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Provably Secure Anonymous-yet-Accountable Crowdsensing with Scalable - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

PETS 2017 The 17th Privacy Enhancing T echnologies Symposium July 1821, 2017 Minneapolis, MN, USA Provably Secure Anonymous-yet-Accountable Crowdsensing with Scalable Sublinear Revocatjon Sazzadur Rahaman 1 , Long Cheng 1 , Danfeng (Daphne)


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Provably Secure Anonymous-yet-Accountable Crowdsensing with Scalable Sublinear Revocatjon

Sazzadur Rahaman1, Long Cheng1, Danfeng (Daphne) Yao1, He Li2, Jung-Min (Jerry) Park2

Computer Science1, Electrical & Computer Engineering2 Virginia Tech {sazzad14, chengl, danfeng}@cs.vt.edu, {heli, jungmin}@ece.vt.edu

PETS 2017

The 17th Privacy Enhancing T echnologies Symposium July 18–21, 2017 Minneapolis, MN, USA

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Mobile Computing Opportunities

Bioanalysis using portable PCR built on mobile phones

1https://www.seas.harvard.edu/news/2017/07/detecting-dangers-with-crowdsourcing

Detectjng dangers with crowdsourcing1

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Crowdsensing and Citizen Science

Pros:

Cost efgectjve, easy to deploy Users are in control!

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  • f 33

Cons:

New possibilitjes to track users!

Data Model User Context New Applicatjons [Kanjo+’10] Behavior Predictjons [Pan+’ 13] Resource Management [McKinley+‘ 15] Crowdsensing Machine learning

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March 28, 2017 – Congress sent proposed legislation to the White House that wipes away landmark online privacy protections.

[Washington Post, March 28, 2017]

Is Privacy a Lost Battle?

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Privacy Preserving Authentjcatjon to the rescue? Privacy Preserving Authentjcatjon (PPA): The mechanism of authentjcatjng a user without knowing her identjty.

User Server Group Manager (1. secret key) (4. Revoke user) (2. Submit data with signature) (3. Request user revocatjon) (1. public key)

Privacy in crowdsensing

Are we ready to ofger privacy preserving crowdsensing infrastructure?

State-of-the art PPA cannot solve this problem!

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Challenges for Existing PPA

Pseudonym-based: Actual IDs are replaced with short-lived pseudonyms.

Group Signature-based: One public key for all users and No two signatures are linkable under same signing key Cons:

  • Public Key certjfjcatjon overhead
  • Signatures under the same secret

key are linkable Cons:

  • The revocatjon check is of O( R )

[SPPEAR: Gisdakis+’ 14] [AnonySense: Cornelius+’ 08]

It can give you server tjmeout 100s of Revoked Users! Finding sublinear revocatjon for VLR-based GS is open for 13+ years! [Boneh+’04]

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Our Contribution

A new computatjonally scalable GS Scheme (SRBE) Features:

  • Security propertjes: Backward Unlinkable Anonymity, Traceability and

Exculpability.

  • Sublinear Revocatjon check – Extremely scalable!
  • It uses pseudonyms but achieves Constant revocatjon token size

A new scalable Crowdsensing Framework (GroupSense) with prototype implementatjon.

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Threat Model and Security Goals

Malicious Users within the group Malicious Users from outside Honest-but-curious Data Collector Accountability (Traceability) Identjty Unforgeability Sensing-tjme Anonymity

Goal: A practjcal anonymous-yet-accountable privacy preserving infrastructure

Threat Model Security Goals

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Assumptjon: Group Manager forms a group, anyone can join/leave at anytjme!

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Our Contribution

A new computatjonally scalable GS Scheme (SRBE) Features:

  • Security propertjes: Backward Unlinkable Anonymity, Traceability and

Exculpability.

  • Sublinear Revocatjon check – Extremely scalable!
  • It uses pseudonyms but achieves Constant revocatjon token size

A new scalable Crowdsensing Framework (GroupSense) with prototype implementatjon.

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PID2 PID3 PID4 PID5 PID1 H1(SEED1) H2(SEED1) H3(SEED1) H4(SEED1) H5(SEED1) H5(SEED2) H4(SEED2) H3(SEED2) H2(SEED2) H1(SEED2) PID3 PID4 PID5 SEED2 H3(SEED1) H4(SEED1) H5(SEED1) H4(SEED2) H3(SEED2) H2(SEED2) H1(SEED2) H5(SEED2) H1(SEED1) H2(SEED1)

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SEED2 SEED1

SRBE – Constant Revocation token Size

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Embedding Pseudonyms in Signature

Security Properties:

  • Signers are restricted to use issued pseudoIDs only.
  • Signer i is restricted to use PIDij for tjme period j.
  • Even if one knows PIDij , she cannot forge signatures.

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Security Analysis

DLIN Assumptjon [Boneh+, 2004] q-BSDH Assumptjon [Boneh+, 2004] DL Assumptjon [Kiayias+, 2004]

Backward Unlinkable Anonymity: The anonymity of a valid signer is preserved (holds for revoked users too).

Traceability: Any valid signature is traceable to an honest signer.

Exculpability: Even the group manager cannot frame an honest signer

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Limitatjon: Signatures from the same signer in the same tjme interval are linkable.

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Performance

Overall computatjonal complexity Performance of RevocatjonCheck

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GroupSense Performance - Server

GroupSense performance during data submission

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GroupSense Performance - Android

Join Algorithm performance Sign Algorithm performance

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Future Work

Correlatjon Based Atuacks

  • Correlatjon using Meta-Data (e.g., Device Info, IP)
  • Correlatjon using Data itself (e.g., GPS locatjon, Special habits)

There are lots of studies addressing these problem in general. Privacy preserving authentjcatjon (PPA) is only a piece of a bigger puzzle! Unfortunately most of them do not consider data collector’s app in phone! Which is inconsistent with crowdsensing settjngs. Unifjed platgorm for anonymous-yet-accountable crowdsensing is necessary!

[Christjn+’ 16]

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Questions?

Sublinear revocatjon is feasible… Universal crowdsensing-platgorm is necessary for:

  • Mass adoptjon
  • interdisciplinary collaboratjons to solve dauntjng humanity problems…

[Key Takeways…]

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Thanks!