Rethinking the Determinants of Corruption in Post- Communist - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Rethinking the Determinants

• f Corruption in Post-

Communist Countries

Anna Grzymala-Busse Department of Political Science University of Michigan, Ann Arbor abusse@umich.edu

Corruption

• Use of public goods for private benefit
• Elite vs. “petty,” political vs. bureaucratic, etc.
• Implications for good governance: TI, WB, IFI

interest

Post-communist cases as laboratory:

• considerable variation in corruption:

Slovenia and Estonia (France, Spain, Japan) to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan (Nigeria, Bangladesh, Haiti)

• similar baseline: communist legacy

Variation:

Corruption score: FH and TI Slovenia 2.55 Estonia 3.35 Poland 4.50 Hungary 4.75 Czech Republic 4.90 Lithuania 4.95 Latvia 5.10 Slovakia 5.25 Croatia 6.10 Bulgaria 6.15 Romania 6.50 Macedonia 6.80 Moldova 6.80 Belarus 7.00 Russia 7.25 Albania 7.40 Armenia 7.40 Georgia 7.40 Ukraine 7.80 Kyrgyzstan 7.95 Uzbekistan 8.00 Kazakhstan 8.05 Turkmen. 8.10 Tajikistan 8.15 Serbia 8.25 Azerbaijan 8.40

Potential Explanations:

• cultural determinants: Protestant, colonial

legacies, family and kinship structures.

Potential Explanations:

• cultural determinants: Protestant, colonial

legacies, family and kinship structures.

• economic development: GDP per capita, natural

resources and their curses.

Potential Explanations:

• cultural determinants: Protestant, colonial

legacies, family and kinship structures.

• economic development: GDP per capita, natural

resources and their curses.

• electoral institutions (personalized vs. party,

presidential vs. parliamentary)

Potential Explanations:

• cultural determinants: Protestant, colonial

legacies, family and kinship structures.

• economic development: GDP per capita, natural

resources and their curses.

• electoral institutions (personalized vs. party,

presidential vs. parliamentary)

• political and economic competition: monitoring

and efficiency.

Competition key

• Cultural and economic explanations:

underspecify mechanisms.

• Existing institutions, international actors,

media, civil society, etc all weak constraints.

• State and state actors, rather than firms or

economic actors.

• Elite competition as critical to state-building

and rent-seeking.

But...

• If elite competition key, measurement critical
• Accepted proxies for competition tell us

little about political party motivations or behavior

• no mechanisms: what do parties do?
• no empirical correlation

Measuring competition

• Fragmentation, ENPP

, turnover, openness, polarization, volatility, average excluded vote

(Frye 2002, Orenstein 2001, Hellman 1998, Przeworski 1999, Grzymala-Busse 2003)

• General measures of democracy

(Persson and Tabbellini 2000, Ades and diT ella 1997, Treisman 2000, Montinolla and Jackman 2002, Hellman and Kauffman 2001)

• Power-sharing institutions

(Weingast 1995, Geddes and Neto 1992)

These measures problematic:

• underspecified: what matters?
• few mechanisms
• often rely on exogenous and stable

institutions

Better measure of competition

• ROBUSTNESS
• clear: alternative to both voters and other

actors.

• plausible: not excluded a priori as

government.

• critical: investigations and questions.

Indicators

• clear: authoritarian exit (new democracies)

and/ or voter differentiation

• plausible: % seats held by parties excluded

from coalitions a priori

• critical: # of questions/ MP/ year and # of

parliamentary investigations launched/ year

Hypothesis:

• Robust competition constrains corruption

Boundary conditions:

• Parliaments exist
• New and would-be democracies

(authoritarian exit)

• Political parties

Bivariate correlations between corruption index and competition proxies, all post-communist cases: robust

• pposition

fragment

• ation

ENPP gov't continuity

• penness of

competition polarization volatility average excluded vote corrupt index Pearson Correlation

• .854**
• .226
• .120

.476* .443

• .091
• .077

.540*

• Sig. (2-

tailed) .000 .313 .596 .025 .050 .688 .740 .025 n 22 22 22 22 20 22 21 17 Bivariate correlations between corruption and competition proxies, democracies only robust

• pposition

fragmen tation ENPP gov't continuity

• penness of

competition polarization volatility average excluded vote corrupt index Pearson Correlatio n

• .865**
• .403
• .423

.183 .358 .118 .117 .531*

• Sig. (2-

tailed) .000 .122 .102 .497 .173 .664 .665 .034 n 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Competing hypotheses

• Cultural hypothesis: % Protestant population

(colonial legacies not tested)

• Economic development: natural resource

dependence (% of exports), per capita GDP 1990 and 2000 (logged and in PPP)

• Institutions: % seats elected via party lists

Unweighted OLS regressions: corruption index as dependent variable 1 2: 3: 4 Robust Opposition

• .549**

(.147)

• .744
• .434**

(.130)

• .587
• .198*

(.111)

• .342
• .300*

(.156)

• .547

Fragmentation

• 4.489

(2.87)

• .233
• 4.71*

(2.35)

• .245

Excluded vote .026 (.13) .130 .025 (.029) .127 Continuity in

• ffice

.134 (1.64) .014 .799 (1.37) .083 Polarization .197 (.026) .106 .023 (.022) .127 Volatility .0024 (.027) .001 .009 (.022) .053 % seats elected via party lists

• 1.688*

(.721)

• .275

.019 (.861) .005 1993 fuel / metal exports as % total exports .009 (.011) .124 .011 (.022)

• .117

% Protestant

• .017

(.012)

• .154

.028* (.015)

• .326

Log per capita GDP/PPP 2000

• 1.250

(.350)**

• .520

Log per capita GDP/PPP 1990

• .830

(.761)

• .253

Constant 10.99*** (2.28) 11.02*** (1.86) 17.40*** (2.59) 14.96** (5.934) Adjusted R2 .743 .829 .811 .630 N 25 24 24 24

Caveats:

• Perceptions of corruption, rather than
• bjective measures
• Elite, rather than bureaucratic, corruption
• Small sample size (n=26)

Mechanisms of constraint:

• constructing formal guarantees / abolishing

discretionary access to state resources

• monitoring and sanctions
• opposition as alternatives: limits

accumulation of resources

Origins of robust competition

• Resources and incentives to construct,

monitor, sanction

• Former authoritarians: exit and adaptation

Further research:

• Disaggregating components of robust

competition

• Investigate impact over time: lags and path

dependence?

Extensions:

• No parliaments or parties: elite competition still

matters (extends time horizons, constrains)

• Weak states/ inchoate institutions: informal

mechanisms of sanction and monitoring critical

• Key question: how to get political actors to act as

if they are vested in public good provision

Conclusions:

• Focus on elites
• Competition critical
• Organization, access to state resources,

and need to extract

• ex-authoritarians as main actors