Magnet Safety System Magnet Safety System Specification - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Common Project Magnet Common Project E. Sbrissa, G. Olesen CERN/EP CERN/EP E. Sbrissa, G. Olesen Magnet Safety System Magnet Safety System Specification Specification 10
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Magnet Common Project Magnet Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Magnet Common Project Magnet Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
1.1 Introduction to CERN
1.2 Introduction to ATLAS
1.3 Subject of this specification
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
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1.3 Subject 1.3 Subject of this specification
This specification concerns the details of the “Magnet Safety Sy This specification concerns the details of the “Magnet Safety System”, or MSS, used to protect stem”, or MSS, used to protect experimental magnets used in particle physics. Due to the nature experimental magnets used in particle physics. Due to the nature of operation and cost of such
magnets, all measures must be taken to provide a system with the magnets, all measures must be taken to provide a system with the highest possible reliability highest possible reliability and availability. and availability. The object of this paper is to specify the MSS system of ATLAS o The object of this paper is to specify the MSS system of ATLAS on the base of a common project for all n the base of a common project for all four experimental magnets at the future LHC machine. This projec four experimental magnets at the future LHC machine. This project is called the “Magnet Control t is called the “Magnet Control Project”, or MCP. Project”, or MCP. The responsibility of the MSS is to detect anomalies endangering The responsibility of the MSS is to detect anomalies endangering the safety of the magnet and/or the safety of the magnet and/or personnel and to take appropriate action in order to bring the m personnel and to take appropriate action in order to bring the magnet to a secure state. agnet to a secure state. The overall definition of the MSS system can be seen in the pape The overall definition of the MSS system can be seen in the paper “MSS Definition 1.0” in appendix r “MSS Definition 1.0” in appendix 1.3.1. This paper defines exactly the functionality of MSS. 1.3.1. This paper defines exactly the functionality of MSS. From From the the updated updated work work packages relevant to packages relevant to the the experiment experiment, , it it is is seen seen that that responsibility responsibility for for developing developing, production, installation , production, installation and and operation
is the the responsibility responsibility of
CERN.
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2.1 General Description: 2.1 General Description:
2.1.1 Differential quench detection
2.1.2 Superconducting quench detection
2.1.3 Bridge quench detection
2.1.4 Voltage measurements
2.1.5 Temperature measurements
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2.1.1 Differential quench detection 2.1.1 Differential quench detection
+
V1=I * RQUENCH - L1*dI/ dt V2= - L2*dφ/dt G Level discriminator Time discriminator Alarm V2'=( - L2*dI/dt)*G V1'=(I * RQUENCH - L1*dI/dt) L2: 19 turns L1: 120 turns Galvanic isolation Differential Amplifier
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2.1.2 Superconducting quench detection 2.1.2 Superconducting quench detection
+
ISOURCE Level discriminator Time discriminator Alarm Current source RSUPRA Galvanic isolation ISOURCE RCONNECTION Level discriminator Time discriminator Warning
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2.1.3 Bridge quench detection 2.1.3 Bridge quench detection
+
discriminator Time discriminator Alarm R2 Galvanic isolation R1 Level discriminator Time discriminator Alarm Aperture 1 Aperture 2
2 2 1 1 R APERTURE R APERTURE
Z Z Z = Z
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2.1.4 Voltage measurements
Same module as for the differential measurement Same module as for the differential measurement
2.1.5 Temperature measurements
Same module as for the superconducting quench measurement Same module as for the superconducting quench measurement 4 4-
wire measurement
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2.2 Main Parameters 2.2 Main Parameters
2.2.1 Machine States 2.2.1 Machine States
2.2.1.1 Inhibit
The The inhibition inhibition of
current in in the the magnet magnet is is controlled controlled by by the the MSS, MSS, eventually eventually under under orders
from MCS or DSS. MCS or DSS.
2.2.1.2 Start-
up tests
All All principal sub principal sub-
systems, , including including the the MSS, must MSS, must be be tested tested and and found found ready ready during during this this phase; phase;
“Normal Mode” cannot cannot be be reached reached. . Only Only minimal minimal magnet magnet current current is is allowed allowed. .
