responsibility functions for explaining deviations in
play

Responsibility Functions for Explaining Deviations in Decision - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Responsibility Functions for Explaining Deviations in Decision Behaviour - CHANGES+ Colloquium - Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe April 2020 Outline Introduction Responsibility Decision Scenario Application Discussion Sarah Hiller |


  1. Responsibility Functions for Explaining Deviations in Decision Behaviour - CHANGES+ Colloquium - Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe April 2020

  2. Outline Introduction Responsibility Decision Scenario Application Discussion Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 2

  3. Introduction Motivation: ◮ Responsibility decision-making nexus ◮ Assign responsibility: Assign call for actions Approach: ◮ Formalized Responsibility Function ◮ Game and according experiment Responsibility Functions based on Heiztig & Hiller (submitted) Decision dilemma in game and according experiment based on Kline et al. (2018) Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 3

  4. Framework w 1 Ingredients: Agents I a w 2 Directed tree � V , E � i Possible actions A v , w 3 v 1 b consequences c v : A v → S v w 4 Figure: Graphical depiction of a morally evaluated multi-agent decision tree with uncertainty. Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 4

  5. Framework Ingredients: w 1 Agents I a Directed tree � V , E � w 2 Possible actions A v , i w 3 v 1 consequences c v : A v → S v b Set of ethically undesired w 4 outcomes ǫ Figure: Graphical depiction of a morally evaluated multi-agent decision tree with uncertainty. Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 4

  6. Framework Ingredients: w 1 1 − p Agents I a Directed tree � V , E � p w 2 Possible actions A v , i w 3 v 1 consequences c v : A v → S v b Set of ethically undesired w 4 outcomes ǫ Ambiguity nodes V a Figure: Graphical depiction of a morally evaluated multi-agent Probabilistic uncertainty V p decision tree with uncertainty. Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 4

  7. Framework Ingredients: w 1 shoot v 1 Agents I j load Directed tree � V , E � pass w 2 Possible actions A v , i w 3 shoot consequences c v : A v → S v pass j Set of ethically undesired v 2 pass w 4 outcomes ǫ Ambiguity nodes V a Figure: Graphical depiction of a morally evaluated multi-agent Probabilistic uncertainty V p decision tree with uncertainty. Information sets ∼ Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 4

  8. Responsibility Function Scenario, strategy A scenario ζ ∈ Z ∼ resolves all ambiguity and information uncertainty A strategy σ ∈ Σ of a group G ⊆ I selects actions for all future decision nodes. Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 5

  9. Responsibility Function Scenario, strategy A scenario ζ ∈ Z ∼ resolves all ambiguity and information uncertainty A strategy σ ∈ Σ of a group G ⊆ I selects actions for all future decision nodes. Hypothetical shortfall Given a scenario ζ , the shortfall of playing a in node v is ∆ ω ( v , a ) := min σ ℓ ( ǫ | c v ( a ) , σ, ζ ) − min σ ℓ ( ǫ | v , σ, ζ ) Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 5

  10. Responsibility Function Scenario, strategy A scenario ζ ∈ Z ∼ resolves all ambiguity and information uncertainty A strategy σ ∈ Σ of a group G ⊆ I selects actions for all future decision nodes. Hypothetical shortfall Given a scenario ζ , the shortfall of playing a in node v is ∆ ω ( v , a ) := min σ ℓ ( ǫ | c v ( a ) , σ, ζ ) − min σ ℓ ( ǫ | v , σ, ζ ) Responsibility R ( v , a ) := ζ ∈ Z ∼ ( v ) ∆ ω ( v , ζ, a ) max Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 5

  11. Criteria Differentiated control groups Uncertainty Ethically (un)desired outcomes Non-linearity Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 6

  12. Game specification Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 7

  13. Game specification Phase 1 : 10 rounds appropriation Phase 2 : 10 rounds mitigation Mitigation goal: 0.53 of total ap- propriation (phase 1). Appropriate 0 , . . . , 4 of the com- Contribute 0 , . . . , 4 to mitigation mon resource. effort. Differentiated case: half of the If the mitigation effort is not agents only start in round 6. met, everyone loses everything with a certain probability p , which increases step-wise from 2 6 12 to 11 9 12 to 12 to 12 with rising total appropriation. Everyone’s choices are made public after each round. Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 8

  14. Game specification Two between-subject treatments ◮ Baseline development ◮ Endogeneous differentiated development Players in the US and China Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 9

  15. Computing responsibility Phase 1: appropriation Phase 2: mitigation -4 i i -20 others 0 0 others 1 2 i -4 3 0 i 4 0 0 i 1-p others others p others -4 0 i 20 1-p 1 -20 2 i 0 3 p 4 others i others -4 1-p 0 i 0 p Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 10

  16. Computing responsibility Except for limit cases (that do not occur in the observed situations), responsibility in phase one is as follows: If we are not in reach of any of the thresholds: 0 When the first appropriation threshold might be crossed: 1 3 When the second appropriation threshold might be crossed: 1 4 When the last appropriation threshold might be crossed: 1 6 Unless agents choose 0 appropriation, in which case the responsibility is also 0 Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 11

  17. Expected behaviour change Always ensure R = 0 4 3 2 1 t1 Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 12

  18. Expected behaviour change Instead: Always ensure R = 0  0 with probability   a i , t = p = λ R ( v , nd t ) 4  3 else nd t  2 where nd t is the mean of what 1 agents selected in the experi- t1 ments in the non-differentiated case in round t . Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 12

  19. Expected behaviour change United States China 4 Expected appropriation 3,5 3 2,5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Period Period Figure: Expected value of the appropriation of the early developer group, E [ a i , t | λ = 0 . 5]. Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 13

  20. Experimental Results Results for mean appropriation per period in both treatment groups, taken from Kline et al. (2018) Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 14

  21. Discussion and Future Work Discussion Curves are shifted between experimental results and computed expectation - possibly due to agents acting according to expectations ⇒ We will not consider this, for normative reasons No account of partial contribution in our framework ⇒ Could include in future variant of a responsibility function Future work Application with other games Extend responsibility function accordingly Sarah Hiller | Anna-Katharina Kothe GaNe Future Lab 15

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend