Published decisions by appellate courts that interpret statutes, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

• Published decisions by appellate

courts that interpret statutes, regulations, and constitutional provisions.

• Case law is the law and must be

followed.

Intentionally violating case law or mistakes in understanding case law can result in:

• Suppression of evidence
• Department Liability
• Your Personal Liability
• Revers

rsal of criminal convictions

The California nia S Supreme C Court a t and nd t the Uni nite ted S State tates S Supreme Court t selec ectivel ely r review c ew cases. ses.

United States Supreme Court

Questions of Federal Law Interprets United States Constitution

United States Court of Appeals

(9th Circuit)

California Supreme Court United States District Court

Federal Habeas Corpus Federal Criminal Cases Civil Rights Cases (Section 1983)

California Court of Appeal

(1st - 6th Districts)

California Superior Courts

58 Counties

Facts ts:

• Distinctive-looking motorcycle escaped in a chase.
• Facebook photos led police to house with that

motorcycle parked in driveway under partial roof.

• Officers went onto driveway and confirmed bike was
• stolen. Defendant challenged the search.

Hel Held: 1) 1) Searc rch wa h was i impr prope per. 2) Officers with probable cause may search a vehicle without a warrant, but o

• nly

y if they have right of access to reach it, such as public access. 3) Here, officers had to walk onto the driveway, which was on “curtilage” of the house, a non- public area similar to a porch or side-yard.

(Pg. 152)

(Pg. 153)

Fa Facts:

• Officers saw defendant sell crack, enter a car, drive away,

return, then exit on foot.

• Defendant was arrested two blocks from car and was

searched, but had no drugs or cash.

• Officers searched the car and found contraband; defendant

challenged the search. He Held: 1) 1) Search wa was pr prope per, but not as search incident to arrest. 2) The search did not take place “when en and nd wher ere” the arrest did. Officers had reason to believe car had evidence related to arrest, but arrestee and car must be in clos

• se proxi
• ximity

ty. 3) 3) However, , sea earch was OK under nder “Automobi bile le Excep eption” because the video provided probable cause in that it showed defendant with crack before entering the car, and then no longer had it when he exited.

Fa Facts:

• Defendant, driving a rental, was pulled over for traffic
• violation. Defendant had fake ID and was not listed on the

car rental agreement.

• Officers searched the car in the field and found 49 bricks
• f heroin, and defendant challenged the search.

Held: d: 1) 1) Remanded ded for further proceedings. 2) The fact that driver is not on the rental contract does not, by itself, eliminate his privacy rights in the car. 3) On the other hand, the fact that a person is driving a car does not, by itself, give him privacy rights to it. (For example, he could be a car thief.) 4) So, on remand, the lower court must decide whether renting a car using fake ID eliminates one’s privacy rights (just like a car thief).

(Pg. 154)

Facts ts:

Zaba bala:

• After traffic stop (suspended license), officer decided to

impound car and conduct “inventory” search in the field.

• Baggies with white powder under the seat led him to

search hidden area behind radio containing drugs.

(Pgs. 157-158)

Wallace:

• After traffic stop &

arrest (outstanding warrant), officer decided there was nobody to take possession of car, so he conducted “inventory” search and found contraband.

• Hel

Held: Both s searches es wer ere i e imp mproper er inventory searches.

• Zabal

ala: Inventory searches are to protect defendant’s property and police safety, not for finding

• contraband. There was no basis to investigate

hidden compartments. (However, search was upheld under automobile exception due to probable cause re: the white powder baggies.)

• Wal

alla lace ce: This was not a true inventory search. Officers did not testify whether the car was ever actually impounded, what basis there was for impound (i.e., car stopped in dangerous place), or whether inventory forms were filled out.

DUI

Facts ts:

Vanne nnesse:

• After accident, officer told defendant he could either

consent to a blood test or have his license suspended (Implied Consent law); Defendant chose blood test.

• Defendant challenged blood draw, saying officer failed

to explain he could have opted for a breath test instead. Ba Balov

• v:
• Officer told defendant under Implied Consent law that he

had to take either a blood or breath test. Defendant agreed to a blood test.

• Defendant challenged blood draw on the basis that
• fficer did not fully inform him that he could refuse both

tests, and the only punishment would be suspension of license.

(Pgs. 155-156)

• Hel

Held: Both h blood d draws we were proper r because failure to strictly follow Implied Consent law does not mean Fourth Amendment was violated. Vannesse: 1) Implied Consent law requires officers to give DUI suspects choice of blood or breath test, and refusal means license suspension. 2) Officer not mentioning breath option, did not violate Fourth Amendment. 3) Officer did not coerce or threaten defendant with criminal penalties if he refused the blood test.

Ba Balov

• v:

1) Officer failed to read the entire Implied Consent statement about how the only penalty for refusing a blood or breath test was license suspension. 2) But this did not undermine defendant’s consent to the blood draw. 3) Fourth Amendment doesn’t require officers to tell suspects that they may refuse to cooperate. ALERT ERT: Calif ifornia ia S Supreme Court ha rt has agre reed t to consider b r both Ba Balov

• v and

d Vanne nnesse sse, s , so s stay ay t tuned.

DUI Blood Tests - Emergencies

Fact acts:

• At hospital, DUI suspect was told he was under

arrest and that blood would be drawn. He did not refuse but did not explicitly consent. No warrant.

• The hospital took one blood sample for

treatment; a second sample was taken for DUI investigation.

• Defendant challenged admission of blood

results.

(Pg. 159)

Hel Held: 1) 1) Forensic blood d draw wa was i impro proper, r, b but its admission i into e evidence ce a at t trial w al was as h har armle less. 2) In emergency, officers may obtain blood sample without warrant, but emergency means more than just a crash/hospitalization. There was no evidence that officer couldn’t have gotten a warrant quickly, had she tried. 3) But because medical staff also drew blood while treating defendant for his injuries, and the BAC of that sample would have been admissible anyway, error was harmless.

Facts:

• Defendant was arrested for arson and, as a

felony arrestee, was ordered to provide a cheek-swab DNA sample; he refused.

• He was later convicted of arson and a

misdemeanor PC 298.1(a) for refusing a DNA test. He argued that the law requiring DNA tests for all felony arrestees is unconstitutional.

(Pg. 160)

He Held: 1) 1) The he D DNA t test l law is l lega gal. 2) Government has a valid interest in identifying

• arrestees. Cheek swab is minimal intrusion,

like a booking fingerprint. 3) Government does not use the DNA to collect genetic information about arrestee other than for identification. 4) Possible future challenges to DNA collection left undecided, e.g., when a suspect is arrested but never charged, or is exonerated.

Stanley ey:

• Bus driver reported passenger who matched description on flier of

a child molester at large: white male, 30, 5’10”, 155 lbs, with a beard.

• Officer detained passenger, learned he was on parole, and

searched him, finding narcotics.

• Passenger was not the child molester, but he was charged for drug
• possession. He challenged detention.

K. K.J.:

• Student texted vice principal that another student had a gun on

campus, but didn’t give suspect’s name. VP called police, who responded and told him to get more info to ID suspect.

• VP contacted tipster again, who described suspect’s gender, race,

and hairstyle, and gave link to social media video of him with the

• gun. VP gave tipster two names of possible suspects, and tipster

ID’d defendant as one of them.

• Officer directed school officials to take defendant out of class;
• fficer detained and searched him, finding gun and ammo.
• Def challenged the detention and the search.

(Pgs. 161-162)

Held ld: Bot

• th detention

ions w were re p proper. r. Stanley ey: 1) Officer had reasonable suspicion justifying a brief detention because defendant matched the age, race, and weight of the suspect and bus driver said he looked similar to flier. 2) Bus driver openly contacted police and was reliable, not a CI. K. K.J.: 1) Police detentions of students at school are OK as long as not arbitrary and capricious; this is a lower standard than reasonable suspicion, which applies to adults. (Police searches of students are still subject to reasonable suspicion.) 2) The detention was not arbitrary – it was based on reliable tip from known student. 3) The search was based on reasonable suspicion because although tipster wished to remain anonymous, the VP knew who she was and she provided many specific details.

(Pgs. 161-162)

Facts ts:

• Officers were conducting a random, routine probation

search at a home where defendant was a guest; pat- down of him and homeowner revealed nothing.

• Defendant was detained for approx. 30 mins before
• fficers were wrongly told by dispatch that he was on
• PRCS. Defendant’s car was searches and found to have

a shotgun and narcotics. Defendant challenged the detention before the search. Held: d: 1) 1) The det e detention w was i improper er. 2) Officers detained defendant 30+mins without reasonable suspicion of a crime before they got the (wrong) PRCS report. 3) There was no suspicion of any crime during the 30 mins, since it had been a random probation search.