2.2.1.3 Normal mode
In In the the “Normal Mode” “Normal Mode” the the MSS MSS is is fully fully operational
, with with or
without current current in in the the magnet magnet. .
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2.2.1.4 Slow discharge
The normal current run The normal current run-
down mode is a “Slow Discharge”, also called a “Slow Dump” or SD. For . For minor problems or defaults occurring in magnet sub minor problems or defaults occurring in magnet sub-
systems the same mode is generally also prescribed (see section 2.2.2 for details). prescribed (see section 2.2.2 for details). In this case the stored magnet energy is dissipated in the run In this case the stored magnet energy is dissipated in the run-
down units in diode-
resistor combinations in parallel with the magnet parts, see also figures combinations in parallel with the magnet parts, see also figures 1.2.2 1.2.2-
1.2.3. The “Slow Discharge“ initiates the following actions: The “Slow Discharge“ initiates the following actions:
Power Converter OFF
Circuit Breaker OPEN These actions are sequential. These actions are sequential. The “Slow Dump” will stop physics data The “Slow Dump” will stop physics data-
taking for a few hours.
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2.2.1.5 Fast discharge
For major problems endangering either the magnet or personnel a For major problems endangering either the magnet or personnel a “Fast Discharge”, also called “Fast Discharge”, also called a “Fast Dump” or FD, is always prescribed (see section 2.2.2 for a “Fast Dump” or FD, is always prescribed (see section 2.2.2 for details). details). In this case the stored magnet energy is dissipated internally i In this case the stored magnet energy is dissipated internally in the coil windings and in the run n the coil windings and in the run-
down units. The “Fast Discharge“ initiates the following actions: The “Fast Discharge“ initiates the following actions:
Power Converter OFF
Circuit Breaker OPEN
Quench heaters ON
CLOSE Current Leads Helium valves These actions are sequential. These actions are sequential. It is important that all sections of the It is important that all sections of the toroids toroids are heated and thus quenched at the same time, to are heated and thus quenched at the same time, to avoid excess mechanical stress on the structure. avoid excess mechanical stress on the structure. The “Fast Dump” will stop physics data The “Fast Dump” will stop physics data-
taking for a few days, until the magnet has recovered a superconducting temperature. superconducting temperature.
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For the “Magnet Control System”, MCS, and the MSS a set of safety parameters have been y parameters have been
net and which system receives them. They are still subject to slight changes. receives them. They are still subject to slight changes.
The current list of parameters can be seen in appendix 2.2.2.1.
Magnet Safety Systems
SAFETY PARAMETERS
Toroid - General Parameters
Last update: 4/4/2003
MCS MSS
Overcurrent D MSS SD x x Check with Deront Saturation D MSS SD x x Internal fault D MCS SD x x Services fault D MCS SD x x Water, Electricity Overcurrent A MCS AL x Circuit open D MCS SD x x Circuit Breaker Balancing current A MCS AL Check with LASA
Temperature D MCS SD x x Thermoswitches Diode shorted D MCS No surveillance Diode open D MCS No surveillance Inhibit request D MSS INH x Slow dump request D MSS SD x x Vacuum Fault D MSS SD x x Cryogenic Fault D MSS SD x x Watch dog D MSS SD x I/O fault D MSS SD x Startup test Fault D MSS SD Rectifier fault D MSS SD x x Battery fault D MSS SD x x Fault D MCS AL Cable trace fault D MCS AL Fault D MSS SD x x
Action Copy to Comments
DCCT
From Equipment Parameter Type - No. Processed by Estimated
Risk assesment
Power converter Earth Current Dump Circuit DSS PLC of control MSS Power supply MSS Monitoring QH power supply
Magnet Safety Systems
SAFETY PARAMETERS
Barrel Toroid
Last update: 4/4/2003
MCS MSS
Voltage A - 2 MSS SD x X MCS Copy of analogue signal Temperature A - 2 MSS SD x x MCS Copy of analogue signal SQD A - 2 MSS FD x x Foot of CL Bridge detector A - 3 MSS FD x x 3 bridges (¼, ½, ¾)
