On the Approximation of Mean-Payoff Games Raffaella Gentilini - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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On the Approximation of Mean-Payoff Games Raffaella Gentilini - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation On the Approximation of Mean-Payoff Games Raffaella Gentilini University of Perugia Convegno Italiano Logica Computazionale (CILC2011) 1 / 20 Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation


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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

On the Approximation of Mean-Payoff Games

Raffaella Gentilini

University of Perugia

Convegno Italiano Logica Computazionale (CILC2011)

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Contents

  • 1. Mean-Payoff Games (MPG) Problems
  • 2. Exact Solutions for MPG
  • 3. Approximate Solutions for MPG: The Additive Setting
  • 4. Approximate Solutions for MPG: The Multiplicative Setting

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Mean-Payoff Games MPG

  • 2 players:

Maximazer Bb vs Minimazer △lice

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Mean-Payoff Games MPG

  • 2 players:

Maximazer Bb vs Minimazer △lice

  • played on a finite graph (arena)

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Mean-Payoff Games MPG

  • 2 players:

Maximazer Bb vs Minimazer △lice

  • played on a finite graph (arena)
  • turn based

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Mean-Payoff Games MPG

  • 2 players:

Maximazer Bb vs Minimazer △lice

  • played on a finite graph (arena)
  • turn based
  • infinite number of turns

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Mean-Payoff Games MPG

  • 2 players:

Maximazer Bb vs Minimazer △lice

  • played on a finite graph (arena)
  • turn based
  • infinite number of turns
  • goal (for Bob): maximazing the long-run

average weight

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG in Formal Term

In a MPG Γ = (V , E, w : V → Z, V, V△): Bb wants to maximize his payoff, i.e. the long-run average weight in a play . Given a play p = {vi}i∈N in Γ, the payoff of Bb on p is: MP(v0v1 . . . vn . . . ) = lim inf

n→∞

1 n ·

n−1

  • i=0

w(vi, vi+1)

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG in Formal Term

The value secured by a strategy σ: V ∗ · V → V in vertex v is: valσ(v) = inf

σ△∈Σ△

MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ△)) supσ∈Σ(valσ(v)) is the optimal value that Bb can secure in v

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG in Formal Term

Example

The value secured by a strategy σ: V ∗ · V → V in vertex v is: valσ(v) = inf

σ△∈Σ△

MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ△)) supσ∈Σ(valσ(v)) is the optimal value that Bb can secure in v

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG in Formal Term

Example

valσ(v) = −4

2

The value secured by a strategy σ: V ∗ · V → V in vertex v is: valσ(v) = inf

σ△∈Σ△

MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ△)) supσ∈Σ(valσ(v)) is the optimal value that Bb can secure in v

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG in Formal Term

Example

The value secured by a strategy σ: V ∗ · V → V in vertex v is: valσ(v) = inf

σ△∈Σ△

MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ△)) supσ∈Σ(valσ(v)) is the optimal value that Bb can secure in v

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG in Formal Term

Example

supσ∈Σ(valσ(v)) = 2

2

The value secured by a strategy σ: V ∗ · V → V in vertex v is: valσ(v) = inf

σ△∈Σ△

MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ△)) supσ∈Σ(valσ(v)) is the optimal value that Bb can secure in v

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG are Memoryless Determined

Theorem [Ehrenfeucht&Mycielsky’79] valΓ(v) = supσ∈Σ infσ△∈Σ△ MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ△)) = = infσ△∈Σ△ supσ∈Σ MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ)). There exist uniform memoryless strategies, π : V → V for Bb , π△ : V△ → V for △lice such that: valΓ(v) = valπ(v) = valπ△(v).

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG are Memoryless Determined

Example

Theorem [Ehrenfeucht&Mycielsky’79] valΓ(v) = supσ∈Σ infσ△∈Σ△ MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ△)) = = infσ△∈Σ△ supσ∈Σ MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ)). There exist uniform memoryless strategies, π : V → V for Bb , π△ : V△ → V for △lice such that: valΓ(v) = valπ(v) = valπ△(v).

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG are Memoryless Determined

Example

Theorem [Ehrenfeucht&Mycielsky’79] valΓ(v) = supσ∈Σ infσ△∈Σ△ MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ△)) = = infσ△∈Σ△ supσ∈Σ MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ)). There exist uniform memoryless strategies, π : V → V for Bb , π△ : V△ → V for △lice such that: valΓ(v) = valπ(v) = valπ△(v).

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG are Memoryless Determined

Example

valΓ(v)= n

d ∈ Q : 0 ≤ d ≤ |V | and |n| d ≤ M= maxe∈E{|w(e)|}.

Theorem [Ehrenfeucht&Mycielsky’79] valΓ(v) = supσ∈Σ infσ△∈Σ△ MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ△)) = = infσ△∈Σ△ supσ∈Σ MP(outcomeΓ(v, σ, σ)). There exist uniform memoryless strategies, π : V → V for Bb , π△ : V△ → V for △lice such that:

Γ π π

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG Problems

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG Problems

  • 1. Decision Problem Given v ∈ V , µ ∈ Z, decide if Bb has a

strategy π to secure valπ(v) ≥ µ.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG Problems

  • 1. Decision Problem Given v ∈ V , µ ∈ Z, decide if Bb has a

strategy π to secure valπ(v) ≥ µ.

  • 2. Value Problem: Compute the set of (rational) values:

{valΓ(v) | v ∈ V }

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG Problems

  • 1. Decision Problem Given v ∈ V , µ ∈ Z, decide if Bb has a

strategy π to secure valπ(v) ≥ µ.

  • 2. Value Problem: Compute the set of (rational) values:

{valΓ(v) | v ∈ V }

  • 3. (Optimal) Strategy Synthesis Construct an (optimal) strategy

for Bb.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG Problems: Why They Matter?

| =

Correctness Relation Quantitative Requirements:

  • limited resources
  • average performance . . .

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG Problems: Why They Matter?

System Model?

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Correctness Relation Quantitative Requirements:

  • limited resources
  • average performance . . .

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG Problems: Why They Matter?

Solved as a game: System vs Environment Solution = Winning Strategy System Model?

| =

Correctness Relation Quantitative Requirements:

  • limited resources
  • average performance . . .

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG Problems: Why They Matter?

  • MPG significative for theoretical and applicative aspects
  • µ-calculus model checking

PTIME

⇐ ⇒ parity games

PTIME

= ⇒ MPG

  • MPG

PTIME

= ⇒ simple stochastic games

  • MPG

PTIME

= ⇒ discounted payoff games

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

MPG Problems: Why They Matter?

  • MPG significative for theoretical and applicative aspects
  • µ-calculus model checking

PTIME

⇐ ⇒ parity games

PTIME

= ⇒ MPG

  • MPG

PTIME

= ⇒ simple stochastic games

  • MPG

PTIME

= ⇒ discounted payoff games

  • MPG problems have an interesting complexity status
  • MPG decision problem belongs to NP ∩ coNP (and even to

UP ∩ coUP)

  • No polynomial algorithm known so far

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Solving MPG Problems

Consider Γ = (V , E, w, V, V△), where w : V → [−M · · · + M]:

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Solving MPG Problems

Consider Γ = (V , E, w, V, V△), where w : V → [−M · · · + M]:

  • U. Zwick and M. Paterson, 1996
  • Θ(EV 2M) algorithm for the decision problem
  • Θ(EV 3M) algorithm for the value problem
  • Θ(EV 4M log( E

V )) algorithm for optimal strategy synthesis

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Solving MPG Problems

Consider Γ = (V , E, w, V, V△), where w : V → [−M · · · + M]:

  • U. Zwick and M. Paterson, 1996
  • Θ(EV 2M) algorithm for the decision problem
  • Θ(EV 3M) algorithm for the value problem
  • Θ(EV 4M log( E

V )) algorithm for optimal strategy synthesis

  • H. Bjorklund and S. Vorobyov, 2004: Use a randomized framework
  • O(min(EV 2M, 2O(√V log V ))) for the decision prob.
  • O(min(EV 3M(log V + log M), 2O(√V log V ))) for the value prob.
  • Θ(EV 4M log( E

V )) algorithm for optimal strategy synthesis

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Solving MPG Problems

Consider Γ = (V , E, w, V, V△), where w : V → [−M · · · + M]:

  • U. Zwick and M. Paterson, 1996
  • Θ(EV 2M) algorithm for the decision problem
  • Θ(EV 3M) algorithm for the value problem
  • Θ(EV 4M log( E

V )) algorithm for optimal strategy synthesis

  • H. Bjorklund and S. Vorobyov, 2004: Use a randomized framework
  • O(min(EV 2M, 2O(√V log V ))) for the decision prob.
  • O(min(EV 3M(log V + log M), 2O(√V log V ))) for the value prob.
  • Θ(EV 4M log( E

V )) algorithm for optimal strategy synthesis

  • Y. Lifshits and D. Pavlov, 2006
  • O(EV 2V log(Z)) algorithm for the decision/value problem

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Solving MPG Problems

Consider Γ = (V , E, w, V, V△), where w : V → [−M · · · + M]:

  • U. Zwick and M. Paterson, 1996
  • Θ(EV 2M) algorithm for the decision problem
  • Θ(EV 3M) algorithm for the value problem
  • Θ(EV 4M log( E

V )) algorithm for optimal strategy synthesis

Pseudopolynomial Algorithms

  • L. Brim, J. Chaloupka, L. Doyen, R. Gentilini and J-F. Raskin – 2010
  • O(E · V · M) for the decision problem & strategy synthesis
  • O(E · V 2 · M · (log(V ) + log(M))) for the value problem
  • O(E · V 2 · M · (log(V ) + log(M))) algorithm for optimal strategy

synthesis

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Value Approximation: Basics (I)

Let Γ = (V , E, w, V0, V1) be a MPG, let v ∈ V and consider ε ≥ 0.

Definition (MPG additive ε-value)

The value val ∈ Q is said an additive ε-value on v if and only if: | val − valΓ(v)| ≤ ε

Definition (MPG relative ε-value)

The value val ∈ Q is said an relative ε-value on v if and only if: | val − valΓ(v)| |valΓ(v)| ≤ ε

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Value Approximation: Basics (II)

Let Γ = (V , E, w, V0, V1) be a MPG: MPG Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) An additive/relative polynomial approximation scheme for Γ is an algorithm A such that for all ε > 0, A computes an additive/relative ε-value in time polynomial w.r.t. the size of Γ.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Value Approximation: Basics (II)

Let Γ = (V , E, w, V0, V1) be a MPG: MPG Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) An additive/relative polynomial approximation scheme for Γ is an algorithm A such that for all ε > 0, A computes an additive/relative ε-value in time polynomial w.r.t. the size of Γ. MPG Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) An additive/relative fully polynomial approximation scheme for Γ is an algorithm A such that for all ε > 0, A computes an addi- tive/relative ε-value in time polynomial w.r.t. Γ and 1

ε.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – FPTAS (I)

  • A. Roth, M. Balcan, A. Kalai & Y. Mansour – 2010

The MPGvalue problem on graphs with rational weights in [-1,+1] admits an additive FPTAS.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – FPTAS (I)

  • A. Roth, M. Balcan, A. Kalai & Y. Mansour – 2010

The MPGvalue problem on graphs with rational weights in [-1,+1] admits an additive FPTAS. Easy approximation algorithm based on: existing pseudopolynomial procedures + graph reweighting

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – FPTAS (II)

Can we efficiently approximate the value in MPG with no restriction on the weights?

