More Harm than Good? William Mitchell College of Law Approved 1.5 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Occupational Licensing: More Harm than Good? William Mitchell College of Law Approved 1.5 CLE credits: 209043 by The Institute for Justice October 23, 2015 1 Agenda Slides Introduction to the Institute for Justice 1-7 Occupational
William Mitchell College of Law Approved 1.5 CLE credits: 209043 by The Institute for Justice October 23, 2015
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Slides
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Licensing 25% of workers Unionism 11% of workers Minimum wage Less than 1% of workers
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by Minnesota consumers.
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benefit members by limiting competition.
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490 days for cosmetologists
372 days
233 days
are licensed in 50 states.
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are usually better off than consumers.
punishes those who don’t.
work or making mid-life career changes.
presumes the right to do so. A society that denies this right cannot be justified, nor can it attain social peace.” (Centesimus Annus #43).
hypothetical harms.
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protection over a competitive labor market.
competition, reputation and legal remedies.
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for workers and consumers.
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≠ Free markets
≠ Limited government
≠ Economic liberty
≠ Social justice
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Takeaway: Policy: Use least restrictive form of regulation
Market competition and private litigation
Deceptive trade practice acts and
Inspections Bonding or Insurance Registration Certification
Licensing
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135 S.Ct. 1101 February 25, 2015
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Sherman Act?
antitrust litigation under Parker v. Brown?
by the states when acting in their sovereign capacity.
possess a significant measure of sovereignty under U.S. Constitution.
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earned large fees.
competitors.
about low prices.
2006.
services in N.C.
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participants enjoys Parker state-action immunity from federal antitrust liability for anticompetitive conduct only if:
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; and
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When state use licensees on boards states must have both:
legislature to the non-sovereign actor.
anticompetitive acts of the non-sovereign actor and disapprove those acts that fail to accord with state policy.
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sovereign actors entitled to Parker immunity from federal antitrust liability.
involvement to ensure the states accept political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit.
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Labor & Industry or Department of Health.
they revoke licenses.
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Takeaway: Government Attorneys
taught and tested.
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Right to earn an honest living
any lawful trade.” Case of the Tailors of Ipswich (1615).
community is the very essence of the opportunity and freedom that was the purpose of the 14th Amendment to secure.“ Truax v. Raich (1915)
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Federal and state constitutional claims
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required to enter the work force: the government or the employer.
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Lee U. McGrath Managing Attorney Institute for Justice 520 Nicollet Mall-Suite 550 Minneapolis MN 55402-2626 Office: (612) 435-3451 lmcgrath@ij.org
www.ij.org
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Certification is a voluntary type of occupational regulation in which the government grants nontransferable recognition to an individual based on meeting certain personal qualifications. Upon approval, the individual may use “certified” as a designated title or as part of a designated title. A non-certified individual may also perform the lawful occupation for compensation but may not use the title “certified.” The term certification is not synonymous with an “occupational license.” 33
Occupational license is a type of occupational regulation that requires an individual to meet certain personal qualifications in
An occupational license is nontransferable. It is illegal for an individual who does not possess an
compensation. Occupational licensing is the most restrictive type of
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Takeaway: Legislators
apprenticeships, on-the-job experience, and military service;
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