A - 4 MSS FD x x extern. CryoRing SQD A - 4 MSS FD x x extern. Current leads Magnet
Action Copy to Estimated
Comments From Equipment Parameter Type - No. Processed by Risk assesment
Magnet Safety Systems
SAFETY PARAMETERS
End-Cap Toroids
Last update: 4/4/2003
MCS MSS
Voltage A - 2 MSS SD x x MCS Copy of analogue signal Temperature A - 2 MSS SD x x MCS Copy of analogue signal SQD A - 2 MSS FD x x Foot of CL Magnet Bridge detector A - 3 MSS FD x x 3 bridges (¼, ½, ¾) SQD A - 2 MSS FD x x extern. Current leads
Action Copy to Estimated
Comments From Equipment Parameter Type - No. Processed by Risk assesment
Magnet Safety Systems
SAFETY PARAMETERS
Solenoid - General Parameters
Last update: 4/4/2003
MCS MSS
Overcurrent D MSS SD x x Check with Deront Saturation D MSS SD x x Internal fault D MCS SD x x Services fault D MCS SD x x Water, Electricity Overcurrent A MCS AL x Circuit open D MCS SD x x Circuit Breaker Balancing current A MCS AL Check if necessary
Temperature D MCS SD x x Thermoswitches Diode shorted D MCS No surveillance Diode open D MCS No surveillance DCCT Power converter Earth Current Dump Circuit
Action Copy to Estimated
Comments Risk assesment From Equipment Parameter Type - No. Processed by
Magnet Safety Systems
SAFETY PARAMETERS
Central Solenoid
Last update: 4/4/2003
MCS MSS
Inhibit request D MSS INH x Slow dump request D MSS SD x x Vacuum Fault D MCS SD x x Verify with calorimeter group Cryogenic Fault D MSS SD x x Watch dog D MSS SD x I/O fault D MSS SD x Startup test Fault D MSS SD Voltage A - 2 MSS SD x x MCS Copy of analogue signal Temperature A - 2 MSS SD x x MCS Copy of analogue signal Voltage-Chimney A - 2 MSS SD x x MCS Copy of analogue signal SQD-Chimney A - 2 MSS FD x x Temp.-Chim.-Bulk. A - 2 MSS SD x x MCS Copy of analogue signal Bridge detector A - 3 MSS FD x x 3 bridges (1/3, 1/2 , 2/3) SQD Coil A - 1 MSS FD x x Coil temperature A - 2 MSS FD x x DSS PLC of control Current leads Magnet Chimney- Bulkhead
Action Copy to Estimated
Comments Risk assesment From Equipment Parameter Type - No. Processed by
Magnet Safety Systems
SAFETY PARAMETERS
Risk assesment
Last update: 4/4/2003
Case number Failure type Risk Consequence Comments
1
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2.3 Magnet Safety 2.3 Magnet Safety System description System description
The The role role of
the MSS MSS is is to to protect protect the the magnet magnet and and the the personnel. personnel. To To be be able to do able to do this this, , it it has has to to exchange exchange information information with with a a number number of
sub-
systems around around the the magnet magnet, as , as shown shown on
the MSS MSS-
MCS architecture. architecture.
Magnets System Service cavern Experimental cavern Solenoid Process Control Units External Cryogenics Process Control Surface MCS
Hardwired Logic 1 Hardwired Logic 2
APC1 APC2 ACS1 ACS2 FACQ MSS
Toroid
Detector Safety System DSS
Safety controls Protection signals Safety controls Protection signals Sensors/Actuators Slow Dump Requests External Cryogenics SupervisorDetector Control System DCS CERN wide area
WEB Monitoring External Cryogenics Supervisor Magnet Supervisor Magnet Supervisor Central control room
Toroid Process Control Units Vacuum Process Control Units
Sensors/Actuators Sensors/ActuatorsANS
Hardwir. Logic 1 Hardwir. Logic 2 APC1 APC2 ACS1 ACS2FACQ
MSS
Solenoid Safety controls Protection signals Safety controls Protection signals Database
Proximity Cryogenics Process Control
Sensors/Actuators Detector control room Magnet and Cryogenics control roomData Server Local Magnet Supervisor
Magnet control room in USA 15
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MSS information exchange MSS information exchange
Quench Heaters Vacuum
MSS
ACS/LCS/API/APC
Power Converter MSS
Power Supply/ Batteries
DSS Cryogenics MSS
Monitoring
MSS
Annunciator
Magnet Emergency Stops MCS Circuit Breaker CERN Power
3 sources Inhibit Fault Trigger Status Status Isolate Status Start-up test,
Open Status Chassis status, cable trace, etc... Remote reset Status Redundant power E-stops Events, values...