(Pg. 163)

Fa Facts: s:

• Officers were called to a loud party at what neighbors said was a

vacant house. They found people drinking and using the property as a makeshift strip club.

• Smelling marijuana and suspecting partygoers were trespassing,
• fficers contacted landlord, who lived elsewhere and said

partygoers did not have permission to be there.

(Pg. 164)

• Partygoers said they

thought they had been given permission by the tenant.

• Partygoers were

arrested but later sued the police for civil rights violations.

Held:

1) 1) The he of

• fficers’ ac

actions/arrests w were pr prop

• per.

2) For party to be a crime, officers must have probable cause that partygoers knew or should have known that they were trespassing. 3) There was probable cause despite partygoers’ claims that they had been “invited” to a party. 4) The house had no furniture except a few chairs and a bare mattress. The floor was so dirty, partygoers refused to sit on it. Multiple people were having sex in an upstairs bedroom. Some partygoers fled when police arrived. Common sense suggests they knew they were not invited houseguests.

Facts ts:

• Officers subpoenaed wireless carrier to provide cell-

site location information (CSLI) on robbery suspects without a search warrant.

• Data showed defendant was in the vicinity of the

robberies when they happened.

• Defendant challenged subpoenas as unlawful

warrantless search of property even though it was held by a third party (i.e., his cell phone provider). Held: d: 1) 1) The s e subp bpoen enas w were ere a a sea earch, a , and nd were ere i improper. 2) Defendant had privacy interest in CSLI even though it was held by a third-party and defendant was free to turn off his phone. It is intimate, detailed information about his daily life. So officers need a warrant per Fourth Amendment. 3) 3) Calif ifornia ia law (Ca CalECPA PA) ) now r requir ires a a warrant anywa way.

(Pg. 165)

Probation Orders with Search Terms

Facts ts:

• Defendant, who entered and then left house suspected
• f being drug den, was stopped for infraction.
• Officer learned defendant was on probation with search

terms for her personal property, so he searched the data on her cell phone, finding texts indicating she was selling drugs.

• Defendant moved to suppress the texts.

Held: d: 1) 1) Search was proper er. 2) California law says that probation conditions are interpreted according to how a reasonable person would understand them. That means “personal property” would include cell phone data. 3) Sandee took place before California’s ECPA took effect, which requires “clear and unambiguous” search waivers. It’s possible that future courts could require more than just “personal property” search terms to cover cell phones.

(Pg. 166)

Facts ts:

• Defendant assaulted and attempted to rob victims using

a toy pistol, including by pistol-whipping. He had addiction problems and a troubled family life.

• Defendant was placed on probation with search terms of

his electronic devices.

• He argued that the probation condition was too broad,

since computers/electronics had nothing to do with his crimes. Held: d: 1) 1) Pr Prob

• bati

tion con

• nditi

tions were prop

• per because they were

reasonably related to his conviction. 2) Defendant’s troubled personal life (drugs, crime, family suicides, poverty) put him at a “crossroads.” 3) Temporary supervision of his electronic media would help make sure he reforms his behavior.

(Pg. 167)

“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” United States Constitution

When Is an Interrogation “Custodial” ?

Fact acts:

• Defendant suspected of child molestation agreed to

speak to officers in police vehicle after being told he was not under arrest and was free to refuse. Defendant had no formal education.

• Officers used ruses to induce a confession, e.g.,

saying they had linked DNA from his hand to victim’s body/clothes, that she had accused him during a polygraph test, and that he should just confess because his conduct was not so bad. Officers said that they would leave as soon as defendant told the truth.

• Defendant challenged failure to give Miranda

warnings during this interview.

(Pgs. 168-169)

Held: Interrogat

• gation
• n w

was i improp

• per

er.

Miranda warnings (right to remain silent, right to an attorney) must be given in any “custodial”

• interrogation. Whether interrogation is custodial

depends on...

a) a) Who i initiat ated ed c contac act- pol

• lice or
• r

sus uspect? t? b) b) Would a aver erag age p per erson f feel el f free ee t to leave? e? c) c) Loc

• cation a
• n and d

duration o

• n of questioni

ning? ng? d) d) Number er o

• f officer

cers? e) e) Demeanor nor o

• f o
• fficers? (

(e.g. g., aggre ressive?) f) f) Did id o

• ffic

icers m mak ake cr crim imin inal accus usati tions? g) g) Restri tricti tions o

• n s

suspect’ t’s mo movement? t?

