Regulatory Impact Analysis
Suyash Rai, Carnegie India November 21, 2019
1
Regulatory Impact Analysis Suyash Rai, Carnegie India November 21, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Regulatory Impact Analysis Suyash Rai, Carnegie India November 21, 2019 1 Outline 1. Introduction and rationale 2. Making Regulatory Impact Analysis useful 3. Steps in Regulatory Impact Analysis 2 Introduction Regulatory Impact Analysis
1
2
3
◮ evaluation of the problem ◮ the objective and intended effect of regulation ◮ consideration of alternative options ◮ assessment of all their impacts ◮ compliance strategies ◮ monitoring and evaluation system
3
◮ Mitigate the principal-agent problems of delegation ◮ Make regulatory agencies engage with and be responsive
◮ Place on-going constraints on regulatory agencies
4
◮ Mitigate the principal-agent problems of delegation ◮ Make regulatory agencies engage with and be responsive
◮ Place on-going constraints on regulatory agencies
◮ Induce optimisation: alternatives are compared using a
◮ Give grounds to resist pressures from interest groups
4
◮ Mitigate the principal-agent problems of delegation ◮ Make regulatory agencies engage with and be responsive
◮ Place on-going constraints on regulatory agencies
◮ Induce optimisation: alternatives are compared using a
◮ Give grounds to resist pressures from interest groups
4
◮ Reasoning primarily serves a social function (Mercier and
◮ Confirmation bias: we use reasoning to find evidence to
◮ High bar for evidence that goes against our intuitive views,
5
6
◮ Exploratory: choose the best regulation ◮ Confirmatory: provide evidence for a given conclusion ◮ Reputational: signal credibility by conducting RIA in
6
7
8
◮ given in the primary law, ◮ prescribed by the government, or ◮ decided by the regulator
◮ weightage of impact on low-income households ◮ inter-generational equity
8
◮ given in the primary law, ◮ prescribed by the government, or ◮ decided by the regulator
◮ weightage of impact on low-income households ◮ inter-generational equity
8
◮ Board structure, not all-powerful Chairperson ◮ Emphasis on diversity of boards, with a few non-experts ◮ Emphasis on consensus, with possibility of majority
9
◮ Board structure, not all-powerful Chairperson ◮ Emphasis on diversity of boards, with a few non-experts ◮ Emphasis on consensus, with possibility of majority
◮ Regulation-making process to be structured around RIA
◮ Transparent and communicative consultation process
9
◮ Board structure, not all-powerful Chairperson ◮ Emphasis on diversity of boards, with a few non-experts ◮ Emphasis on consensus, with possibility of majority
◮ Regulation-making process to be structured around RIA
◮ Transparent and communicative consultation process
◮ Investment in information collection and research systems ◮ Information sharing across agencies ◮ Build analytical capabilities
9
10
11
12
13
◮ address a significant market failure: eg. market power,
◮ promote certain features of a market: eg. neutrality of
14
15
◮ Establish an optimised scenario ◮ Consider market forces within existing legal and
◮ Assume reasonable innovation and progress
◮ Do nothing: baseline scenario ◮ Command and control ◮ Nudge towards self-regulation ◮ Incentive-based (eg. performance-linked penalties) ◮ Market-based (eg. competition; disclosures)
16
◮ Dynamic Spectrum Access and Database on Spectrum
◮ Incentive auctions ◮ Monetary penalties for license breaches
17
18
◮ Within the territorial boundaries of India ◮ Include as many stakeholders as feasible: probability of
◮ Comprehensive identification of consequences requires an
19
20
21
Methodology Suitable when Cost- benefit analysis Monetise costs and benefits for regulatory alternatives, and recommend the option with highest net present value When monetisation of benefits and costs is feasible, and the decision to regulate has not yet been taken, and the best regulation is to be found out 22
Methodology Suitable when Cost- benefit analysis Monetise costs and benefits for regulatory alternatives, and recommend the option with highest net present value When monetisation of benefits and costs is feasible, and the decision to regulate has not yet been taken, and the best regulation is to be found out Cost- effectiveness analysis Quantify the benefits (no monetisation), and monetise the costs. Recommend the lowest cost alternative When monetisation of benefits is not feasible, and the decision to regulate has been taken 22
