Making at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Professor Neil Quigley - - PDF document
Making at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Professor Neil Quigley - - PDF document
Governance and Decision- Making at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Professor Neil Quigley Vice-Chancellor University of Waikato 3 July 2018 Go Gover erna nanc nce e And And Decision Decision-Mak Making ing Unde Under t r the he C
Governance and Decision- Making at the Reserve Bank
- f New Zealand
Professor Neil Quigley
Vice-Chancellor University of Waikato 3 July 2018
Go Gover erna nanc nce e And And Decision Decision-Mak Making ing Unde Under t r the he C Cur urren ent Act t Act
- Single decision-maker
- Meet the requirements of the Act - stability in
prices and financial system
- Policy Targets Agreement
- Board keeps the Governor and Bank “under
constant review”
- Double veto appointment of Governor
Wha hat is t is Wr Wrong with the
- ng with the
Cur Current Act? ent Act?
- It is not 1989 any more
- Lack of clarity
- Can be challenging because all aspects of Reserve
Bank operations governed by the Act
- Benefits of formalising committee decision-
making
- Role of Board unclear
The P he Path T th To
- a R
a Review view of
- f
the Act the Act
- The benefits of a review discussed for some
time – but concerns about “opening up” the Act
- Minister English “Letter of Expectations”
- Rennie review for Treasury (Minister Joyce)
- Post-election decision to move forward with
Review in two phases
Phase Phase 1 1 Review view Decisions Decisions
- Policy Targets Agreements “maintaining
stability in the general level of prices over the medium term and supporting maximum sustainable employment”
- Monetary Policy Committee chaired by the
Governor – up to 4 Bank staff and 3 externals. Non-voting Treasury member
- Appointment of MPC members by Minister on
recommendation of Board
Purpose of the Reserve Bank Act To promote the prosperity and wellbeing of the people of New Zealand and contribute to a sustainable and productive economy
Internal members
Governor and Deputy Chief Executive ex-officio members, Governor as Chair, casting vote if required 5-year terms (staggered) Max 2 terms in one role Full-time
External members
Non-Bank staff with relevant knowledge and experience 4-year terms (staggered) Max 2 terms Part-time
Non-voting Treasury observer Reserve Bank Board
Minister of Finance appoints Board and determines Chair and Deputy Chair Board responsible for monitoring performance of the PMC and its individual members in their duties
The MPC and Minister of Finance to agree a Charter setting out the approach to issues defined in the Act, including the approach to its work and communications. Details of the first Charter are yet to be determined, but its is the Minister’s intention that:
- The MPC aims to reach decision by consensus
- Non-attributed votes are published where there is not consensus
- Non-attributed records of meeting that reflect any differences of view are published
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) responsible for formulating monetary policy
7 voting members (the Act will allow 5 to 7), majority internal members All members to be nominated by the Reserve Bank Board, appointed by the Minister of Finance