Plutonium Recycle: international security, economics and waste - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Plutonium Recycle: international security, economics and waste disposal

Victor Gilinsky Tokyo November 6, 2015

Treat plutonium as fuel—or explosive?

• The original goal of the world’s nuclear community was

eventual reliance on advanced reactors fueled with plutonium

• It’s an attractive concept, but it ignored (1) economics, and

(2) the international dangers of relying on a nuclear explosive

• We don’t have adequate protection against countries using

their plutonium for nuclear weapons, if they later so decide

• IAEA inspection can’t warn in time because separated

plutonium can be put to weapon use too quickly

• For this reason, US President Ford concluded in 1976 that use
• f plutonium fuel should stop until the world “can effectively
• vercome the associated risks of proliferation”
• We are still not able to “effectively overcome” the risks
• We need restrictions, but they can gain acceptance only if

they apply to all, including advanced and weapons countries

Plutonium: unfavorable economics

• Today, even eminent Japanese scientists and former officials

who support Rokkasho concede that plutonium recycle is not economic (see CSIS interviews on vimeo.com)

• For example, Professor Atsuyuki Suzuki (Emeritus, Tokyo

University) maintains it is important to prove plutonium recycle technology, but says it is “economically unnecessary” to operate the plutonium fuel cycle commercially

• Rokkasho has become a “white elephant”
• Nevertheless, its nuclear supporters see it as a link to their
• riginal dream of plutonium-fueled advanced reactors
• But the objective of a plutonium-fueled future now appears

less and less realistic economically

• And, more importantly, it is incompatible with international

security, which should be the overriding consideration

Does reprocessing aid waste disposal?

• A pro-reprocessing argument is that it reduces waste volume

and simplifies waste disposal in costly geologic repositories

• In reality, reprocessing complicates radioactive waste storage

and disposal, and increases risks of accidents and leaks

• It is also doubtful that there will even be any geologic

repositories, at least in democratic countries like the US, Japan, and Britain—because of public resistance

• Despite many promises by nuclear agencies, none of these

countries has even started building a geologic repository

• Realistically, radioactive waste—either spent fuel or

reprocessing waste—will stay in surface facilities indefinitely

• The simplest, cheapest, and safest approach is to put spent

fuel in “dry casks” (about 100 casks per reactor lifetime)