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Probabilistic Long-term Assessment of New Energy Technology - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Probabilistic Long-term Assessment of New Energy Technology Scenarios PLANETS Final Event: Policy Implications Bob van der Zwaan ECN and Columbia University vanderzwaan@ecn.nl Bruegel Institute Brussels, 8 June 2010 www.ecn.nl Outline

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www.ecn.nl

Probabilistic Long-term Assessment of New Energy Technology Scenarios

PLANETS Final Event: Policy Implications

Bob van der Zwaan ECN and Columbia University vanderzwaan@ecn.nl Bruegel Institute Brussels, 8 June 2010

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SLIDE 2

2 Jun-10

Outline

  • I. Policy implications
  • II. Several examples
  • III. Overall recommendations

The EC is greatly acknowledged for funding PLANETS, and the Bruegel Institute for hosting this final event. Probabilistic Long-term Assessment of New Energy Technology Scenarios

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3 Jun-10

  • I. 1. Interim emission targets
  • Several scenarios with a 500 ppm-e (2.3 C) climate

target prove unreachable.

  • Especially scenarios in which some regions

postpone significant abatement are infeasible.

  • Emission targets for 2050 are very relevant for the

economics of long-term climate stabilization.

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SLIDE 4

4 Jun-10

  • I. 2. Costs of climate policy
  • The cost of achieving a 530 ppm-e (2.5 C) target is

typically below 1-2 % of Gross World Product.

  • A 500 ppm-e (2.3 C) climate target, if reachable, is

significantly more costly to achieve.

  • Even for a target less ambitious than 2.0 C, deep

early global emission reductions are essential.

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SLIDE 5

5 Jun-10

  • I. 3. Regional mitigation costs
  • As an alternative to immediate global participation,

PLANETS considered second-best quota systems.

  • Our quota systems with 28% global abatement

(2050 vs. 2005) involve varying regional costs.

  • Across scenarios, developing countries typically

gain large benefits as carbon permit sellers.

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SLIDE 6

6 Jun-10

  • I. 4. Carbon trading
  • Global costs of emission control are only modestly

affected by a limit on carbon permit trading.

  • Such a trading limit, however, can have a

significant effect on regional abatement costs.

  • But trade restrictions can spur carbon-free energy

innovation and stimulate energy security.

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SLIDE 7

7 Jun-10

  • I. 5. Mitigation portfolio
  • All scenarios imply cost-efficient solutions based
  • n a broad set of different mitigation options.
  • Apart from savings, this set includes renewables,

nuclear, and CCS (fossil- and biomass-based).

  • For the medium term, bridging technologies are

valuable, as they fit in the existing energy system.

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8 Jun-10

  • I. 6. CCS bridging technology
  • CCS is currently among the obvious transition

technologies, with a large potential until 2050.

  • But for the short- and long-term its role remains

unsure (imperfect capture rate, leakage).

  • Medium-term CCS deployment is determined by

the importance of savings and electricity sector.

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9 Jun-10

  • I. 7. CCS policy requirements
  • Technical, economic and social uncertainties

remain, and scaling is a fundamental challenge.

  • A massive ramp-up is required of the entire chain
  • f capture, transportation and storage of CO2.
  • Even while CCS cannot be fully exempt from a

carbon tax, climate policy is a key determinant.

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SLIDE 10

10 Jun-10

  • II. WITCH: coal with CCS

Future capacity additions of coal-based power plus CCS (GW/yr) in a business-as-usual scenario and two climate control scenarios.

Coal power (with and without CCS)

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

new capacity (GW/yr) single year 450ppm Historical 550ppm BAU

Source: Tavoni and van der Zwaan, 2009.

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11 Jun-10

  • II. WITCH: new nuclear

Future capacity additions of nuclear power (GW/yr) in a business-as-usual scenario and two climate control scenarios.

Nuclear power 10 20 30 40 50 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

new capacity (GW/yr) single year 450ppm Historical 550ppm BAU

Source: Tavoni and van der Zwaan, 2009.

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12 Jun-10

  • II. DEMETER: CCS with leakage

Optimal CCS deployment.

Source: Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2010.

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 [tCO2/yr]

S1 S2 S3 S4

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13 Jun-10

  • II. DEMETER: CCS carbon tax exempt

CCS effectiveness.

Source: Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2010.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 [CCS effectiveness]

S1 S2 S3 S4

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14 Jun-10

  • II. TIAM-ECN: CCS and climate target

CO2 capture and storage deployment. Panel b) replaces the 3.2 W/m2 by a 3.6 W/m2 climate target.

Source: Keppo and van der Zwaan, 2010.

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2010 2020 2030 2040

Captured CO 2, MtonCO2/yr

Target 5.5 High Target 5.5 Low Target 4.0 High Target 4.0 Low Target 3.2 High Target 3.2 Low Stochastic

a)

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2010 2020 2030 2040

Captured CO 2, MtonCO2/yr

Target 5.5 High Target 5.5 Low Target 4.0 High Target 4.0 Low Target 3.6 High Target 3.6 Low Stochastic, variant

b)

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15 Jun-10

  • III. Overall recommendations
  • Deep global GHG emission reductions need to be

implemented as soon as possible.

  • Our findings justify a tightening of EU emission

abatement efforts from 20% to 30% in 2020.

  • In order to facilitate this, there is an urgent need for

a global climate agreement.

  • In the EU as elsewhere, the mix of carbon-free

energy technologies should be highly diverse.