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Optimal Aggregator Bidding Strategies for Vehicle-To-Grid
Energy and the Environment Seminar By Eric Sortomme PhD Candidate, University of Washington October 7, 2010
Optimal Aggregator Bidding Strategies for Vehicle-To-Grid Energy - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Optimal Aggregator Bidding Strategies for Vehicle-To-Grid Energy and the Environment Seminar By Eric Sortomme PhD Candidate, University of Washington October 7, 2010 1 Outline Introduction State of the Art in the Field
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Energy and the Environment Seminar By Eric Sortomme PhD Candidate, University of Washington October 7, 2010
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V2G offers benefits to all participants
EV owners can generate revenue and receive lower energy prices
Utilities can increase system flexibility for increased system control
Significant to the operation of V2G are aggregators which bid combined capacities of many EVs into the appropriate markets
Base load
Peak Energy
Spinning Reserves
Regulation
Non-Spinning Reserves
Bidding is not without its challenges
EVs can disconnect from the grid whenever the owner has need
Owners are not primarily concerned with power market participation and may not do so if there is much inconvenience
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Source: NREL
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General Welfare
Aid in hastening the adoption of EVs
Reduced emissions
Energy independence
Aggregator Development
Provides useful algorithms for different types of controllable loads
Utility planning
Algorithms can be used by utilities to forecast EV charging impacts and benefits
Can determine what load and feeder constraints will need to be imposed
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Most studies considered only bidirectional V2G. Bidirectional V2G has the challenges of:
Additional aftermarket hardware for the EVs
Interconnection studies and anti-islanding protection at the point of connection
Increased cycling wear on the batteries
Customer resistance against the idea of letting the utility “drain their batteries”
Manufacturer resistance to utilities degrading their batteries while under warranty.
Because of these issues a logical first step is to begin with unidirectional V2G.
No aftermarket EV hardware required
No interconnection studies nor anti-islanding protection required
Battery cycling is not an issue
Customer concerns are assuaged
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MnAPi is the minimum additional power draw
PDi is the power draw of the battery of the ith EV CRi is the charge remaining to be supplied to the ith EV MPi is the maximum possible power draw of ith EV MC,i is the maximum charge capacity of the ith EV Efi is the efficiency of the ith EV’s battery charger
Yes
RS >= 0
Yes No
(RS/RD) *MxAPi + POPi < CRi/Efi
PDi = (RS/RU)* MnAPi + POPi
PDi = CRi/Efi
Yes No No
(RS/RU) *MnAPi + POPi < CRi/Efi
PDi = CRi/Efi
PDi = (RS/RD)* MxAPi + POPi
Where: RS is the system regulation signal provided to the aggregator RU is the regulation up capacity of the aggregator RD is the regulation down capacity of the aggregator POPi is the preferred operating point of the ith EV battery MxAPi is the maximum additional power draw
EV SOCi is the state of charge of the ith EV battery
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Yes
RRS >= 0
FPi = (RRS/RR)* RsRPi + PDi
FPi = CRi/Efi
No
(RSS/RR) *RsRPi + PDi < CRi/Efi
Where: RRS is the responsive reserve signal provided to the aggregator RR is the responsive reserve capacity of the aggregator RsRPi is the reduction in power draw available for spinning reserves of the ith EV FPi is the final power draw of the ith EV combining the effects of regulation and responsive reserves
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Considers the net of load and uncontrollable renewables
Keeps a near constant POP so as to bid regulation for the entire charging period
Does not consider spinning reserves
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5 10 15 20 25 50 100 150 200 250 Time (hours) Day-ahead Price $/MWh Max Actual Min
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5 10 15 20 25 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 x 10
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Time (hours) Day-ahead Net Load (MW) Max Min Actual
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Where: In is the income of the aggregator C is aggregator costs Mk is aggregator markup over wholesale energy price α is the percentage of regulation revenue taken by the aggregator SOCI,i is the initial state of charge of the ith EV PRU (t) is the forecasted price of regulation up for time t PRD (t) is the forecasted price of regulation down for time t PRR (t) is the forecasted price of responsive reserves for time t