MSS
equipment
MSS
Sensors Sensor values Status SD, inhibit... Current status, dump status...
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MSS basic components: MSS basic components:
An analogue part grouped around a chassis system called ACS a chassis system called ACS
A digital part grouped around a chassis system called LCS a chassis system called LCS
A control and interconnection system called APC/API system called APC/API
Analog sensor inputs. Unique sensors - Directly cabled 16 channels/chassis Redundant power input Chassis monitoring/reset Redundant power input Chassis monitoring/reset W arnings/Alarms from signal conditioning modules HLM output signals Dump command signals LCS input signals. 64 inputs 1 DCS section Analog copies of sensor values. To MCS-Annunciator Digital copies of warnings/ alarms. To MCS-Annunciator ACS - Analog Chassis System
8 Dual Channel Cards + Analog OutputsLCS - Logic Chassis System
2 Sections: 4x16 Input Cards/1 Hard-wired Logic Card per section. Total: 128 InputsAPI/APC - Application Interface and Control
Interface between MSS and application.External application signals. Dry-contact inputs Actuator signals for Power Supply-Circuit Breakers, etc. Safety relay output MSS output signals. Opto-coupled/relay
Emergency Stops Safety relais
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2.3.1 Analogue part: 2.3.1 Analogue part:
The analogue chassis receives the sensor values directly from th The analogue chassis receives the sensor values directly from the magnet. After level conditioning and e magnet. After level conditioning and level/time discrimination the result of the treatment is send to level/time discrimination the result of the treatment is send to the logic chassis, in the form of the logic chassis, in the form of
coupled alarm signals. A A series series of
signal conditioners conditioners have have been been developed developed particularly particularly for for this this type type of
These analogue modules analogue modules can can be be adapted adapted to a to a variety variety of
different sensors sensors and and situations, situations, and and exists exists in in three three versions: versions:
A resistive measurement module for temperature and superconducting quench measurements. ng quench measurements.
A voltage measurement module for low/high level voltages and for differential measurements. differential measurements.
A bridge quench detection module for measuring unbalance between coil sections. coil sections. The modules all share a common platform, with only the front The modules all share a common platform, with only the front-
end part being different from module to
s, in order to issue stable and consistent alarm signals with no spurious effects. They also con consistent alarm signals with no spurious effects. They also contain local latched/non tain local latched/non-
latched monitoring, voltage outputs, test connectors, etc. monitoring, voltage outputs, test connectors, etc.
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The The analogue signal analogue signal treatment treatment is is contained contained in in the the “Analogue “Analogue Chassis Chassis System System”. ”. The The ACS ACS contains contains the the following following parts in a parts in a chassis chassis enclosure enclosure with with corresponding corresponding back back-
planes: :
8 analogue modules of 2 channels each
2 output modules for analogue signals
2 redundant power supply modules
1 monitoring module The output modules are not in the safety chains, but used for mo The output modules are not in the safety chains, but used for monitoring MSS analogue signals by the nitoring MSS analogue signals by the MCS and MCS and annunciator annunciator systems. The output modules receive the result of the signal co
nditioning from the analogue modules via the internal back plane. This sign from the analogue modules via the internal back plane. This signal is then duplicated and either al is then duplicated and either buffered and sends as a voltage signal or transformed to a stand buffered and sends as a voltage signal or transformed to a standard current loop signal. The ard current loop signal. The channels are mounted only according to the “Safety Parameters” l channels are mounted only according to the “Safety Parameters” list, since not all signals are ist, since not all signals are monitored. monitored. The redundant power supplies converts the battery supported inpu The redundant power supplies converts the battery supported input voltages of 48 VDC to all internal t voltages of 48 VDC to all internal voltages. voltages. These These modules modules and and all all associated associated voltages are voltages are surveyed surveyed by by the the monitoring module, monitoring module, which which in addition in addition monitors module monitors module faults faults and and cable cable traces.
It has has a a World World-
FIP connection connection to to the the overall
PLC based based MSS monitor, MSS monitor, which which is is also also associated associated with with the the MCS. MCS.
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MSS basic components: MSS basic components:
An analogue part grouped around a chassis system called ACS a chassis system called ACS
A digital part grouped around a chassis system called LCS a chassis system called LCS
A control and interconnection system called APC/API system called APC/API
A n a lo g se n sor in p u ts. U n iq u e sen so rs - D irectly ca b le d 1 6 ch an n e ls/ch a ssis R e du n d a nt p o w er in p u t C h assis m o nito ring /re se t R e du n d a nt p o w er in p u t C h assis m o nito ring /re se t W a rning s/A la rm s fro m sig na l co n d ition in g m o d ule s HLM output signals Dump command signals L C S in p u t sig n als. 6 4 in p uts 1 D C S se ctio n A na log co p ie s of se n sor va lu es. T o M C S -A n n un cia to r D ig ita l co p ie s o f w a rning s/ ala rm s. T o M C S -A n nu n cia to r A C S - A n a lo g C h a ssis S yste m
8 D ual C hannel C ards + A na log O utpu tsL C S - Lo g ic C h a ssis S yste m
2 S ection s: 4x16 In put C ards/1 H ard-w ired Lo gic C ard per section. T otal: 128 InputsA P I/A P C - A p p lica tio n Interfa ce an d C o n tro l
Interface betw een M S S and application. M ax. 3 D C SE xtern a l a p plicatio n sig na ls. D ry-co n ta ct in p u ts A ctua to r sig na ls for P ow e r S u pp ly-C ircu it B re a ke rs, e tc. S afety re la y o u tp ut M S S o u tp u t sig n als. O p to -co u ple d/re la y
E m e rge n cy S to p s S a fe ty re la is
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2.3.2 Digital part: 2.3.2 Digital part:
To receive and process the logical signals formed by the analogu To receive and process the logical signals formed by the analogue modules or from the magnet e modules or from the magnet surroundings two digital modules have been developed: surroundings two digital modules have been developed:
A digital input module for receiving and filtering the logical level signals from analogue modules evel signals from analogue modules
A hard-
wired logic module that contains the main decision equations for the magnet safety and the magnet safety and
The digital input modules have The digital input modules have galvanically galvanically isolated constant current inputs with subsequent on isolated constant current inputs with subsequent on-
delay filters to eliminate spurious or mains noise. The input signals filters to eliminate spurious or mains noise. The input signals are also duplicated and available are also duplicated and available as isolated as isolated opto
coupled outputs for monitoring by the MCS and annunciator annunciator systems. systems. The logic decision module receives all logic signals from the in The logic decision module receives all logic signals from the input modules. The program stored in the put modules. The program stored in the modules memory then treats these signals and sets the decision m modules memory then treats these signals and sets the decision modules outputs set
panel in two ways:
On a LED display symbolizing all inputs associated with the module. The information displayed
depends on the mode, such as indicating active inputs, the first depends on the mode, such as indicating active inputs, the first event that arrived, inputs event that arrived, inputs associated with FD/SD, and so forth. associated with FD/SD, and so forth.
On an alphanumeric display where information can be displayed on demand, such as the mode demand, such as the mode
ksum.
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The digital signal treatment is contained in the “Logic Chassis The digital signal treatment is contained in the “Logic Chassis System”. The LCS contains the System”. The LCS contains the following parts in a chassis enclosure with corresponding back following parts in a chassis enclosure with corresponding back-
planes:
8 digital input modules of 16 channels each
2 logic decision modules
2 redundant power supply modules
1 monitoring module The The modules are modules are arranged arranged in in two two sections, sections, with with 4 input modules 4 input modules feeding feeding 1 1 decision decision module module and and the the 2 2 decision decision modules modules communicating communicating via via back back plane connections. plane connections.