Held:

1) At first, the interrogation was not custodial because defendant was told he was free to leave. 2) 2) But i it beca came custodial al after:

a) Officers pressured defendant with nonexistent evidence b) Officers asked accusatory, leading questions (suggested acts of molestation he may have done and asked him to choose which was true) c) Officers assured defendant that they could prove his guilt no matter what he said, and that he should confess to placate the judge d) Officers minimized defendant’s suspected conduct and assured him that denying it would be worse than confessing Altogether, these tactics would have caused the average person to feel they were not free to leave; Miranda should have been given.

Fact acts:

• Similar to Torres - Molestation suspect agreed to

interview at police station. Officer said he was not being arrested “right now” and could leave if he wanted.

• However, officer then spoke for 40 minutes about

how he was sure suspect was guilty, that DNA would prove it, and he should just confess.

• After denying it 25 times, he ultimately confessed.

He was allowed to leave but arrested a block away.

(Pg. 170)

He Held:

1) 1) As As i in Torre res, interr rrogation wa was i impro proper r due t to lack ack o

• f Miranda

a warn rnin ing. 2) The interrogation began without pressure, but eventually beca came c custodial al:

a) The purpose of interview was to interrogate defendant as a suspect in a police interrogation room b) Officer minimized crime and offered suspect excuses (“sometimes we make mistakes”) to induce confession c) Officer flatly accused suspect of lying about molesting victims; a reasonable person would not feel free to leave d) Officer falsely claimed there was DNA evidence (this would be fine if Miranda was given) e) Officer allowed suspect to leave, but then he was arrested minutes later

f) f) Just sayi ying g “you you’re f free t to l leave” ( (Beh ehel eler er) ) does n not necessarily m make interro rogati tion wi witho hout Mi Mirand nda OK OK

Interviews of Juveniles

Facts ts:

• Defendant was 12-year old interrogated four times

without Miranda re: stabbing death of his eight-year old

• sister. He made incriminating statements.
• Int

nterviews o

• ne a

ne and nd two (at hospital and DA’s office):

1) No pressure by father or police 2) At hospital, there was a single non-confrontational officer 3) At DA’s office suspect told he was free to leave, 4) A cat was roaming around and father was in adjacent room

• Inter

erview ews t three ee and f four ( (at DA’s office): :

1) Consent given by father rather than suspect 2) Suspect separated from parent 3) Closed doors in interview room 4) No promise that he could leave 5) Suspect expressed desire not to return after a break 6) When father came back, he pressed suspect to confess before officers reentered

(Pg. 171-172)

He Held: 1) 1) Third a and fourth i h interrogat

• gations
• ns we

were i imp mprope per due to lack of Miranda warnings. 2) The second two interviews involved repeated criminal accusations from officers, separation from and then pressure by family, and ambiguous statements about whether he was free to leave. 3) A reasonable 12-year old in defendant’s position, being offered no choice whether to participate and no assurance he could leave, would have perceived the interrogations as custodial.

Invocation of Miranda Rights

Fact acts:

• Defendant was told he was being interviewed

re: a robbery/murder and read his Miranda rights.

• Asked if he wanted to talk, he said “No, not

about a robbery/murder.”

• Officers then asked some background

questions, but soon started asking about defendant’s alibi at the time of the murders. He continued to respond to questioning.

• Defendant challenged the interrogation, saying
• fficers kept questioning him even after he

invoked Miranda.

(Pg. 174)

Hel Held: 1) 1) Interro rogation wa was i impr prope per b because s suspe pect invoke ked Mi Mirand nda. 2) When suspect said he didn’t want to talk about the robbery/murder, he effectively invoked Miranda because tha hat w t was t the he only t topic ic o

• ffic

icers rs wan anted t to t talk lk ab about. 3) It may have been different had defendant begun talking about the main crime and only refused to comment when it came to side issues or tangents. 4) But the error was harmless in this case. Anyway, there was no damning confession and other evidence was strong. 5) The confession was voluntary, not coerced, meaning the information officers could still use the learned from the Miranda violation interview.

(Pgs. 173, 177)

Fact acts:

Pa Park rker:

• Defendant was already in custody when questioned
• n cold-case murders/rapes in several different

cities.

