Operation Black tulip: Certificate authorities loose authority 24th - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Operation Black tulip: Certificate authorities loose authority 24th - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mar 29, 2024 144 likes •467 views

Operation Black tulip: Certificate authorities loose authority 24th Annual FIRST Conference 19 June 2012, Malta Dr. Marnix Dekker, CISA Security expert Information security officer ENISA www.enisa.europa.eu About ENISA o The European

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www.enisa.europa.eu

Operation Black tulip: Certificate authorities loose authority

24th Annual FIRST Conference 19 June 2012, Malta

  • Dr. Marnix Dekker, CISA

Security expert Information security officer ENISA

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www.enisa.europa.eu

  • The European Network and Information Security Agency
  • gives advice on information security issues
  • to national authorities, EU institutions, citizens, businesses
  • acts as a forum for sharing good NIS practices
  • facilitates information exchange and collaboration
  • Set up in 2004 – EC proposed a new mandate for 2013.
  • Around 30 security experts and 20 staff.
  • ENISA has an advisory role (not operational) and the focus

is on prevention and preparedness.

About ENISA

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  • Set up by EU legislation for very specific technical, scientific
  • r managerial tasks.
  • For example:
  • ENISA – European Network and Information Security Agency
  • CFCA - Community Fisheries Control Agency
  • EASA - European Aviation Safety Agency
  • ECDC - European Center for Disease Prevention and Control
  • EEA - European Environment agency
  • Et cetera.

About the EU agencies

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Black tulips

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  • Public key crypto is great!
  • Authenticate and encrypt
  • user to user (email)
  • machine to machine (WS)
  • user to server (login)
  • server to user (https)
  • But who uses which key?
  • To prevent spoofing (MITM)
  • One solution for this is called PKI
  • List of <name, key> pairs published by a trusted party (a CA)
  • Sometimes there is a hierarchy of CAs

Public key cryptography

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  • PKI is cumbersome for authenticating or

authorising users

  • No anonymous claims of attributes
  • No distributed trust (I am Bob’s friend)
  • Alternatives
  • SPKI (Carl Ellison)
  • SDSI (Ron Rivest, Butler Lampson) (like SXIP, Identity 2.0)
  • PGP (Phil Zimmermann)
  • It is easy to see that PKI does not exploit the

great possibilities of public key cryptography

  • Even worse: the most common use of PKI, HTTPS

(SSL + CA’s in the browser + OCSP) is flawed.

Wide spread criticism of PKI

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… and this has been argued in many articles by well known experts.

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  • Matt Blaze http://www.crypto.com/blog/spycerts : “Products

appear sophisticated, mature, and mass-produced… an active vendor community”

  • On CA’s: “a surprisingly large number of root authorities, from

tiny, obscure businesses to various national governments”

  • Moxie Marlinspike http://blog.thoughtcrime.org/ssl-and-the-

future-of-authenticity : Repeated hacks of CAs, and you don’t even need to hack.

Spy in the middle

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And then…

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MITM on 300.000 Iranians

For several weeks in August 2011

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Dutch eGovernment offline

For several weeks in September 2011

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Impact timeline

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Security breach at Diginotar Privacy breach in Iran Outage in the Netherlands

July 2011 August 2011 September 2011

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Let’s look at the impact, starting small first…

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  • Bankruptcy for Diginotar
  • Vasco estimates losses at around 4 million euros
  • Vasco acquired Diginotar for 12 million euros
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  • eGov outage for millions of users for several weeks
  • Dutch state claims 9 million euros in damages
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Mikko Hyppönen: “It is plausible that people died.”

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Critical information infrastructure: Those interconnected information systems and networks, the disruption or destruction of which would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of citizens, or on the effective functioning of government or the economy. (So the CA’s in your country are critical information infrastructure)

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  • New EU regulation contains:
  • Breach notification obligation
  • Appropriate security measures
  • Summary reporting of breaches to ENISA
  • Some issues to keep in mind here
  • Detecting breaches is hard (see Verizon data breach report)
  • Most breaches are detected by 3rd parties (92%)
  • … and only weeks later (85%)
  • Security measures are difficult to enforce (the devil is in the

details of the implementation)

  • Diginotar was well reputed, frequently audited and found

compliant with security standards

  • We should go from certification to continuous monitoring

EU regulation for eID/eSig services

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Is new regulation enough?

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600 single points of failure…

(meaning: attacker needs to succeed at compromising 1 of 600 to allow attacks on any website!)

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Job security

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Aart Jochem (NCSC.nl) @ FIRSTCON 2012: “The Diginotar crisis is over, but the PKI crisis is still ongoing.”

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Key issues to address…

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  • 600 CA’s in the trusted list of browsers and
  • perating systems
  • 600 single points of failure
  • Large CA’s work with hundreds of resellers
  • Do you even need to hack?

Weakest link?

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  • Google: “Soft-fail revocation checks are like a

seat-belt that snaps when you crash. “

  • Hard-fail revocation checks require highly

available OCSP responders at CA’s.

  • Revocation checks add on average 1 second to

page loading.

  • Revocation checks allow CA’s to monitor who

visited which websites.

  • Google Chrome browser dropped OCSP
  • Can we revoke trust in a CA? Is there a plan?

Revocation?

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  • Educate the user?
  • Extended validation certificates, blue bars, green

bars, locks, warnings – do they help?

  • Warnings when there is no attack (bad)
  • 1 in 300 users disconnected when a NZ banking website

showed the wrong certificate for one hour.

  • No warnings when there is an attack (worse)
  • No choice for users about which CA’s they trust
  • So sites have no incentive to use better CAs
  • So CA’s have no incentive to get better

Usability?

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  • Few trusted parties to establish trust between

everyone else.

  • Some very large businesses depend on very

small ones, with a tough business model

  • “Diginotar earned around 100.000 euros from its

certificate business in the first half of 2011. ”

  • Can these small trusted parties withstand the

attack pressure facing billion dollar companies?

  • Some CA’s can not, TLD’s can (DNSSEC)?
  • Can we somehow leverage the large user base of

the larger websites for conveying trust?

Who do we trust?

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  • Prepare now for a CA failure!
  • E.g. have a spare certificate ready for critical sites
  • Fix HTTPS
  • it is the foundation of online security
  • E.g. DNSSEC, DANE, Convergence, Tack
  • eCommunications go beyond the last mile
  • Border gateway protocol, Internet exchange points
  • Routers, datacenters
  • CA’s, TLD’s, browsers, etc.
  • EU Internet security strategy
  • Extending Article 13a beyond telecom sector
  • Assess what is widely-used critical infrastructure

Some conclusions

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Contact

  • Dr. Marnix Dekker, CISA

CIIP and Resilience, ENISA marnix.dekker@enisa.europa.eu www.enisa.europa.eu http://twitter.com/marnixdekker

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