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – FPTAS (II)

Can we efficiently approximate the value in MPG with no restriction on the weights? Theorem The MPG value problem does not admit an additive FPTAS , unless it is in P.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – FPTAS (II)

Can we efficiently approximate the value in MPG with no restriction on the weights? Theorem The MPG value problem does not admit an additive FPTAS , unless it is in P. Proof (Sketch):

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – FPTAS (II)

Can we efficiently approximate the value in MPG with no restriction on the weights? Theorem The MPG value problem does not admit an additive FPTAS , unless it is in P. Proof (Sketch):

  • By contradiction. Assume an additive FPTAS exists.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – FPTAS (II)

Can we efficiently approximate the value in MPG with no restriction on the weights? Theorem The MPG value problem does not admit an additive FPTAS , unless it is in P. Proof (Sketch):

  • By contradiction. Assume an additive FPTAS exists.
  • Choose ε =

1 2n(n−1) and compute the additive ǫ-value vε.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – FPTAS (II)

Can we efficiently approximate the value in MPG with no restriction on the weights? Theorem The MPG value problem does not admit an additive FPTAS , unless it is in P. Proof (Sketch):

  • By contradiction. Assume an additive FPTAS exists.
  • Choose ε =

1 2n(n−1) and compute the additive ǫ-value vε.

  • The MPG value v is the unique rational with denominator

1 ≤ d ≤ n in the interval [vε − ε, vε + ε].

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – PTAS

Are weaker notions of approximation usefull to obtain some positive result w.r.t. the MPG value approximation problem?

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations – PTAS

Are weaker notions of approximation usefull to obtain some positive result w.r.t. the MPG value approximation problem? Theorem For any constant k: If the problem of computing an additive k-approximate MPG value can be solved in polynomial time (w.r.t. the size of the MPG), then the MPG value problem belongs to P.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations

Corollary The following problems are P-time equivalent:

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations

Corollary The following problems are P-time equivalent:

  • 1. Solving the MPG value problem.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations

Corollary The following problems are P-time equivalent:

  • 1. Solving the MPG value problem.
  • 2. Determining an additive FPTAS for the MPG value problem.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations

Corollary The following problems are P-time equivalent:

  • 1. Solving the MPG value problem.
  • 2. Determining an additive FPTAS for the MPG value problem.
  • 3. Determining an additive PTAS for the MPG value problem.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Additive Approximations

Corollary The following problems are P-time equivalent:

  • 1. Solving the MPG value problem.
  • 2. Determining an additive FPTAS for the MPG value problem.
  • 3. Determining an additive PTAS for the MPG value problem.
  • 4. Computing an additive k-approximate MPG value in

polynomial time, for any constant k.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Relative Approximations (I)

  • Y. Boros, E. Elbassioni, M. Fouz, V. Gurvich, K. Makino i & B.

Manthey – 2011 The MPG value problem on graphs with nonnegative weights admits a relative FPTAS.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Relative Approximations (II)

Can we design efficient relative approximations for the MPG value problem on graphs with no restriction on the weights?

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Relative Approximations (II)

Can we design efficient relative approximations for the MPG value problem on graphs with no restriction on the weights? Theorem The MPG value problem does not admit a relative PTAS, unless it is in P.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Relative Approximations (III)

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Relative Approximations (III)

Corollary The following problems are P-time equivalent:

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Relative Approximations (III)

Corollary The following problems are P-time equivalent:

  • 1. Solving the MPG value problem.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Relative Approximations (III)

Corollary The following problems are P-time equivalent:

  • 1. Solving the MPG value problem.
  • 2. Determining a relative FPTAS for the MPG value problem.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

Relative Approximations (III)

Corollary The following problems are P-time equivalent:

  • 1. Solving the MPG value problem.
  • 2. Determining a relative FPTAS for the MPG value problem.
  • 3. Determining a relative PTAS for the MPG value problem.

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Mean-Payoff Games Exact Solutions Approximation

The End

Thank you!

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