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Optimal Decisions in Finite State Markov Chains: Applications to - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Optimal Decisions in Finite State Markov Chains:


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Optimal Decisions in Finite State Markov Chains: Applications to Personal Finance and Credit Risk Management

Mogens Ste¤ensen Linz October 24, 2008

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Picture Of A Break, Festival, 1892

  • G. Laska (19th C. Czech), Oil On Canvas

Private Collection, Munich, Germany

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Based on (all articles joint with Holger Kraft, Goethe-University, Frankfurt) Optimal Consumption and Insurance: A Continuous-Time Markov Chain Ap- proach ASTIN Bulletin 2008 The Policyholder’s Static and Dynamic Decision Making of Life Insurance and Pension Payments. Blätter der DGVFM 2008. Bankruptcy, Counterparty Risk, and Contagion. Review of Finance 2007 Asset Allocation with Contagion and Explicit Bankruptcy Procedures. Journal of Mathematical Economics 2008

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Intro Life Insurance Modelling Credit Risk Modelling Life Insurance Decision Making Optimal Credit Risky Portfolios Outtro

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Life insurance Modelling 0alive

  • !

1dead Figure 1: Survival model N (t) = # fs 2 (0; t] ; Z (s) 6= 0; Z (s) = 1g M (t) = N (t)

Z t

0 I (s) (s; Y (s)) ds

dB (t) = ’death sum’dN (t) +I (t) ’pension sum’d" (t; n) I (t) ’premium rate’dt

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0active/employed

  • 1disabled/unemployed
  • &
  • .

2dead Figure 2: Disability/Unemployment model Nk (t) = # fs 2 (0; t] ; Z (s) 6= k; Z (s) = kg Mk (t) = Nk (t)

Z t

0 k (s; Z (s) ; Y (s)) ds

dB (t) =

X

k:k6=Z(t)

bZ(t)kdNk (t) +

  • BZ(t) (t) d" (t; n) + bZ(t) (t) dt
  • __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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0husband and wife alive

  • .
  • &

1husband dead, wife alive # 2husband alive, wife dead & . 3husband and wife dead Figure 3: Dependent lives ’Weak’ dependence induced by Y ’Medium’ dependence induced by e.g. 0 > or 0 < ’Strong’ dependence induced by > 0

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Credit Risk Modelling Everybody knows by now what a ’survival model’ looks like so therefore I show you instead a...

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...’Default model’ 0solvent

  • !

1default Figure 4: Default model N (t) = # fs 2 (0; t] ; Z (s) 6= 0; Z (s) = 1g M (t) = N (t)

Z t

0 I (s) (s; Y (s)) ds

dB (t) = ’recovery payment’dN (t) +I (t) ’lump sum coupon’d" (t; n) +I (t) ’coupon rate’dt

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Everybody knows by now what a ’disability model’ looks like so therefore I show you instead a...

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...’Corporate rating model’: 0rating A

  • 1rating B
  • &
  • .

2default Figure 5: Rating model Nk (t) = # fs 2 (0; t] ; Z (s) 6= k; Z (s) = kg Mk (t) = Nk (t)

Z t

0 k (s; Z (s) ; Y (s)) ds

dB (t) =

X

k:k6=Z(t)

bZ(t)kdNk (t) +

  • BZ(t) (t) d" (t; n) + bZ(t) (t) dt
  • __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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Everybody knows by now what a ’dependent lives model’ looks like so therefore I show you instead a...

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...’Dependent corporates model’: 0both corp.s solvent

  • .
  • &

1A default, B solvent # 2A solvent, B default & . 3both corp.s default Figure 6: Dependent corporates ’Weak’ dependence induced by Y ’Medium’ dependence induced by e.g. 0 > or 0 < ’Strong’ dependence induced by > 0

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Further comments to (lack of) analogies Evolutionary …nance (life cycle, fertility, infection, adaptation etc.) Mortality linked derivatives (N or Y ) versus credit derivatives (N or Y ) Statistical inference versus calibration

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Life Insurance Decision Making The model, dA (t) = aZ(t) (t) dt +

X

k aZ(t)k (t) dNk (t)

dC (t) = cZ(t) (t) dt +

X

k cZ(t)k (t) dNk (t)

dX (t) = rX (t) dt + dA (t) dC (t) +

X

k:k6=Z(t) RZ(t)k (t) dMk (t)

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  • the problem,

dU (t) = 1 wZ(t) (t)1 c (t) dt +

X

k

1 wZ(t)k (t)1 ck (t) dNk (t) +1 W Z(t) (t)1 X (t) d" (t; n) sup

R;C

E

Z n

0 dU (t)

  • __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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  • and its solution,

Rjk (t; x) + x + gk (t) = fk (t) fj (t)hjk (t)

  • x + gj (t)
  • g is human wealth

f is a ’value’ of future utility weights h is a price ratio Insure to protect your wealth up to a utility ratio and a price ratio

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Example: Optimal disability annuity - for the survival model see Richard (1975) - 0active/employed

  • 1disabled/unemployed
  • &
  • .

2dead R01 (t; x) + x = f1 (t) f0 (t)h01 (t)

  • x + g0 (t)
  • Achieved by demanding e.g. the disability annuity rate b1 (t) solving the relation

x + b1 (t)

Z n

t

e R s

t r+ds = f1 (t)

f0 (t)h01 (t)

  • x + g0 (t)
  • __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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Optimal Credit Risky Portfolios The model (in case of no macro risk), dX (t) X (t) =

B B @r X

k

  • k (t) 1
  • k (t)

X

i i (t) Rk i (t)

| {z }

excess return from event risk

1 C C A dt

+

X

i

X

k i (t)

Rk

i (t)

| {z }

net gain from bond i from event k

dMk (t) k 1 = market price of risk

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  • the problem,

Gj (t; x) = sup

Et;x;j

"Z T

t

1 X (T)

#

= 1 xfj (t)1 ;

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  • and its solution

Incomplete market: I (number of assets) non-linear equations with I unknowns

X

k6=j Rjk v jkjk =

X

k6=j Rjk v jk

1 +

X

i j iRjk i

1

fk fj

!1

Complete market: I linear equations with I unknowns 1 +

I

X

i=1

j

i (t) Rjk i (t) = fk (t)

fj (t)hjk (t) f is a ’value’ of a terminal endowment 1 h is a price ratio (related to ) Invest to protect your wealth up to a utility ratio and a price ratio

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Example: Optimal investment under contagion 0both corporates solvent

  • .
  • &

1Corp.A default, Corp.B solvent # 2Corp.A solvent, Corp.B default & . 3both corporates default Figure 7: Dependent corporates 1 + 0

A (t) R01 A (t) + 0 B (t) R01 B (t)

= f1 (t) f0 (t)h01 (t) 1 + 0

A (t) R02 A (t) + 0 B (t) R02 B (t)

= f2 (t) f0 (t)h02 (t)

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FOC revisited to discuss the di¤erent market situations and decision processes Insurance FOC without income: Rjk (t; x) + x + gk (t)

| {z }

=0

= fk (t) fj (t)hjk (t)

@x + gj (t) | {z }

=0

1 A

1 + Rjk (t; x) x = fk (t) fj (t)hjk (t) Credit FOC: 1 +

I

X

i=1

j

i (t) Rjk i (t) = fk (t)

fj (t)hjk (t)

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Outtro Constraints (IME) Static problems (Blätter) Product design Everybody knows what a ’Bellman equation’ looks like so therefore I show you instead...

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Figure 8: Richard Ernest Bellman (1920-1984) "I believe that the growth of vital mathematics depends crucially on continuing interaction with the real world" (1966)

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