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On Some Constructions for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data Palash Sarkar Applied Statistics Unit Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata India palash@isical.ac.in (Partially based on joint work with Debrup Chakraborty) Directions


  1. On Some Constructions for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data Palash Sarkar Applied Statistics Unit Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata India palash@isical.ac.in (Partially based on joint work with Debrup Chakraborty) Directions in Authenticated Ciphers – DIAC 2012, 6th July 2012 isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 1 / 32

  2. Encryption Sender public channel Receiver msg cpr Encrypt Decrypt K adversary K isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 2 / 32

  3. Authentication Sender public channel Receiver msg Generate Verify (msg, tag) Tag Tag K adversary K isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 3 / 32

  4. Authenticated Encryption (AE) Sender public channel Receiver msg nonce nonce cpr = (C, tag) Encrypt Decrypt K adversary K isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 4 / 32

  5. AE with Associated Data (AEAD) Sender public channel Receiver hdr, msg nonce nonce (hdr, cpr = (C, tag)) Encrypt Decrypt K adversary K isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 5 / 32

  6. Deterministic AEAD (DAEAD) Sender public channel Receiver hdr, msg (hdr, cpr = (C, tag)) Encrypt Decrypt K adversary K isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 6 / 32

  7. Construction Approaches We will consider: Single-pass block cipher modes of operations. From tweakable block ciphers. From (plain) block ciphers. isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 7 / 32

  8. Construction Approaches We will consider: Single-pass block cipher modes of operations. From tweakable block ciphers. From (plain) block ciphers. Stream cipher with IV and a hash function (with provably low collision and differential probabilities). isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 7 / 32

  9. Construction Approaches We will consider: Single-pass block cipher modes of operations. From tweakable block ciphers. From (plain) block ciphers. Stream cipher with IV and a hash function (with provably low collision and differential probabilities). Other approaches: Direct construction of an integrated primitive: PHELIX, SOBER, AEGIS, ... From permutations (Bertoni at al 2011). Generic conversion from AE to AEAD: AE+MAC (Rogaway 2002); AE+CRHF (Sarkar 2010). isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 7 / 32

  10. Some AE(AD) Schemes from Block Ciphers Two-pass: Cost per block (approx): 2[BC] or 1[BC]+1[M] . CCM: Counter + CBC-MAC; standardised by NIST (USA). GCM: Counter + (universal) hash; standardised by NIST (USA). CWC: Carter-Wegman + Counter Mode; EAX; CHM: CENC + hash; CCFB: between one and two-pass. isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 8 / 32

  11. Some AE(AD) Schemes from Block Ciphers Two-pass: Cost per block (approx): 2[BC] or 1[BC]+1[M] . CCM: Counter + CBC-MAC; standardised by NIST (USA). GCM: Counter + (universal) hash; standardised by NIST (USA). CWC: Carter-Wegman + Counter Mode; EAX; CHM: CENC + hash; CCFB: between one and two-pass. Single-pass: Cost per block (approx): 1[BC]+ SOMETHING . Constructions having associated (US) patents: IACBC, IAPM: (Jutla, 2001); XCBC, XECB: (Gligor-Donescu, 2001); OCB: (Rogaway et al, 2001; Rogaway 2004; Krovetz-Rogaway, 2011). isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 8 / 32

  12. Some AE(AD) Schemes from Block Ciphers Two-pass: Cost per block (approx): 2[BC] or 1[BC]+1[M] . CCM: Counter + CBC-MAC; standardised by NIST (USA). GCM: Counter + (universal) hash; standardised by NIST (USA). CWC: Carter-Wegman + Counter Mode; EAX; CHM: CENC + hash; CCFB: between one and two-pass. Single-pass: Cost per block (approx): 1[BC]+ SOMETHING . Constructions having associated (US) patents: IACBC, IAPM: (Jutla, 2001); XCBC, XECB: (Gligor-Donescu, 2001); OCB: (Rogaway et al, 2001; Rogaway 2004; Krovetz-Rogaway, 2011). Constructions without assoicated patents: Chakraborty-Sarkar (2006, 2008); Sarkar (2010). isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 8 / 32

  13. AE(AD) from Tweakable Block Ciphers isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 9 / 32

  14. (Tweakable) Block Ciphers msg blk cpr blk key K key K Encrypt Decrypt msg blk cpr blk msg blk cpr blk tweak T key K tweak T key K Encrypt Decrypt msg blk cpr blk Non-secret tweak allows flexibility in designing applications. isilogo Formalised by Liskov-Rivest-Wagner (2002). Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 10 / 32

  15. TBC and Modes of Operations Rogaway (2004). Provides efficient construction of a TBC family. Introduces a technique for using a TBC family to construct different modes of operations. isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 11 / 32

  16. TBC and Modes of Operations Rogaway (2004). Provides efficient construction of a TBC family. Introduces a technique for using a TBC family to construct different modes of operations. Chakraborty-Sarkar (2006, 2008). A new TBC family obtained by generalising Rogaway’s construction. Can be instantiated over GF ( 2 n ) or Z 2 n . Provides two techniques for constructing modes of operations. The first technique generalises Rogaway’s work. A second new technique. Provides a family of modes of operations for MAC, AE and AEAD. Only one of each kind was known earlier. isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 11 / 32

  17. From BC to TBC (Generalising Rogaway 2004) N , l ( M ) = E K ( M + ∆) . XE Construction (tweakable PRP): � E K N , l ( M ) = E K ( M + ∆) − ∆ . XEX Construction (tweakable SPRP): � E K where ∆ = f l ( N ) and N = E K ( N ) . f 1 , f 2 , . . . is a masking sequence. ( N , l ) is the tweak; tweak space is { 0 , 1 } n × { 1 , 2 , . . . , 2 n − 2 } . Addition (and subtraction) is over a ring R . isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 12 / 32

  18. From BC to TBC (Generalising Rogaway 2004) N , l ( M ) = E K ( M + ∆) . XE Construction (tweakable PRP): � E K N , l ( M ) = E K ( M + ∆) − ∆ . XEX Construction (tweakable SPRP): � E K where ∆ = f l ( N ) and N = E K ( N ) . f 1 , f 2 , . . . is a masking sequence. ( N , l ) is the tweak; tweak space is { 0 , 1 } n × { 1 , 2 , . . . , 2 n − 2 } . Addition (and subtraction) is over a ring R . The generalisation arises from the notion of masking sequence and working over R . isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 12 / 32

  19. Masking Sequence: Definition f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m is an ( n , m , µ ) masking sequence if: ( f s : { 0 , 1 } n → { 0 , 1 } n ) 1 Prob [ f s ( N ) = α ] ≤ µ 1 Prob [ f s ( N ) = N + α ] ≤ µ 1 Prob [ f s ( N ) = f t ( N ) + α ] ≤ µ 1 Prob [ f s ( N ) = f t ( N ′ ) + α ] ≤ µ where N and N ′ are randomly and independently chosen from { 0 , 1 } n . α is any fixed n -bit string. isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 13 / 32

  20. Instantiations of R R as GF ( 2 n ) : Define f i ( N ) = N G i where G is an n × n binary matrix whose characteristic polynomial is primitive over GF ( 2 ) . f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f 2 n − 2 is an ( n , 2 n − 2 , 2 n ) masking sequence. Efficient instantiations of G : powering method, (word oriented) LFSR, CA. isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 14 / 32

  21. Instantiations of R R as GF ( 2 n ) : Define f i ( N ) = N G i where G is an n × n binary matrix whose characteristic polynomial is primitive over GF ( 2 ) . f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f 2 n − 2 is an ( n , 2 n − 2 , 2 n ) masking sequence. Efficient instantiations of G : powering method, (word oriented) LFSR, CA. R as Z 2 n : Let p = 2 n + δ be a prime, with δ as small as possible, eg: p = 2 128 + 51. Define f i ( N ) = (( i + 1 ) N mod p ) mod 2 n . f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f 2 n − 2 is an ( n , 2 n − 2 , 2 n − 1 / ( δ + 1 )) masking sequence. isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 14 / 32

  22. Instantiations of R R as GF ( 2 n ) : Define f i ( N ) = N G i where G is an n × n binary matrix whose characteristic polynomial is primitive over GF ( 2 ) . f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f 2 n − 2 is an ( n , 2 n − 2 , 2 n ) masking sequence. Efficient instantiations of G : powering method, (word oriented) LFSR, CA. R as Z 2 n : Let p = 2 n + δ be a prime, with δ as small as possible, eg: p = 2 128 + 51. Define f i ( N ) = (( i + 1 ) N mod p ) mod 2 n . f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f 2 n − 2 is an ( n , 2 n − 2 , 2 n − 1 / ( δ + 1 )) masking sequence. Rogaway (2004): R as GF ( 2 n ) with the powering construction. isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 14 / 32

  23. From TBC to AE E with tweak space { 0 , 1 } n × { 1 , 2 , . . . , 2 n / 2 } × { 0 , 1 } . XEX-TBC � isilogo Palash Sarkar (ISI, Kolkata) AEAD Constructions DIAC 2012 15 / 32

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