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M C S Annunciator 16 Inputs C oded cable trace D IM 1 16 16 16 16 From D IM 2 From D IM 3 From D IM 4 16 1 6 16 16 From D IM 8 From D IM 9 From D IM 10 Series connectionA LTER A
Program m able Logic Array. H ard-w ired logic burned in PR O M . C lock circuit M onitoring Pow er Status Indication Dum p acknow ledge. O nly H LM w ith D C C T! C onnector coding M onitoring H LM 6A LTER A
Program m able Logic Array. H ard-w ired logic burned in PR O M . C lock circuit M onitoring Pow er Status Indication Dum p acknow ledge. O nly H LM w ith D C C T! C onnector coding M onitoring H ard-w ired logic m odule 5 outputs H ard-w ired logic m odule 6 outputs H ard-w ired logic m odules 5-6 com bined outputs To API. H ard-w ired logic 10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
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MSS basic components: MSS basic components:
An analogue part grouped around a chassis system called ACS a chassis system called ACS
A digital part grouped around a chassis system called LCS a chassis system called LCS
A control and interconnection system called APC/API system called APC/API
A n a lo g se n sor in p u ts. U n iq u e sen so rs - D irectly ca b le d 1 6 ch an n e ls/ch a ssis R e du n d a nt p o w er in p u t C h assis m o nito ring /re se t R e du n d a nt p o w er in p u t C h assis m o nito ring /re se t W a rning s/A la rm s fro m sig na l co n d ition in g m o d ule s HLM output signals Dump command signals L C S in p u t sig n als. 6 4 in p uts 1 D C S se ctio n A na log co p ie s of se n sor va lu es. T o M C S -A n n un cia to r D ig ita l co p ie s o f w a rning s/ ala rm s. T o M C S -A n nu n cia to r A C S - A n a lo g C h a ssis S yste m
8 D ual C hannel C ards + A na log O utpu tsL C S - Lo g ic C h a ssis S yste m
2 S ection s: 4x16 In put C ards/1 H ard-w ired Lo gic C ard per section. T otal: 128 InputsA P I/A P C - A p p lica tio n Interfa ce an d C o n tro l
Interface betw een M S S and application. M ax. 3 D C SE xtern a l a p plicatio n sig na ls. D ry-co n ta ct in p u ts A ctua to r sig na ls for P ow e r S u pp ly-C ircu it B re a ke rs, e tc. S afety re la y o u tp ut M S S o u tp u t sig n als. O p to -co u ple d/re la y
E m e rge n cy S to p s S a fe ty re la is
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The logic decision module controls the surrounding sub The logic decision module controls the surrounding sub-
systems via the MSS application control, the
contacts are send to the equipment to be controlled. equipment to be controlled. As seen in figure 2.3.3 the magnet emergency stops intervene dir As seen in figure 2.3.3 the magnet emergency stops intervene directly in the interface box APC, ectly in the interface box APC, bypassing the logic part. bypassing the logic part. The application interface, API, is the component through which a The application interface, API, is the component through which all other signals in and out of MSS are ll other signals in and out of MSS are
input/outputs connectors of the MSS and the external connections is contained. This part will be MSS and the external connections is contained. This part will be specifically manufactured for specifically manufactured for the individual parts of the ATLAS MSS systems. the individual parts of the ATLAS MSS systems.
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2.4 Fail 2.4 Fail-
safe operation
All connections around the MSS are “fail All connections around the MSS are “fail-
safe” types, that is, if a connection is broken the system will by default initiate an connection is broken the system will by default initiate an action to bring the machine to a safe state. This principle is action to bring the machine to a safe state. This principle is shown in figure 2. 4.1. shown in figure 2. 4.1. During operation of the magnet, but only at low currents, the ca During operation of the magnet, but only at low currents, the cavern vern can be accessible and cable disconnections can therefore can be accessible and cable disconnections can therefore
1. Analogue sensors cable errors Analogue sensors cable errors
2. Digital signals cable errors Digital signals cable errors Any disconnections of cables in the safety chain produce a cable Any disconnections of cables in the safety chain produce a cable trace trace error, which will be registered by the MCS via the MSS error, which will be registered by the MCS via the MSS monitoring system, see also figure 2.3.2. The logic of the MCS monitoring system, see also figure 2.3.2. The logic of the MCS will then decide what action to take. The cable traces are also will then decide what action to take. The cable traces are also part of the start part of the start-
up tests and initial current cannot be allowed in the magnet if all traces are not connected. the magnet if all traces are not connected. Disconnecting any of the analogue sensor cables will cause emiss Disconnecting any of the analogue sensor cables will cause emission ion
From the analogue chassis and onwards signals in the safety chain are digital. A disconnection of a cable will here initiate chain are digital. A disconnection of a cable will here initiate an an action associated with the highest level of safety contained in action associated with the highest level of safety contained in the cable, due to the “fail the cable, due to the “fail-
safe” principle used. The resulting action is usually a “Fast Dump”, necessitating a subsequent action is usually a “Fast Dump”, necessitating a subsequent reset of the whole MSS. reset of the whole MSS.
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Galvanic isolation: > 2 kV Cable trace Input protection/ Signal conditioner Sensor input Filtering/ Voltage discrimination Analog level Surveillance by over-range Over-range
Analog Module
Power Cable trace Analog
Time discrimination Level fail-safe Opto normally ON Monitoring system Module fault Level fail-safe Opto normally ON Level fail-safe Opto normally ON
Digital Input Module
Digital
Level fail-safe Opto normally ON
Hard-wired Logic Module. Second section not shown.
Monitoring/ Cable trace Monitoring system Clock ALTERA Monitoring MCS/ Annunciator MCS/ Annunciator Cable fail-safe. If cable is dismounted, all alarms/warnings are active.
LCS-Logic Chassis System API/APC-Application Interface and Control
Fail-safe Relais normally ON Cable fail-safe. If cable is dismounted, fast dump is initiated. Monitoring/ Cable trace Monitoring system MCB, CP, CR, etc.
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2.4 Fail 2.4 Fail-
safe operation
The exceptions to the fail The exceptions to the fail-
safe principle are the analogue levels, by definition, and the ALTERA integrated circuit used for the logic definition, and the ALTERA integrated circuit used for the logic program. program. Window detectors on the modules, which will signal an out Window detectors on the modules, which will signal an out-
range to the MSS monitoring system, monitor the analogue levels. This the MSS monitoring system, monitor the analogue levels. This detects the cases where an analogue circuit has an internal detects the cases where an analogue circuit has an internal short short-
circuit and the level is close to the supply voltages. Due to the internal structure of the ALTERA circuits it is not p Due to the internal structure of the ALTERA circuits it is not possible
to certify that these are fail to certify that these are fail-
quality and estimated life quality and estimated life-
time of these. The ALTERA corporation regularly up corporation regularly up-
dates their reliability reports for their circuits, and the latest, showing the data relevant to the circuits, and the latest, showing the data relevant to the ALTERA used in MSS, can be seen in appendix 2.4.1. ALTERA used in MSS, can be seen in appendix 2.4.1. It is here stated, that the corporation is ISO 9001, MIL and JED It is here stated, that the corporation is ISO 9001, MIL and JEDEC EC certified, and uses recognized methods for reliability testing. certified, and uses recognized methods for reliability testing. The The chip in question, EP20K200, chip in question, EP20K200, has has a a combined combined FIT ( FIT (Failure Failure In In Time Time) )
24 (page 13), meaning meaning one
estimated failure failure in 42 million in 42 million device device hours hours. .
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2.5 Standard equipment 2.5 Standard equipment
As mentioned the MSS is a common project. For this purpose a ser As mentioned the MSS is a common project. For this purpose a series of signal conditioner and logic ies of signal conditioner and logic modules has been developed and tested, identical for all experim modules has been developed and tested, identical for all experiments. Due to severe restrictions
regarding high tension, galvanic isolation, features and lifetim regarding high tension, galvanic isolation, features and lifetime, no commercial components are e, no commercial components are available for this. available for this. These modules will be used for safety systems in all LHC experim These modules will be used for safety systems in all LHC experimental magnets. ental magnets. To accommodate the modules, a complete chassis system has also b To accommodate the modules, a complete chassis system has also been developed, which will be een developed, which will be common for both analogue and digital modules. It will consist of common for both analogue and digital modules. It will consist of a standardized chassis, a a standardized chassis, a monitoring module, and redundant power supplies. Each chassis wi monitoring module, and redundant power supplies. Each chassis will be connected to a ll be connected to a centralized alarm system via a monitoring module. Together with centralized alarm system via a monitoring module. Together with the separate ventilator unit, the separate ventilator unit, this will be the basis of all MSS systems. this will be the basis of all MSS systems.
