On behavioral complementarity and its implications Chris Chambers, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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On behavioral complementarity and its implications Chris Chambers, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

On behavioral complementarity and its implications Chris Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya California Institute of Technology UPenn March 18, 2008 Complementary goods Complementary goods Coffee and Sugar Tea and Lemon Peanut


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On behavioral complementarity and its implications

Chris Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya

California Institute of Technology

UPenn – March 18, 2008

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Complementary goods

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Complementary goods

Coffee and Sugar Tea and Lemon Peanut butter and Jelly Cheese and Wine Beer and Pretzels Gin and Tonic Matters for IO models and practical problems. (e.g. firms’ pricing policy).

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Consumer Theory

Explain consumer behavior: choices of consumption bundles x ∈ X ⊆ Rn

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Consumer Theory

Postulate a utility function u : X → R Consumer behaves as if max u(x) x ∈ {y ∈ X : p · y ≤ m}

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Consumer Theory

{y : p · y ≤ p · x} x

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Consumer Theory

Problem: we don’t observe u; it’s a theoretical construct.

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Consumer Theory

Problem: we don’t observe u; it’s a theoretical construct. Consider data (xk, pk), k = 1, . . . , K on prices and consumption. Say that u rationalizes the data if, for all k, y = xk and pk · y ≤ pk · xk ⇒ u(y) < u(xk)

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Consumer Theory

Problem: we don’t observe u; it’s a theoretical construct. Consider data (xk, pk), k = 1, . . . , K on prices and consumption. Say that u rationalizes the data if, for all k, y = xk and pk · y ≤ pk · xk ⇒ u(y) < u(xk) Can we rationalize anything choosing the appropriate u ?

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x1 x2

Two observations: (x1, p1), (x2, p2)

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Afriat (1967)

Consider data (xk, pk), k = 1, . . . , K.

Theorem

The following are equivalent

  • 1. The data can be rationalized.
  • 2. The data satisfy GARP.
  • 3. The data can be rationalized by a weakly monotonic,

continuous, and concave utility.

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Back to complementary goods

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How do choices between Coffee and Sugar and between Coffee and Tea differ ? (choices → testing) How do preferences differ ? (preferences → modeling)

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Complementarity in utility (Edgeworth-Pareto)

q ❛ ❛ q ✻ ✲

x x ∨ y x ∧ y y u(x) − u(x ∧ y) ≤ u(x ∨ y) − u(y) Sugar Coffee

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Complementarity in utility (Edgeworth-Pareto)

q ❛ ❛ q ✻ ✻ ✲

x x ∨ y x ∧ y y u(x) − u(x ∧ y) ≤ u(x ∨ y) − u(y) Sugar Coffee

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Complementarity in utility (Edgeworth-Pareto)

q ❛ ❛ q ✻ ✻ ✻ ✲

x x ∨ y x ∧ y y u(x) − u(x ∧ y) ≤ u(x ∨ y) − u(y) Sugar Coffee

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Theorem (Chambers & Echenique (2006))

Data, (xk, pk), k = 1, . . . , K, can be rationalized if and only if it can be rationalized by a supermodular utility

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Behavioral complementarity

The standard notion of complementarities based on utility has no implication for (observable) choices. So we study a behavioral notion.

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Behavioral complementarity

↓ price of coffee ⇒ ↑ demand for sugar. “Behavioral” = condition on preferences.

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Behavioral complementarity

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Behavioral complementarity

Essentially a property of pairs of goods. Ex: Coffee, Tea and Sugar. Use more sugar for tea than for coffee.

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What if have n goods ?

Standard practice: estimate cross elasticity assuming demand functional form. We need separability in preferences (and possibly aggregation). e.g. heating and housing.

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Demand

A demand is a function D : R2

++ × R+ → R2 2 s.t. ◮ p · D(p, I) = I (Walras Law). ◮ ∀t > 0, D(tp, tI) = D(p, I) (Homogeneity of degree zero)

A demand function is rational if it can be rationalized by a weakly monotonic utility.

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Demand

A demand is a function D : R2

++ × R+ → R2 2 s.t. ◮ p · D(p, I) = I (Walras Law). ◮ ∀t > 0, D(tp, tI) = D(p, I) (Homogeneity of degree zero)

A demand function is rational if it can be rationalized by a weakly monotonic utility. i.e. ∃ w. mon. u with D(p, I) = argmax{x:p·x≤I}u(x)

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Behavioral complementarity – Two Models

◮ Demand: D(p, I) (Nominal Income).

D satisfies complementarity if p ≤ p′ ⇒ D(p′, I) ≤ D(p, I).