• After Miranda warnings, he said “Why would I want

to talk to you about something that occurred back then?” Interrogation continued until defendant said “I will reserve the right to speak at another time . . . the day is not today.”

• That interrogation ended, but another officer

(different jurisdiction) then started his interrogation, and defendant confessed. Defendant challenged both parts of interrogation.

Spencer er:

• Defendant was given Miranda warnings relating to

robbery investigation. He waived his rights and confessed.

• Less than five hours later, officer from another city

interrogated defendant about another case- a murder.

• Second officer confirmed that defendant had

waived his rights but did not re-read them. Defendant confessed to murder.

• Defendant challenged the second interrogation.

He Held: : Both i

inter errogations w were e proper er. Parke ker: 1) Waiver of Miranda need not be explicit; defendant can waive rights by simply continuing to talk. 2) A rhetorical question like, “Why would I want to talk?” does not invoke Miranda. 3) Invoking Miranda as to one investigation does not invoke it as to another; defendant never invoked during second interview. Spe pencer: 1) Second officer did not need to re-read Miranda. Only five hours had passed and defendant remained in the same place the entire time. 2) Also, second officer reminded defendant of prior Miranda advisement and defendant said he’d understood it and waived it. 3) Courts will look at “totality” of circumstances to weigh whether a later interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with a prior waiver.

Facts ts:

• Defendant was 15-year old suspected of molesting a four-year
• ld.
• Two officers interrogated him in high school conference room

without reading him Miranda advisements.

(Pgs. 175-176)

• Detectives accused defendant
• f crime for 60 minutes and he

eventually broke down emotionally and confessed. He was arrested.

• At station, interrogation

continued but officer said he had to read Miranda “before we talk.” Miranda was given in rapid, cursory fashion, to which defendant responded “Mm hmm.” He then made more confessions.

• Defendant challenged the

interrogations.

Hel Held:

1) 1) Int nterro rogations were ere improper, , bo both bec because Miranda wasn’t n’t p pro roper erly ly w waived ed and bec nd because conf nfessions w were ere inv nvolu luntary ry. 2) Juvenile Miranda waiver depends on factors not met here:

a) Defendant was already interrogated for 60 minutes before Miranda was given b) Record didn’t show that defendant understood each right c) Defendant was just a freshman in H.S. with minimal contact with law enforcement and was scared d) When officer gave Miranda, he implied it was just routine and they were going to talk anyway

3) The confessions were also involuntary:

a) Defendant was young and had intellectual disabilities b) Questioning was aggressive and officer threatened to use polygraph machine c) Officer minimized the crime to induce a confession When n it com

• mes t

to

• juveni

niles, s, c cou

• urts a

are mor

• re skeptical of
• f

conf

• nfessi

sions a ns and nd Miranda da waivers. s.

Facts ts:

• Defendant was 14-year old suspected of murder,

interrogated by officers at a probation camp.

• He was Mirandized and spoke with officers for a while,

but eventually demanded an attorney.

• But before terminating, officer asked defendant if he

knew the victims, showed him a photo of them, said one victim died, and added that if defendant didn’t talk, he would be charged with murder and transferred.

• After transfer to second facility, defendant asked officer

for his card. Officer said he could not talk unless defendant had “changed his mind” about an attorney.

• Defendant agreed to talk and confessed.
• He later challenged the interrogations.

(Pg. 178)

He Held:

1) 1) The he i interr rrogations we were impro proper. r. 2) In the first interview, the officer violated Miranda when he continued to talk to defendant after defendant invoked his rights (e.g., by asking defendant if he knew the victims and saying he would be charged with murder & transferred). 3) Defendant’s later reinitiation of contact was not “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” because

• fficers had already implied that invoking his

rights would be bad for him, and he still had not been provided a lawyer. 4) The second interrogation might have been OK had officers cleared up the misconceptions from the first interview—but they did not.

Clara Levers Deputy Attorney General Clara.Levers@doj.ca.gov (916) 210-7773 Idan Ivri Deputy Attorney General Idan.Ivri@doj.ca.gov (213) 269-6168 Karen Bovarnick Deputy Attorney General Karen.Bovarnick@doj.ca.gov (415) 703-5550 Meredith White Deputy Attorney General Meredith.White@doj.ca.gov (619) 738-9069 Amanda Cary Deputy Attorney General Amanda.Cary@doj.ca.gov (559) 477-1682