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Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols Gildas Avoine Universit e catholique de Louvain, Belgium Workshop on Cryptography for the Internet of Things November 20 21, 2012, Antwerp, Belgium SUMMARY Relay Attacks Distance Bounding


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Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols

Gildas Avoine Universit´ e catholique de Louvain, Belgium

Workshop on Cryptography for the Internet of Things November 20 – 21, 2012, Antwerp, Belgium

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SUMMARY

Relay Attacks Distance Bounding Distance Bounding Protocols Discussion

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RELAY ATTACKS

Relay Attacks Distance Bounding Distance Bounding Protocols Discussion

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1976

Chess Grand master problem (Conway 1976)

  • J. H. Conway. On Numbers and Games. Number 6 in London Mathematical Society Monographs, 1976.

Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 4

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1987

Feige-Fiat-Shamir ZK Protocol (1987) Shamir: “I can go to a Mafia-owned store a million successive times and they still will not be able to misrepresent themselves as me.” (Gleick quoting Shamir, 1987) Desmedt, Goutier, Bengio (1987): Mafia fraud

Desmedt, Goutier, and Bengio. Special Uses and Abuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol. CRYPTO’87 Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 5

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2006

Radio link over 50 meters (Hancke 2006).

  • Hancke. Practical Attacks on Proximity Identification Systems. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2006

Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 6

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2011

Attacks by Francillon, Danev, ˇ Capkun against passive car keyless entry and ignition systems (2011).

Francillon, Danev, and ˇ

  • Capkun. Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars.

Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2011 Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 7

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Today and Tomorrow

Implementation included in libNFC (PN53x readers).

Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 8

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DISTANCE BOUNDING

Relay Attacks Distance Bounding Distance Bounding Protocols Discussion

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Distance Bounding Based on the Speed of Light

Measure the round-trip-time (RTT) of an auth. message

  • Provide a bound on the distance.
  • Idea introduced by Beth and Desmedt (1990).

Tag Reader Neighborhood Computation Beth and Desmedt. Identification Tokens - or: Solving the Chess Grandmaster Problem. CRYPTO’90. Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 10

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Distance Bounding

Definition (Avoine et al. 2011) A distance bounding is a process whereby one party is assured:

1 Of the identity of a second party, 2 That the latter is present in the neighborhood of the verifying

party, at some point in the protocol.

Reader Tag Adversary Reader Tag

Distance bounding does not avoid relay attacks.

Avoine, Bing¨

  • l, Kardas, Lauradoux, and Martin.

A Framework for Analyzing RFID Distance Bounding Protocols, 2011. Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 11

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Mafia and Terrorist Frauds

Definition (Mafia Fraud) A mafia fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a distance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle (MITM) between the reader and an honest tag located outside the neighborhood.

Adversary Tag Reader

Definition (Terrorist Fraud) A terrorist fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a distance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle (MITM) between the reader and a dishonest tag located outside of the neighborhood, such that the latter actively helps the adversary to maximize her attack success probability, without giving to her any advantage for future attacks.

Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 12

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Distance Fraud

Definition (Distance Fraud) Given a distance bounding protocol, a distance fraud is an attack where a dishonest and lonely prover purports to be in the neighborhood of the verifier.

Tag Reader

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Real Life

ISO 14443 already includes a timeout. Mifare Plus has a distance bounding protocol.

Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 14

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Distance Bounding Based on the Speed of Light

Reader Neighborhood computation Accelerated Tag Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 15

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DISTANCE BOUNDING PROTOCOLS

Relay Attacks Distance Bounding Distance Bounding Protocols Discussion

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Brands and Chaum’s Protocol (1993)

Verifier (secret k) Prover (secret k) Start of fast phase for i = 1 to n Start Clock

Ci∈R{0,1}

− − − − − − − − − − − → Stop Clock

Ri∈R{0,1}

← − − − − − − − − − − − Check ∆ti ≤ ∆tmax End of fast phase Check signature

Signk(C1||R1||···||Cn||Rn)

← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −

Question

1 Mafia fraud:

1

2

n

2 Terrorist fraud: 1 3 Distance fraud: 1

Brands and Chaum, Distance-Bounding Protocols, EUROCRYPT’93. Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 17

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Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol (2005)

Reader Tag (secret K) (secret K) Pick a random Na Pick a random Nb

Na

− − − − − − − →

Nb

← − − − − − − − h(K, Na, Nb) =

  • v0

= 1 1 1 1 1 v1 = 1 1 1 1 1 Start of fast bit exchange for i = 1 to n Pick Ci ∈R {0, 1} Start Clock

Ci

− − − − − − − → Ri = v0

i , if Ci = 0

v1

i , if Ci = 1

Stop Clock

Ri

← − − − − − − − Check: △ti ≤ tmax Check: correctness of Ri End of fast bit exchange

Question

1 Mafia fraud:

3

4

n

2 Terrorist fraud: 1 3 Distance fraud:

3

4

n

Hancke and Kuhn. An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol. SecureComm 2005. Gildas Avoine Relay Attacks and Distance Bounding Protocols 18

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DISCUSSION

Relay Attacks Distance Bounding Distance Bounding Protocols Discussion

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Current Issues

Improving the security w.r.t. the three frauds. Propagation delays are much shorter than processing times. Filling the gap between theory and practice. Defining clear adversary’s capabilities. Provably secure distance-bounding protocols: Serge Vaudenay’s talk.

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Relay Attack in Chess (Chess Olympiad 2010)

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