( ), ( ), ( ), ( )
maximize
i i i i
POP t MxAP t MnAP t RsRP t In
C
subject to:
( ) ( )
i i
MnAP t POP t i
,
( ( ))
i I i Ci t
E PD t SOC M i
,
( (1) (1))
i i i I i Ci
MxAP POP Ef SOC M i ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
RsRP t POP t MnAP t i ( ) ( )
i i i
MxAP t POP t MP i ( )
i
MxAP t i ( )
i
MnAP t i ( )
i
RsRP t i ( )
i
POP t i
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
RU U RD D RR R t i i t
In P t R t P t R t P t R t Mk E PD t
1
( ) ( )
cars U i i
R t MnAP t
1
( ) ( )
cars D i i
R t MxAP t
1
( ) ( )
cars R i i
R t RsRP t
( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i D i i U i R
E PD t MxAP t Ex POP t MnAP t Ex RsRP t Ex
min min
Pr( )
RS D RS
RS RS dRS Ex RSdRS
max max
Pr( )
RS U RS
RS RS dRS Ex RSdRS
max max
Pr( )
RRS R RRS
RRS RRS dRRS Ex RRSdRRS
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Simulated all six POP selection algorithms over an entire year’s period
Looked only at commuter EVs charging while at work (8AM- 5PM)
Test System
BPA Wind, Load, Regulation prices for 2007
MidC energy prices for 2007
Hypothetical Group of 10000 EVs
500 Tesla Roadsters
2000 Th!nk Citys
2500 Mitsubishi i-MiEVs
2000 BMW Mini-Es
3000 Nissan Leafs
Puget Sound commute distance distribution
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 5 10 15 20 25 30 MW (a) MaxReg Algorithm PD POP POP-RUp POP+RDow n 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 5 10 15 20 25 30 Time (hours) (b) MW OptMaxReg Algorithm PD POP POP-RUp POP+RDow n
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 10 20 30 40 MW Load Algorithm (a) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 10 20 30 40 Time (hours) (b) MW OptLoad Algorithm Max Additional Load POP POP-RUp POP+RDow n Max Additional Load POP POP-RUp POP+RDow n
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 5 10 15 20 25 30 MW (a) Price Algorithm 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 5 10 15 20 25 30 Time (hours) (b) MW OptPrice Algorithm Max Additional Load POP POP-RUp POP+RDow n Max Additional Load POP POP-RUp POP+RDow n
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$310 $320 $330 $340 $350 $360 $370 $380 Price Load MaxReg OptPrice OptLoad OptMaxReg
Charging Algorithm Profits ($1000)
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5 10 15 20 25 P r i c e L
d M a x R e g O p t P r i c e O p t L
d O p t M a x R e g
Charging Algorithm Peak Load Increase (MW) Average Maximum
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0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Hour Regulation Up Capacity (MW) Price Load MaxReg OptPrice OptLoad OptMaxReg
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Hour Regulation Down Capacity (MW) Price Load MaxReg OptPrice OptLoad OptMaxReg
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$0.080 $0.082 $0.084 $0.086 $0.088 $0.090 $0.092 $0.094 P r i c e L
d M a x R e g O p t P r i c e O p t L
d O p t M a x R e g
Charging Algorithm Energy Price ($/kWh)
60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% P r i c e L
d M a x R e g O p t P r i c e O p t L
d O p t M a x R e g
Charging Algorithm SOC
Compared to not using an aggregator, the consumer should benefit. The aggregator markup is over wholesale energy costs, while the consumer standing alone would be paying retail energy costs. Moreover the aggregator is constrained by the retail costs to keep the markup modest.
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10 $/MWh markup on energy
20% of ancillary services revenues
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 5 10 15 20 25 Time (hours) Ancillary Service Price ($/MW) Regulation Up Regulation Down Responsive Reserves
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 5 10 15 20 25 MW Time (hours) POP POP-RU POP+RD POP-RU-RR
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 MW Time (hours) Max Additional Load POP POP-RU POP+RD POP-RU-RR 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 MW Time (hours) Max Energy Purchase POP POP-RU POP+RD POP-RU-RR
OptLoad OptPrice
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$ $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000 $5,000 $6,000 $7,000 $8,000 OptPrice Opt Load OptComb
Charging Algorithm Profits
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0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Hour OptPrice OptLoad OptComb 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Hour OptPrice OptLoad OptComb
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0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Hour OptPrice OptLoad OptComb
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