ○ All products & acquisitions (more careful) ○ Mobile? (Android, iOS, Windows Phone? j/k) ○ Human & physical

Source (Accurate Shooter) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Scope

  • Define non/rewardable findings

○ No security impact (Logout csrf) ○ Best practice (Session management) ○ Full/partial poc? (XXE, SSRF,SQLI)

  • Define reward range

○ Min and Max ○ Table based on vuln types

  • Define Disclosure

○ Allowed or not

Source (Accurate Shooter) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Exclusions

  • You might not care about:

○ (Low-impact) “low hanging fruit” ○ Intended functionality ○ Known issues (call out!) ○ Accepted risks ○ Issues based on pivoting

Source (Meme Generator) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Environment

  • Production vs. staging
  • Make sure it can stand up to testing!

○ Scanners ○ Contact forms ○ Pentesting requests

  • Special bounty types

○ IoT/devices

  • Researcher environments

Source (The Daily Mail) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Access

  • Easier = better (self-signup)
  • Provide adequate resources for success

○ E.g. sandbox credit cards

  • No shared credentials

Source (Demotivation) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Post-Launch

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Be Prepared

  • High volume of submissions
  • Scanners
  • Manpower
  • Communication

Bsides Vienna 2016 Source (Meme Generator)

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Tips: Triage submissions

  • Work oldest to newest
  • Push back if unclear (ask more info)
  • Tag valid findings
  • Experience -> faster triage

Bsides Vienna 2016 Source (Meme Generator)

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Tips: Triage submissions efficiently

  • Check Domain/Bug for in scope
  • Check for duplicates
  • Reproduce (Replication steps)
  • Have accounts (with diff roles) ready

Bsides Vienna 2016 Source (Meme Generator)

  • Have multiple browsers ready
  • Keep burp open (you’ll need it)
  • Have environment ready (XXE oob via ftp)
  • Keep scope handy
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Communication is Key

  • Researchers like:

○ Concise, unambiguous responses ■ ESL ○ Short response time ○ Predictable reward time

  • Communicate issue being looked at
  • Reply to researcher questions.

Bsides Vienna 2016 Source (Profielwekstuk)

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Define a Vulnerability Rating Taxonomy

  • For program owners:

○ Speeds up triage process ○ Track your organization’s security posture ○ Arrive at a reward amount more quickly

  • For researchers:

○ Focus on high-value bugs ○ Avoid wasting time on non-rewardable bugs ○ Alongside brief, helps build trust

Bsides Vienna 2016

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Discuss the VRT at a Roundtable

  • Priority will change as your organization does
  • Establish a regular meeting

○ Review interesting bugs ○ Discuss additions ○ Propose changes

  • This is an ongoing process!
  • Great learning opportunity

Bsides Vienna 2016 Source (Wikipedia)

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Notable Findings

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  • 2 Remote BoF kernel level (Cifs/NSF)
  • Found in custom kernel modules
  • Rewarded $10k each
  • Timeframe: 2 weeks

Kernel Panic

Source (Meme Generator) Bsides Vienna 2016

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  • POS tablet (Android)
  • Shipped to researchers for testing
  • Winner takes all ($15k)
  • Hacked via flashing
  • Bonus bug: admin backdoor

“You can’t see me” exposed!

Source (Meme Generator) Bsides Vienna 2016

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  • SSO available for setup
  • Domain no verified
  • Attacker set ups SSO
  • Attacker adds ANY email address in their

SSO account

  • Attacker available to login using that email

address

  • Reward: $10k

Login as anyone

Source (Meme Generator) Bsides Vienna 2016

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Shpend Kurtishaj me@shpendk.com @shpendk

Thanks!

Source (xkcd)