Methodology Suitable when Cost- benefit analysis Monetise costs and benefits for regulatory alternatives, and recommend the option with highest net present value When monetisation of benefits and costs is feasible, and the decision to regulate has not yet been taken, and the best regulation is to be found out Cost- effectiveness analysis Quantify the benefits (no monetisation), and monetise the costs. Recommend the lowest cost alternative When monetisation of benefits is not feasible, and the decision to regulate has been taken Multi- criteria analysis Identify criteria for achievement
criteria based on relative importance (use expert surveys). Recommend option with the highest score When quantification of at least some of the major regulatory impacts is not feasible 22
Methodology Suitable when Cost- benefit analysis Monetise costs and benefits for regulatory alternatives, and recommend the option with highest net present value When monetisation of benefits and costs is feasible, and the decision to regulate has not yet been taken, and the best regulation is to be found out Cost- effectiveness analysis Quantify the benefits (no monetisation), and monetise the costs. Recommend the lowest cost alternative When monetisation of benefits is not feasible, and the decision to regulate has been taken Multi- criteria analysis Identify criteria for achievement
criteria based on relative importance (use expert surveys). Recommend option with the highest score When quantification of at least some of the major regulatory impacts is not feasible Break- even analysis Estimate the costs of regulation, and evaluate effectiveness
benefits to justify the costs Costs known, but effectiveness
benefit is debatable 22
◮ Relatively easy to monetise: eg. compliance
◮ Can be quantified, but difficult to monetise: eg.
◮ Very difficult to quantify: eg. values such as privacy
◮ ’externalities’ or unmarketed spillover effects ◮ goods affected by taxes and subsidies ◮ goods subject to import or export restrictions ◮ labour inputs in the presence of unemployment
23
◮ Displaced investment: social cost of capital (SOC) ◮ Decreased consumption: social rate of time preference
24
25% VoIP growth 40% VoIP growth Costs (££) 10,204,664 10,204,664 Benefits (££) 23,833,805 33,851,698 Net benefits (££) 13,634,141 23,647,034
25
1https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/
26
◮ Estimating the costs of the regulation ◮ Evaluation of regulations on their effectiveness in
◮ Judgments by policy-makers on the effectiveness and size
27
◮ Identify criteria that indicate achievement of a policy
◮ Rank the criteria (assign weights) in terms of their
2https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/
28
◮ Assign scores to each regulatory option for each criterion ◮ Calculate weighted scores to compare options
29
Weightage Fluoride regulation Advertising campaign Free dentist visits Effectiveness in improving dental health 4 5 (20) 3 (12) 3 (12) Ability to address existing dental problems 2 0 (0) 1 (2) 5 (10) Ability to improve dental health of the poorest groups 2 4 (8) 2 (4) 5 (10) Ability to improve health in all regions 1 5 (5) 5 (5) 3 (3) Cost (higher score for lower cost) 4 5 (20) 4 (16) 2 (8) Score 53 39 43 30
31
◮ Worst/ best case scenario analysis — using most
◮ Partial sensitivity analysis for key risk factors ◮ Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis — complex; uses
32
33
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 Total (NPV) Set-up costs (£) 7,054,516 7,054,516 Ongoing costs (£) 674,105 651,310 629,285 608,005 587,444 3,150,148 Total indus- try costs (£) 7,728,622 651,310 629,285 608,005 587,444 10,204,664
34
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 Total (NPV) Set-up costs (£) 17,703,722 17,703,722 Ongoing costs (£) 1,078,568 1,042,095 1,006,855 972,807 939,910 5,040,234 Total indus- try costs (£) 18,782,290 1,042,095 1,006,855 972,807 939,910 22,743,956
35
36
37
◮ Problem trees: root causes -> core problem -> effects ◮ Objective trees: regulation -> layers of objectives ◮ Intervention logic diagrams: regulation -> results ->
38