Making fiscal policy more stabilising in the next upturn: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Making fiscal policy more stabilising in the next upturn: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Making fiscal policy more stabilising in the next upturn: Challenges and Policy Options Challenges and Policy Options Anne-Marie Brook New Zealand Treasury y Presentation to Macroeconomics Imbalances Forum, Wellington 24 June 2011 24 June


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SLIDE 1

Making fiscal policy more stabilising in the next upturn: Challenges and Policy Options Challenges and Policy Options

Anne-Marie Brook New Zealand Treasury

Presentation to Macroeconomics Imbalances Forum, Wellington 24 June 2011

y

24 June 2011

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SLIDE 2

Roadmap Roadmap

I. The ‘mix’ of macroeconomic conditions matters for New Zealand

  • II. ‘Better’ fiscal policy over the 2005 – 2008

period would have meant running larger period would have meant running larger surpluses

  • III. We need new Policy Tools for the future
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SLIDE 3
  • I. Fiscal Policy influences the ‘mix’ of

macroeconomic conditions

  • Fiscal policy matters for interest rates cycles.
  • The ‘mix’ is particularly important for New

Zealand Zealand.

  • Broader government policies can also influence

h

l l f

l the average level of real interest rates.

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SLIDE 4

Big increase in government spending boosts aggregate demand

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SLIDE 5

Tighter monetary policy pushes the exchange rate up

% $

6 7 0 80 0.90

% $

4 5 0.70 0.80

NZ/ US 90-day interest rate differential (left hand axis)

2 3 0.60 1 0.50

Nominal NZD/ USD (right hand axis)

  • 2
  • 1

0.30 0.40 2 0.30

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

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SLIDE 6
  • II. We should have run larger surpluses

g p

  • ver 2005 – 2008
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SLIDE 7

Three reasons why we didn’t Three reasons why we didn t

  • Political economy
  • Measurement challenges (real me ≠ ex-post)

Measurement challenges (real me ≠ ex post)

  • No explicit mandate for continuing to run

d d b b d h id d down debt beyond what was considered a ‘prudent’ level

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SLIDE 8

Political Economy Political Economy

12 October, 2007

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SLIDE 9

Measurement Challenges Measurement Challenges

  • Trend vs cycle
  • Real time uncertainty

Real time uncertainty

  • Limitations of fiscal impulse measures
  • Need to look at wide range of measures and

communicate uncertainty and risks communicate uncertainty and risks

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Fiscal impulse measure suggests too many

  • utturns in the bottom right quadrant
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But ‘ex ante’ measure suggests the pro-cyclical

  • utturns were ‘accidental’
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SLIDE 12

Our estimates of Structural Revenues are always being revised

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Policy implications of measurement challenges

  • Don’t rely on an accurate trend/cycle

decomposition p

  • Be more cautious about judging revenue

surprises as being permanent surprises as being permanent

  • Pay attention to composition effects
  • Better communication to public of macro-

stability objective uncertainty risks etc stability objective, uncertainty, risks etc

  • Introduce policies more gradually?
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SLIDE 14

Three reasons why we didn’t Three reasons why we didn t

  • No explicit mandate for continuing to run

d d b b d h id d down debt beyond what was considered a ‘prudent’ level

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SLIDE 15

Public Finance Act (PFA) Public Finance Act (PFA)

  • Framework

Framework

Principles-based approach rather than numerical targets: focus on maintaining debt at a “prudent” targets: focus on maintaining debt at a prudent level and encouraging transparency Supported by good budgeting and fiscal Supported by good budgeting and fiscal management practices

  • Possible Weakness
  • Possible Weakness

No explicit mandate to continue to pay down debt (or build up government net worth) for debt (or build up government net worth) for

stabilisation purposes

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SLIDE 16

Fiscal policy viewed through the three lenses

Sustainability Sustainability

Good fiscal policy

Structure Stabilisation

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SLIDE 17

Example 1: Economic crisis countries Example 1: Economic crisis countries

Sustainability

Good fiscal policy Structure

Stabilisation

policy Structure

Stabilisation

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Example 2: NZ 2005 2008 Example 2: NZ 2005-2008

Sustainability

Good fiscal policy

Structure

Stabilisation

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SLIDE 19
  • III. We need new Policy Tools for

y the Future

  • Some of the commonly proposed Policy Tools

unlikely to do much better unlikely to do much better

– Structural balance targets (too crude) – TTT tools (e.g. active tax policy tools)

  • Instead recommend sticking with the current

Instead recommend sticking with the current approach but with enhancements

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Enhancements worth considering Enhancements worth considering

Policy Tool M ain strength M ain weakness

Revise PFA to put more (some) weight on macro- stability Would strengthen rationale for running surpluses during upturn May not be sufficient stability during upturn Multi-year spending cap

C

  • uld improve quality of

spending and prevent large di i Pro-cyclical spending increases could still occur (j t ith l ) spending increases (just with a lag) More focus on commitment to medium- If combined with revised PFA could increase focus May be difficult to enforce term spending plans

  • n macro stability

Independent Fiscal Council Improve public debate May not add much Stabilisation Fund Would ease political economy challenge by shifting focus to timing Difficult to determine appropriate contributions and withdrawals g g

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What can we learn from Chile? What can we learn from Chile?

New Zealand Chile

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What would a Stabilisation Fund for New Zealand look like?

  • Similar to NZ Super Fund but Different

– Funds would flow in and out – Requiring less risky and more liquid asset allocation

  • Offshore assets would be held on an un-hedged

b i basis

  • Contributions could = “revenue windfalls”
  • Draw-downs could be used to finance fiscal

deficits during recessions or to finance particular projects projects

  • Some implied cost for the Crown Balance Sheet
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SLIDE 23

IV: Conclusion IV: Conclusion

  • Fiscal policy should do more to stabilise the exchange rate.
  • Pro-cyclical fiscal policy may be more problematic for New

Zealand than for some other countries.

  • Still exploring which combination of policy options might
  • Still exploring which combination of policy options might

work best in the future.

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IV: Conclusion IV: Conclusion

  • Fiscal policy should do more to stabilise the exchange rate.
  • Pro-cyclical fiscal policy may be more problematic for New

Zealand than for some other countries.

  • Still exploring which combination of policy options might
  • Still exploring which combination of policy options might

work best in the future.

Standard prescription

Fiscal policy should follow stable

Future prescription

Fiscal policy should actively seek to Fiscal policy should follow stable and transparent rules that allow automatic fiscal stabilisers to

  • perate fully while refraining from

Fiscal policy should actively seek to avoid offsetting the automatic fiscal stabilisers, by putting in place institutional structures that promote

  • perate fully while refraining from

the temptation to use discretionary countercyclical policy owing to the likely decision institutional structures that promote greater transparency and accountability and build public support for the need to run large p y g y and implementation lags. pp g fiscal surpluses during upturns.

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Questions for Discussion Questions for Discussion

  • Which Policy Options would work best?
  • How much weight should we put on fiscal

How much weight should we put on fiscal policy stability vs structure?

E i ht it ti b i t t t d ff – E.g. might it sometimes be appropriate to trade off some stability (i.e. allow a bit of pro-cyclicality) in d t l k i d t t l f

  • rder to lock in some good structural reforms

during good times (e.g. growth-enhancing tax cuts)