Questions of Trust Jason Quinley, Christopher Ahern University of T - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Questions of Trust

Jason Quinley, Christopher Ahern

University of T¨ ubingen, University of Pennsylvania

August 13, 2012

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Goals

Explain existence of polite linguistic behavior in various contexts. What are polite linguistic expressions? Why do we use polite expressions? When do we use polite expressions?

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Talk Outline

1

Introduction

2

Politeness Theory

3

Game Theory

4

Trust and Modals

5

Conclusion

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Consider the following...

Questions

Will/Would you lend me a dollar? Will/Would you open the door? Will/Would you turn that music down? Will/Would you marry me?

Answers

Would seems more appropriate for the first three, whereas will a is better in the last.

aDo you want to will always suffice here.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Why be polite?

Scarcity

Resources are limited, life requires cooperation.

Ambiguity

Information regarding the intentions of other is not always abundant.

Politeness

Offers a strategic solution for these two problems and increasing the range of interactions between individuals with other-regarding preferences.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

What politeness gets us

Humor(/Cruelty)

A: Would you marry me? B: I would if you were rich/handsome/x! (A: Well I was just asking hypothetically.) We commit ourselves to actions by our words. The ways in which this plays

• ut reveals the underlying structure of the games being played.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Crucial points from politeness theory

Face Face-threatening acts (FTAs) Strategic handling of FTAs

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face

What is face? Autonomy and Affiliation

Brown and Levinson (1978)

Face (Goffman, 1982) consists of an individual’s basic needs: Negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, right to non-distraction, i.e. freedom of action and freedom from imposition. Positive face: the positive consistent self-image or ’personality’ (including the approval by others of this self-image) claimed by interactants.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face-threatening acts

Face-threatening acts

When situations call for it...

Speakers must commit a face-threatening act (FTA). In order to mitigate the weight of a FTA, speakers may use several strategies. Intention Don’t do FTA Do FTA Off Record On Record Redress Negative Politeness Positive Politeness Don’t Redress

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Crucial points from game theory

Sequential Games Cooperation vs. Coordination Preferences vs. Payoffs

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games

Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma

X Y (2,2) C (0,3) D C Y (3,0) C (1,1) D D B

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games

Coordination: Pure Coordination Game

X Y (1,1) A (0,0) B A Y (0,0) A (1,1) B B B

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Formal Mechanisms for Analyzing Trust

Trust Games Other-regarding preferences Self-enforcing equilibria

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Trust Games

Consist of...

An Investor and a Trustee. Investor begins with an Initial endowment, which he can keep or invest. If he invests the endowment with the Trustee it grows by some amount/ The Trustee must then decide what amount, if any, to return to the Investor.

Cooperation

Trustee does best when he keeps all money invested. Knowing this, Investor should never invest. Everyone does worse than they could by cooperating.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Requests as Trust Games

Quinley (2012)

Asymmetries in abilities lead to requests. Requests involve a loss of face on the part of the requester, and carry a risk that the request will be denied. X can ask (A) or not ask Y (¬A) to grant a request. Y can grant (G) or not grant (¬G) the request.

Main Results

Repetition, reputation, and observation increase trust and requests (probability

• f cooperation).

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Requests as Extended Trust Games

More Structure

X can ask (A) or not ask Y (¬A) to grant a request. Y can grant (G) or not grant (¬G) the request. X can thank (T) Y for granting the request, or not (¬T).

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Game Structure

X ¬ A Y ¬ G G A X ¬ A Y ¬G X ¬T T G A

Figure: Classic vs. Extended Request Trust Game: Player X can choose to Ask (A) something from Player Y, who can then choose to Grant (G) the favor. Player X can choose to Thank (T) or not Thank (¬T) player Y.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Payoff Structure

Costs

cx is the cost to X to achieve desired outcome. cy is cost to Y. (cy < cx) bx is the benefit to X of Y granting request. (bx < cx)

Face

A requires face “payment” fr by X. Y receives mrfr from A. (mr > 1) T requires face “payment” ft by X. Y receives mtft from T. (mt > 1)

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Payoff Structure

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

What to expect

Rollback Equilibrium(Backward Induction)

X prefers ¬T to T Y prefers ¬G to ¬T X prefers ¬A to ¬G

Result

No one should ever make requests because they will never be granted. Yet we can, and do, make polite requests of strangers we will never interact with

• again. Why is this possible?

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Other-Regarding Preferences

Homo economicus or Homo empathicus

Theoretical (Rabin 1993, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Levine 1998) Behavioral (Fehr & Schmidt 2003, Camerer 2003) Neurobiological (Fehr 2009)

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Other-Regarding Preferences

Sympathy (Sally 2000, 2001)

Sympathy Distribution

For each agent, there is a distribution, δi ∈ ∆(U), such that ∑j δi(Uj) = 1, which determines how much that agent cares about her own payoffs and those

• f others.

Homo economicus: Classical Utility

δi(Uj) = 0 for all j = i.

New utility function

Vi = δi(Ui)·Ui +(1−δi(Ui))·Uj

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

When do we thank people?

Condition

It suffices for X to prefer T to ¬T for Vx(T) > Vx(¬T), which is true when: δx(Uy) >

1 1+mt

Interpretation

The greater the benefit to Y for thanking, the less X has to care about Ys payoff to do so.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

When to grant a request?

