PENG Session 1 Roland M uhlenbernd Seminar f ur - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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PENG Session 1 Roland M uhlenbernd Seminar f ur - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

PENG Session 1 Roland M uhlenbernd Seminar f ur Sprachwissenschaft University of T ubingen Introduction Roland M uhlenbernd Email: roland.muehlenbernd@uni-tuebingen.de Room 1.24 (Wilhelmstr. 19) w 3


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SLIDE 1

PENG Session 1

Roland M¨ uhlenbernd Seminar f¨ ur Sprachwissenschaft University of T¨ ubingen

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SLIDE 2

Introduction

◮ Roland M¨

uhlenbernd Email: roland.muehlenbernd@uni-tuebingen.de Π Room 1.24 (Wilhelmstr. 19) w3 http://www2.sfs.uni-tuebingen.de/˜roland/PENG Introduce yourself...

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Introduction: Course Info

◮ Time: Thursday 12-14 ◮ Place: Wilhelmstr. 19, 2.26 ◮ Tasks

◮ Teamwork! Group Coordination, Time Management, Data

Management (e.g. SVN), Internet Platform

◮ Programming Project: MAS, Games, Simulation, Language

Evolution

◮ Paperwork: Final Article, Documentation

◮ Assessment: Individual Treatment ◮ Planed Schedule - Big Picture:

Topic Weeks Timeframe Completion Introduction 3 Oct 20 - Nov 3 Tournament Programming 7 Nov 4 - Dec 22 Presentation Paperwork 4 Jan 5 - Feb 2 Subchapters

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Games: Classics & Solutions

C D C 3, 3 0, 5 D 5, 0 1, 1

C: Cooperate, D: Defect

W G W 2, 2

  • 1, 5

G

5,-1

0, 0

W: Work Hard, G: Goof Off

S R S 2, 2 0, 1 R 1, 0 1, 1

S: Stag, R: Rabbit

B S B 2, 1 0, 0 S 0, 0 1, 2

B: Bach, S: Stravinsky

L R L

  • 1,1

1,-1

R

1,-1

  • 1,1

L: Left, R: Right

P V P 1, 1 0, 0 V 0, 0 1, 1

P: Paris, V: Vienna

Solutions:

◮ (strict) Nash equilibria? ◮ Pareto optimality? ◮ Risk dominance?

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SLIDE 5

Games: Signaling Game

◮ a signaling game is a tuple SG = {S, R}, T, Pr, M, A, U ◮ a Lewis game is defined by: ◮ T = {t1, t2} ◮ M = {m1, m2} ◮ A = {a1, a2} ◮ Pr(t1) = Pr(t2) = .5 ◮ U(ti, aj) =

1 if i = j else a1 a2 t1 1 t2 1 N S R 1 R 1 S R 1 R 1

.5 .5

t1 t2 m1 m2 m1 m2 a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a2

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SLIDE 6

Games: Signaling Game Strategies

Sender & Receiver Strategies: σ1:

t1 m1 t2 m2

σ2:

t1 m2 t2 m1

σ3:

t1 m1 t2 m2

σ4:

t1 m2 t2 m1

ρ1:

m1 a1 m2 a2

ρ2:

m1 a2 m2 a1

ρ3:

m1 a1 m2 a2

ρ4:

m1 a2 m2 a1

Expected utilities: ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 σ1 1 .5 .5 σ2 1 .5 .5 σ3 .5 .5 .5 .5 σ4 .5 .5 .5 .5 Signaling Languages: L1: t1 t2 m1 m2 a1 a2 L2: t1 t2 m1 m2 a1 a2

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SLIDE 7

Homework: The Evolution of Cooperation

Read:

◮ Axelrod, R. (1984), ”The Evolution of Cooperation”

(Chapter 1,2)