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Pl Plan fo for T Today Strategic behavior related to transaction fees in Bitcoin Revisiting basics of equilibria Best response dynamics and potential games Online learning as a way to play games Bitcoin Transaction fees in are


  1. Pl Plan fo for T Today — Strategic behavior related to transaction fees in Bitcoin — Revisiting basics of equilibria — Best response dynamics and potential games — Online learning as a way to play games

  2. Bitcoin Transaction fees in are rewards Q will happen when block what is transaction fees all reward negligible Model atonstrate transactions arrive ant total units of the t interval g an in C t cel fees is in rate outcast are created blocks available fees R transaction block can put any fraction into miner have enough space to include everything miners decisions Strategic extend to block which much of outstanding has aches to include how to publish found blocks when Protocol honest miner tie breaking for chain what heard about first longest mine an transachs you know about all Include publish found blocks immediately Pelty Compliant strategy EffEEainaw most leftover fees 43

  3. undermHg Lazy b a suppose Da b J 10 a TDs ss f Function Fork DIFF D Fios 0441 Hx Kx

  4. Selfish mining into creating goal to trick oher miners be orphaned blocks Naturel chain private creaky 04 30 0 0 0

  5. Equilibria Cost minimization games K players Ai strategies of player I Cics tsysar.si c Hi cFplayeri s fi 5 sie Ai f NE is g a pure Ci Csi Ei Ei si 3 c a prob dish where pi is dishns 15 one prob 17 ypk Ai over Fi Hsi Y a mixed ME p is Cics siDsE np CICED Ess Pai para Ell Pir

  6. mixed ME Any finite game has a Correlated equilibrium A xAaX xAk Dish p on over strategy profiles Fi a correlated is y equilibrium C Ai si si sE pk si Eep si Isi Ci Traffic Light ETTA us

  7. Dish p XAK A xAgx on CCE Y is coarseconcledated a f approx fi Hsi a CED h Eznpf.ca sifs iD tf F shops 46 fi 1 6 46 H ti Best response dynamics pureME if this halts pune ME not guaranteed to reach even if one exists finite EveypVdenhalgane a pure NE has Potential games IR consider mind I CI TAI Eels si c Ai fi su cicsi.si EsiEiEIT5D f

  8. Ne Network formation games tGtGz t t 4 47 Pa Pk 2 3 help g t EAT E C5 help g paths trim edgee Cy I ICs 5 cat Sgt Cy oils i C5

  9. Online learning against adversary gane S can take each day A achers player setg possible I Afn for l gT f a c A playerpicks prob dish over actions pypa pn CIELO D c Ch C Cz dM y pic Fxp cost investnutshaty routes t t 2achs Ex Benchmark adv pious T every day Ma E ma ifeng.EE f Impossible Export of any I alg 2

  10. The regent of a sequence of aig on an vectors cost IEa acetate Ep'TalgEa AEA 0 regret get Goal Too ach3 3 I cost ache play ohms O T algpap EIn cost F that has aan his gains i has exposttz Any alg EE.ie tiII3 ft E

  11. wt fwf.us WI For each maintain actor weight wya Fa l initialize for fo T f I with prob proportonel to wt at choose pta wTaT C gwen Tachn a w4a E wth l a This algfq ELITISTS beset Thm Yf Ai Ei si cf It 31,83 Let No regret let the uniform dish dynamics be p IT E on in CCE is p approx FCE.ae s ng EIicsisEtiI testify gsni

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