Network Access for Remote Users Dr John S. Graham ULCC - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

network access for remote users
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Network Access for Remote Users Dr John S. Graham ULCC - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Network Access for Remote Users Dr John S. Graham ULCC j.graham@ulcc.ac.uk Review of Technologies Remote Site Private Leased Lines Kilostream or Megastream Circuits LES ISDN EPS9 ISP Remote User


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SLIDE 1

Network Access for Remote Users

Dr John S. Graham ULCC j.graham@ulcc.ac.uk

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SLIDE 2

Review of Technologies

  • Remote Site

– Private Leased Lines

  • Kilostream or Megastream Circuits
  • LES

– ISDN – EPS9 – ISP

  • Remote User

– Private Dialup Service – ISP

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SLIDE 3

Site-to-Site Private Infrastructure

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SLIDE 4

Traditional Dialup Service

High Costs Support Burden Limited to 56K Analogue Dialup Limited Service Security Guaranteed

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SLIDE 5

Virtual Private Network

Highly Flexible Solution Uses Existing Infrastructure

Complex Security Issues

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SLIDE 6

VPN Roadmap

Tunnelling Symmetric Asymmetric Encryption Endpoints Data User Authentication IP Framework

VPN

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SLIDE 7

Tunnelling Methods

  • Layer III

– GRE – IPSec

  • Layer II

– L2F – PPTP – L2TP

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Layer 3 Tunnelling (GRE)

TCP IP Data GRE IP

GRE

TCP IP Data

passenger protocol encapsulating protocol carrier protocol

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SLIDE 9

Tunnelling In Action

IP GRE TCP IP Data

Destination 62.49.38.138 Source 192.168.17.26 194.82.103.186

IP GRE TCP IP Data

192.168.17.26

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SLIDE 10

Layer 2 Tunnelling (L2TP)

TCP IP Data L2TP UDP IP PPP TCP IP Data L2TP UDP IP PPP ESP ESP

L2TP L2TP + IPSec

TCP IP Data PPP

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Layer 2 Tunnelling Modes

Compulsory L2 Tunnelling Voluntary L2 Tunnelling

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Authentication

  • Peer Identity

– Shared Secret – Digital Certificate

  • Data Integrity

– Digital Signatures

  • User Identity

– Kerberos – RADIUS

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IP Security (IPSec)

  • Protocols

– Authentication Header – Encapsulating Security Payload – Internet Key Exchange

  • Modes

– Tunnel – Transport

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IPSec Protocols

Sequence Number Authentication Data SPI Next Header Payload Length Reserved Sequence Number SPI Authentication Data Data Next Header Pad Length Pad IV Authentication Header (51) Encapsulating Security Protocol (50)

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IPSec Modes

Tunnel Mode Transport Mode

IP AH/ESP TCP IP Data AH/ESP TCP IP Data

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Equipment at Remote Site

  • ‘Wires Only’ ADSL Connection

– One Static IP Address

  • Splitter
  • Cisco 827H Router

– Ethernet hub (4 ports) plus ATM port

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SLIDE 17

Customer Installation

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SLIDE 18

Router Configuration

Routing Table NAT IPSec Tunnel Dialer A1 A2 B1 B2 B3 Ethernet

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IPSec Followed by NAT

  • Immutable fields of outer IP header

included in AH protocol’s ICV data.

  • Transport mode IPSec renders TCP/UDP

checksums invalid.

  • Multiple incompatibilities between SA

parameters and NAT.

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-reqts-04.txt

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SLIDE 20

Fragmentation Hell

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SLIDE 21

http://www.ja.net/documents/