◮ Demand: D(p, p · ω) (Endowment Income)

D satisfies (weak) complementarity if, for every p, ω there is a p′ such that

  • D1(p′, p′ · w) − D1(p, p · w)

D2(p′, p′ · w) − D2(p, p · w)

  • ≥ 0
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Results (vaguely)

◮ Necessary and sufficient condition for observed demand to be

consistent with complementarity (testable implications).

◮ Necessary and sufficient condition (within domains) for

preferences to generate complements in demand.

◮ Differences in Nom. Income vs. Endowment Income.

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

Expenditure data: (x, p) (x′, p′) (Samuelson (1947), Afriat (1967), etc.)

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

p x

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

x x′ p′ p

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

x x′ p′ p

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

So x ∨ x′ / ∈ B ∨ B′

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

p′ p x x′ x ∨ x′

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

Necessary condition 1 : x ∨ x′ ∈ B ∨ B′

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

p p′ x x′

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

p p′ x x′

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Nominal Income – Testable Implications

Necessary condition 2 : a strengthening of WARP.

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Nominal Income

By homogeneity, D(p/I, 1) = D(p, I). So fix income I = 1 and write D(p). Note: B ∨ B′ is budget with p ∧ p′ and I = 1.

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Nominal Income

An observed demand function is a function D : P → R2

+ ◮ P ⊆ R2 ++ is finite ◮ p · D(p) = 1

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Nominal Income

Let D : P → R2

+ be an observed demand.

Theorem (Observable Demand)

D is the restriction to P of a rational demand that satisfies complementarity iff ∀p, p′ ∈ P

  • 1. (p ∧ p′) · (D(p) ∨ D(p′)) ≤ 1.
  • 2. If p′ · D(p) ≤ 1 and p′

i > pi then D(p′)j ≥ D(p)j for j = i.

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Nominal Income

Theorem (Continuity)

Let D : R2

++ → R2 + be a rationalizable demand function which

satisfies complementarity. Then D is continuous. Furthermore, D is rationalized by an upper semicontinuous, quasiconcave and weakly monotonic utility function.

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Nominal Income

Theorem (Continuity)

Let D : R2

++ → R2 + be a rationalizable demand function which

satisfies complementarity. Then D is continuous. Furthermore, D is rationalized by an upper semicontinuous, quasiconcave and weakly monotonic utility function.

Remark

We extend the data to a demand, and then find it’s rational. Difference from Afriat’s approach of constructing a utility.

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Theorem 1

Suppose we observe (p, x) and (p′′, x′′). Find demand at prices p′ (extend demand).

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x p p’

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p’ p p’’

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Theorem (Observed Demand)

p p′ p ∧ p′ B B A A x

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Theorem (Observed Demand)

p′′ x C C p ∧ p′′

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Theorem (Observed Demand)

x C C D p′ ∧ p′′ p ∧ p′ A A D

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Nominal Income

Let u be a C 2 utility. m(x) = ∂u(x)/∂x1 ∂u(x)/∂x2 is the marginal rate of substitution of u at an interior point x.

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Nominal Income

Let D a demand w/ interior range and monotone increasing, C 2, and strictly quasiconvex rationalization.

Theorem (Smooth Utility)

D satisfies complementarity iff ∂m(x)/∂x1 m(x) ≤ −1 x1 and ∂m(x)/∂x2 m(x) ≥ 1 x2

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Theorem (Smooth Utility)

x1 x2 ˆ x1 ˆ x1 + ǫ ˆ x2

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Nominal Income

Separability: u (x, y) = f (x) + g (y) . Then complementarity iff f and g more concave than log.

  • Expect. util.: π1U (x) + π2U (y).

Then complementarity iff RRA ≥ 1. Analogous result for subst. due to Wald (1951) and Varian (1985).

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Endowment Income

D satisfies complementarity if, for all (p, ω) and all p′,

  • D1(p′, p′ · ω) − D1(p, p · ω)

D2(p′, p′ · ω′) − D2(p, p · ω)

  • ≥ 0.

(1) D satisfies weak complementarity if, for every (p, ω), there is one price p′ = p satsfying (1).

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Endowment Income

Let D be a rational demand.

Theorem (Endowment Model)

The following are equivalent:

  • 1. D satisfies complementarity.
  • 2. D satisfies weak complementarity.
  • 3. ∃ cont. strictly monotone, fi : R+ → R∪ {∞}, i = 1, 2, at

least one of which is everywhere real valued (fi (R+) ⊆ R), s.t. u(x) = min {f1(x1), f2(x2)} is a rationalization of D.

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Endowment Income

ω p x = ω′

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Endowment Income

p

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Conclusions: