Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA): Challenges and New - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA): Challenges and New - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Feb 05, 2024 90 likes •270 views

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA): Challenges and New Considerations Michael J. Campola NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects

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SLIDE 1

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA): Challenges and New Considerations

Michael J. Campola NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

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SLIDE 2

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

Acronyms

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COTS Commercial Off The Shelf DD Displacement Damage GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center LEO Low Earth Orbit LET Linear Energy Transfer MBU Multi-Bit Upset MCU Multi-Cell Upset NEPP NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging RDM Radiation Design Margin RHA Radiation Hardness Assurance SEB Single Event Burnout SEDR Single Event Dielectric Rupture SEE Single Event Effects SEFI Single Event Functional Interrupt SEGR Single Event Gate Rupture SEL Single Event Latchup SOA Safe Operating Area TID Total Ionizing Dose

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SLIDE 3

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

RHA Challenges

  • New Technologies
  • Device Topology / Speed / Power
  • Modeling the Physics of Failure
  • Increased COTS parts / subsystem usage
  • Traceability
  • Packaging / Copper bond wires
  • Thermal constraints
  • Translation of system requirements into

radiation pass / fail criteria

  • Determining appropriate mitigation level

(operational, system, circuit, software, device, material, etc.)

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To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

RHA Challenges

(The list goes on…)

  • Testing
  • Device topology / beam access
  • Specialized equipment needs
  • Test Facility Access
  • More users / less time
  • Wide range of mission profiles and needs
  • CubeSats / SmallSats
  • New targets
  • Continued service builds
  • Always in a dynamic environment

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SLIDE 5

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

RHA Flow Doesn’t Change With Risk or Mission

  • Define the Environment

– External to the spacecraft

  • Evaluate the Environment

– Internal to the spacecraft

  • Define the Requirements

– Define criticality factors

  • Evaluate Design/Components

– Existing data/Testing – Performance characteristics

  • “Engineer” with Designers

– Parts replacement/Mitigation schemes

  • Iterate Process

– Review parts list based on updated knowledge

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K.A. LaBel, A.H. Johnston, J.L. Barth, R.A. Reed, C.E. Barnes, “Emerging Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) issues: A NASA approach for space flight programs,” IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., pp. 2727-2736, Dec. 1998.

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SLIDE 6

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

Risk Acceptance Will Change

  • Mission Profiles Are Expanding
  • Based on mission life, objective, and cost
  • Oversight gives way to insight for lower class
  • Ground systems, do no harm, hosted payloads
  • Similarity and heritage data requirement widening
  • In some cases unbounded radiation risks are likely
  • Part Classifications Growing
  • Mil/Aero vs. Industrial
  • Automotive vs. Commercial

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Credits: NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center/Bill Hrybyk

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SLIDE 7

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

Summary of Environmental Hazards

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Plasma (charging) Trapped Protons Trapped Electrons Solar Particles Cosmic Rays Human Presence Long Lifetime (>10 years) Nuclear Exposure Repeated Launch Extreme Temperature Planetary Contaminates (Dust, etc) GEO Yes No Severe Yes Yes No Yes No No No No LEO (low- incl) No Yes Moderate No No No Not usual No No No No LEO Polar No Yes Moderate Yes Yes No Not usual No No No No ISS No Yes Moderate Yes - partial Minimal Yes Yes No Yes No No Interplanetary During phasing

  • rbits;

Possible Other Planet During phasing

  • rbits;

Possible Other Planet During phasing

  • rbits;

Possible Other Planet Yes Yes No Yes Maybe No Yes Maybe Exploration – Lunar, Mars, Jupiter Phasing

  • rbits

During phasing

  • rbits

During phasing

  • rbits

Yes Yes Possibly Yes Maybe No Yes Yes https://radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov/radhome/papers/SSPVSE05_LaBel.pdf

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SLIDE 8

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

Two Example Missions

  • LEO Technology Demonstration
  • SEE more of a driver than TID
  • Un-vetted technology

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  • Interplanetary Asset
  • Mission objectives
  • Exotic environment at target

K.A. LaBel, J.A. Pellish, “Notional Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) Planning For NASA Missions: Updated Guidance” HEART Conference 2014.

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SLIDE 9

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

RHA Risk Acceptance

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  • Define the Environment

– External to the spacecraft

  • Evaluate the Environment

– Internal to the spacecraft

  • Define the Requirements

– Define criticality factors

  • Evaluate Design/Components

– Existing data/Testing – Performance characteristics

  • “Engineer” with Designers

– Parts replacement/Mitigation schemes

  • Iterate Process

– Review parts list based on updated knowledge

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SLIDE 10

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017 10

Environment/Lifetime Low Medium High Criticality High

Dose-Depth / Worst Case SEE Rate Dose-Depth evaluation at thinnest shielding / SEE Rate Calculation Ray-Trace for subsystem / SEE Criticality Analysis

Medium

Dose-Depth / SEE do no harm Dose-Depth / Worst Case SEE Rate Dose-Depth evaluation at thinnest shielding / SEE Rate Calculation

Low

Similar mission dose, same solar cycle / SEE do no harm Dose-Depth / Worst Case SEE Rate Dose-Depth / SEE Rate Calculation

Interplanetary Asset

Environment/Lifetime Low Medium High Criticality High

Ray-Trace for subsystem / SEE Criticality Analysis Ray-Trace for subsystem / SEE Criticality Analysis Full Ray-Trace / SEE Criticality Analysis

Medium

Dose-Depth evaluation at thinnest shielding / SEE Rate Calculation Ray-Trace for subsystem / SEE Rate Calculation Ray-Trace for subsystem / SEE Criticality Analysis

Low

Dose-Depth / SEE do no harm Dose-Depth / Worst Case SEE Rate Dose-Depth evaluation at thinnest shielding / SEE Rate Calculation

LEO Tech Demo

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SLIDE 11

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

New Considerations: NEPP Efforts to Improve RHA

  • Define / Evaluate the Environment
  • Inclusion of Environment Variability

»

  • M. Xapsos; C. Stauffer; A. Phan; S. McClure; R. Ladbury; J. Pellish; M. Campola; K. LaBel, "Inclusion of Radiation

Environment Variability in Total Dose Hardness Assurance Methodology," in IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science , vol.PP, no.99, pp.1-1.

  • Define the Requirements
  • Requirements by Technology

»

JESD57 updates, establishes testing procedures.

»

NEPP RHA guideline & Small Mission RHA .

  • Evaluate Design/Components and “Engineer” with Designers
  • Bayesian Methodologies

»

  • R. Ladbury, J. L. Gorelick, M. A. Xapsos, T. O'Connor and S. Demosthenes, "A Bayesian Treatment of Risk for Radiation

Hardness Assurance," 2005 8th European Conference on Radiation and Its Effects on Components and Systems, Cap d'Agde, 2005, pp. PB1-1-PB1-8.

»

Ron Schrimpf’s MRQW talk before the break.

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To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

Inclusion of Environment Variability

  • Confidence levels on environment external to the spacecraft account for variation.
  • Transport to spacecraft’s internal environment remains the same.
  • Convolution of part failure distribution with environment confidence removes the

ambiguity of RDM while maintaining/tailoring conservatism for TID/DD.

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SLIDE 13

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

Requirements by Technology

  • SEL, SEB
  • Environment driven, risk avoidance
  • Protection circuitry / diode deratings
  • SEGR, SEDR
  • Effect driven, normally incident is worst case
  • Testing to establish Safe Operating Area (SOA)
  • MBU, MCU, SEFI, Locked States
  • Only invoked on devices that can exhibit the

effect

  • Watchdogs / reset capability
  • Proton SEE susceptible parts are evaluated

as determined here:

https://nepp.nasa.gov/files/25401/Proton_RHAGuide_NASAAug09.pdf

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SLIDE 14

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

Bayesian Methodology

  • Likelihood of Schottky Diode SEE

failure at 0.5 -0.75 VR (binomial)

  • All data (110/207)
  • Manufacturer data (33/42)
  • Part family data (23/30)
  • 100V parts (19/42)
  • Priors

1.

Flat prior, uninformed

2.

Beta, informed by total failing at VR (140/207)

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Likelihood: All Manufacture Family 100V Credible Set 95% 99% 95% 99% 95% 99% 95% 99% Prior 1 .598 .618 .882 .907 .881 .909 .601 .645 Prior 2 .650 .667 .845 .864 .843 .864 .737 .761

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SLIDE 15

To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

Summary

  • Challenges identified in the past are here to stay
  • RHA flow doesn’t change, risk acceptance needs to be tailored
  • Varied missions profiles and environments don’t necessarily benefit

from the same risk reduction efforts or cost reduction attempts

  • We need data with statistical methods in mind
  • Risks versus rewards can have big impact on mission enabling

technologies

  • Sponsor: NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program

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To be presented by M. J. Campola at the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium coupled with the. Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop in La Jolla, California May 22-25, 2017

THANK YOU

michael.j.campola@nasa.gov

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