Condition

It suffices for Y to prefer T to ¬G for Vy(T) > Vy(¬G), which is true when:

(cy−mtft) (cy−mtft)+bx+cx−ft < δy(Ux)

Interpretation

The greater the benefit to X relative to cx and cy determines this threshold. If cx is much greater than cy this becomes very small.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

Some Examples

You see a stranger with arms full of boxes struggling to open a door

X: “Would you mind opening the door for me?” Y: “Sure!” It would seem unreasonable to not help in this context, suggesting that we have a general expectation of a minimum degree of other-regard

You forgot your watch and your phone has died

X: “Excuse me. Could you tell me the time please?” Y: “F@!k you!” This actually occured (Asher, 2012). What is shocking about this example is that it shows a total lack of other-regard. Took place in New York City, make

• f that what you will.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

The main effect of politeness

What happens without face?

System without face boils down to a choice on the part of Y, where granting is better if Vy′(¬G) < Vy′(G), which holds when:

cy cy+bx+cx < δy′(Ux′)

Compared to system with face

System with face has lower threshold when δy(Ux) < δy′(Ux′), which is true when:

cy bx+cx < mt

Given that cx > cy and mt > 1, this is always true.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

The main effect of politeness

What face buys you

A system of requests with polite forms that address face wants requires a lower threshold of other-regarding preferences than one without such means

• f addressing face wants. This can be thought of in two ways:

1

The same requests can be made between more distant individuals.

2

More requests can be made between individuals with a given relationship.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Credible Signaling

Proposals: Will/Would

Xavier: Would you marry me? Yvonne: I would...if you were rich. Xavier:*Sigh* (or) Yvonne: Yes!!! Xavier:Woah, I was just asking hypothetically! Xavier: Would you like to see a movie? Yvonne: Yeah, there are a few I’d like to see. Xavier: Great! When can I pick you up? Yvonne: Oh! I didn’t realize you meant with you. (or) Yvonne:Yeah! When do you want to go? Xavier:Oh! I didn’t mean with me, just in general.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Credible Signaling

Self-Enforcing Equilibria

Aumann (1990)

C D C 3,3 0,2 D 2,0 1,1 There are two pure strategy Nash Equilibria (C,C) and (D,D). (C,C) is the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Neither player can be sure of what the other player will do, even if they agree beforehand to play C. Why? Both players want the other to play C regardless of what they do. Thus the agreement to play the payoff-dominant equilibrium is not self-enforcing.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Credible Signaling

When using polite form

Strategies

X can ask for information (Ai) or to ask as a request (Ar) Y can interpret statement as asking for information (Mi) or as a request (Mr)

Payoffs

(Ai,Mi) results in some baseline payoff where both players receive 0. (Ar,Mi) results in a loss of effort on the part of X to address Y’s negative face, fn, which is transferred to Y. X is embarrassed by the miscommunication and loses some amount of positive face because Y does not have the same wants as him. (Ai,Mr) results in a loss of positive face on the part of Y. (Ar,Mr) results in a payoff, v, modulo a transfer of negative face.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Credible Signaling

When using polite form

Mr Mi Ar v−fn, v+fn −fn −fp,fn Ai 0,−fp 0,0 Two pure strategy Nash equilibria, if v > fn. (Ar,Mr) is payoff dominant, but not self-enforcing. X wants Y to play Mr regardless of what X does. Similarly, Y wants X to play Ar regardless of what Y does.

When not using polite form

Mr Mi Ar v, v −fp,0 Ai 0,−fp 0,0 Two pure strategy Nash equilibria. (Ar,Mr) is payoff dominant and self-enforcing. X wants Y to play Mr (Mi) only if X plays Ar (Ai).

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Credible Signaling

Why proposals need a “will”

Using the modal will ignores the listener’s negative face, but renders the request self-enforcing. This aligns perfectly with our intuition that one cannot back out after asking “Will you marry me?”. Moreover, this reasoning about face provides a rationale for why commissive speech acts are possible, and the form they take.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Conclusions

Politeness strategies that address face, along with other-regarding preferences, allow requests and trust between a wider range of individuals and relationship types. There is a necessary amount of sympathy between two individuals that suffices to transform a game of cooperation into one of coordination. Face lowers this threshold. would and will differ fundamentally in terms of illocutionary force, and the underlying structure of the interaction. would allows for disavowal and is not necessarily self-enforcing, whereas will as a commissive speech act commits the speaker to a course

• f action by creating common knowledge of preferences.

Revelation of preferences and committal to action open up research directions in game dynamics and epistemic logic’s connections to each

• ther and the semantics-pragmatics interface. I.e. what we will do and

what we want to do share a special link.

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Quinley and Ahern () Questions of Trust August 13, 2012 34 / 35

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Thanks!

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Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

References

Asher (2012) The Non Cooperative Basis of Implicatures Aumann (1990) Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing Brown & Levinson (1978) Politeness Camerer (2003) Behavioral Game Theory Fehr (2009) Social Preferences and the Brain Fehr & Schmidt (1999) A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation Fehr & Schmidt (2003) Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications Goffman (1967) Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior Levine (1998) Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments Quinley(2012) Trust Games as a Model for Requests Rabin (1993) Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics Sally (2000) A General Theory of Sympathy, Mind-Reading, and Social Interaction, with an Application to the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Sally (2001) On Sympathy and Games

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