PPI PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE Are Personal Accounts suitable for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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PPI PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE Are Personal Accounts suitable for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

PPI PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE Are Personal Accounts suitable for all? Niki Cleal and Adam Steventon Pensions Policy Institute Supporting members event 29 November 2006 www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk This presentation is intended as a


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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Niki Cleal and Adam Steventon Pensions Policy Institute Supporting members event 29 November 2006 www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk

Are Personal Accounts suitable for all?

This presentation is intended as a contribution to the policy debate on Personal Accounts. Nothing in this presentation should be used by individuals or their advisors as the basis for saving and investment decisions.

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Are Personal Accounts suitable for all?

  • Methodology
  • Findings
  • Policy implications
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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Are Personal Accounts suitable for all?

  • Analysed the interaction between Personal

Accounts, state pensions, the tax system and means-tested benefits in detail

  • To identify groups for whom Personal Accounts

may be suitable and those for whom they may not be suitable

  • Used the PPI’s Individual Model: 210 individuals

analysed

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Many factors affect the value

  • f saving

£2.73 £1.00

Individual contribution Tax relief Employer contribution Investment returns Charges Income tax Pension Credit Council Tax Benefit + Housing Benefit Total

Value of saving in a Personal Account for a median- earning man with a full NI record aged 25 in 2012 for each £1 of contributions

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Returns from Personal Accounts could be much higher than from Stakeholder Pensions

5.9% 0.4% 1.6% 3.9%

Stakeholder pensions (AMC of 1.5% for 10 years, 1% thereafter) Impact of an employer contribution Impact of low charges (0.5% AMC) Personal Accounts

Internal rate of return from saving for a median-earning man with a full NI record aged 25 in 2012

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Defining ‘Suitability’

  • ‘Not losing out’ as a result of saving
  • Less stringent than ensuring saving in

Personal Accounts is the right thing for all

  • No single definition is appropriate for all,

so risk groups used

  • Based on an ‘Internal Rate of Return’ (IRR)
  • NOT comparable to interest rates on other

products

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

Three risk-categories are used, based on the IRR

plus Investment returns on TR + E’er plus Employer contribution plus Tax relief plus Investment returns Gets back own contributions + inflation

  • ?

?

  • Partial

High-risk Medium-risk

Partial Partial

Low-risk

5.5% = investment returns 2.5% = inflation

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Low risk Medium risk High risk

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Individuals in their twenties in 2012 with full working histories could be in the low-risk category

5.9% 5.9% 5.8% 6.0% 6.8%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

1st 3rd Median 7th 9th

Estimated IRR for men with full NI records and no retirement saving other than Personal Accounts, aged 25 in 2012, by decile of the male earnings distribution

Low risk Medium risk High risk

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Low risk Medium risk High risk

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Returns can be lower for people with lower earnings and career breaks

4.8% 5.8% 5.9% 4.8%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

Median-earning man, full NI record Low-earning man, full NI record Low-earning man, intermittent unemployment Low-earning woman, caring breaks

Estimated IRR for men and women aged 25 in 2012, for different levels of earnings and work histories

Low risk Medium risk High risk

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Personal Account returns can be higher for people who have other forms of saving

6.0% 4.8%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

Low-earning woman, caring breaks Low-earning woman, caring breaks, £35,000 of saving on top of Personal Accounts

Estimated IRR for men and women aged 25 in 2012, for different levels of saving on top of Personal Accounts

Low risk Medium risk High risk

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Returns from Personal Accounts can be lower for today’s older workers

4.3% 5.8% 5.9%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

25 40 55

Estimated IRR for median-earning men with full NI records of different ages in 2012, with no retirement saving

  • ther than Personal Accounts

Low risk Medium risk High risk

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Self-employment can lead to lower returns

4.3% 4.7% 5.9%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

Employed and saving in a Personal Account throughout working life Not voluntarily

  • pting-in to Personal

Accounts after age 40 Voluntarily opting-in to Personal Accounts from age 40

Estimated IRR for median-earning men with full NI records and aged 25 in 2012, with no retirement saving

  • ther than Personal Accounts

Low risk Medium risk High risk

Self-employed from age 40

Mainly effect of S2P Effect of no 3% e’er cbn

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Low risk Medium risk High risk

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Renting in retirement can lead to very low returns

0.2% 5.9%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

Owns his own home in retirement Rents in retirement

Estimated IRR for median-earning men with full NI records and aged 25 in 2012, with no retirement saving

  • ther than Personal Accounts

Low risk Medium risk High risk

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Who is at risk of finding PAs unsuitable?

  • Low-risk: Single people in their 20s in 2012 with full working

histories

  • Medium-risk:
  • Single people in their 20s in 2012 with low earnings and

broken working histories (whether because of caring breaks

  • r unemployment) – unless they have other savings
  • Single people in their 40s and 50s in 2012 with low earnings

and full working histories

  • Single people in their 20s in 2012 who stay opted-in to

Personal Accounts while employed, and then later become self-employed

  • High-risk: Those who are likely to rent in retirement
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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

What other factors could affect suitability?

  • Risk is lower for people who are likely to be

married in retirement

  • Consumption smoothing – individuals

might otherwise face low retirement incomes

  • Debt – levels of secured and unsecured debt

are historically high

  • Affordability – will depend on individual

preferences on current expenditure and saving

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

What does this mean for policy?

  • Even if Personal Accounts are not suitable for all, it

does not necessarily mean that individuals should not be auto-enrolled

  • But should help inform the type of information

supplied to help decision making

  • Some factors may be more problematic than others:
  • Current age, earnings and debt
  • Future marital or housing status
  • Affordability
  • The design of information may need to change over

time

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PPI

PENSIONS POLICY INSTITUTE

Next steps?

  • Can generic advice cover

everything sufficiently?

  • Is there a need for more radical

solutions (e.g. not auto-enrolling some groups)?

  • Should trivial commutation levels

be changed?