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2.5 Standard equipment 2.5 Standard equipment
Analogue modules Analogue modules
Dual Resistive Measurement module – – DRM DRM
Dual/Differential Voltage Measurement module – – DVM DVM
Dual Bridge Quench Detection module -
DBQD Digital modules Digital modules
Digital Input Module -
DIM
Hard-
wired Logic Module -
HLM Standard Chassis System Standard Chassis System -
SCS
EMC chassis
Redundant power supplies
Analogue output modules
Monitoring module
Ventilation module APC (API specific for each installation) APC (API specific for each installation)
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2.5 Standard equipment 2.5 Standard equipment
Cables Cables Connectors (Connector/Signal standard in Appendix 2.5.5.1) Connectors (Connector/Signal standard in Appendix 2.5.5.1) Rack system Rack system
Rack type
Rack control
Heat exchanger Power control box Power control box Annunciator Annunciator system system Synoptics Synoptics
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2.5.1.1 Analogue modules: Dual Resistive Measurement module 2.5.1.1 Analogue modules: Dual Resistive Measurement module
Isolation amplifier Over-voltage protection Filter 1600 Hz-6 dB/oct Instrumentation amplifier2 kV isolation
Main analogue signal 0- +/-10 V for GainxV in Dual bi-level voltage discriminator Dual duration discriminator Opto-couplers Power supplyWarning Output
Positive Voltage Input
Decoupling
Opto-couplers Fuses Buffer 0 - +/- 10 VTo multiplication module - AOM
Card Monitoring/ Status Memorization Buffer 0 - +/-10 VFront-panel
Warning Output
On-board test connections Latch Reset circuit Manual Reset Dual memorisation Front-panel status indications Remote Reset ResetNegative Voltage Input
Alarm Output Alarm Output
Active filter 10 Hz-12 db/OctCommon Hard Dump Output
Off-set adjustment Mode selection Power In Cable Trace Overrange/ Front-end fault Monitoring Module Monitoring Current sourceCurrent Out Current In
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2.5.1.1 Dual Resistive Measurement module 2.5.1.1 Dual Resistive Measurement module – – Input stage Input stage
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2.5.1.1 Dual Resistive Measurement module 2.5.1.1 Dual Resistive Measurement module – – Current source Current source
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2.5.1.2 Dual Voltage Measurement module 2.5.1.2 Dual Voltage Measurement module – – Differential stage Differential stage
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2.5.1.3 Dual Bridge Quench Detection module 2.5.1.3 Dual Bridge Quench Detection module – – Input stage Input stage
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2.5.1.4 Galvanic isolation 2.5.1.4 Galvanic isolation
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2.5.1.5 Voltage discrimination 2.5.1.5 Voltage discrimination
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2.5.1.5 Time discrimination 2.5.1.5 Time discrimination
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2.5.2.1 Digital Input Module 2.5.2.1 Digital Input Module
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2.5.2.1 Hard 2.5.2.1 Hard-
wired Logic Module
16 16 16 16 From DIM2 From DIM3 From DIM4 Hard-wired logic modules communication 20
ALTERA
Programmable Logic Array. Hard-wired logic burned in PROM. Clock circuit Monitoring Power Status Indication Dump acknowledge. Only HLM with DCCT! From DIM1
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2.6 Rack lay 2.6 Rack lay-
Barrel Toroid Barrel Toroid
Power Box API
3U 9U 6U 1U 4U 2U 6U 1U 6U 1U 45U
CM6A: DBQD 1: Bridge quench detection 1-1/4 CM6B: DBQD 2: Bridge quench detection 2-1/2 CM7A: DBQD 3: Bridge quench detection 3-3/4 CM7B: DBQD 4: Not used CM8A: Not used CM8B: Not used CM6A: DTM: Current lead temperature + CM6B: DTM: Current lead temperature - CM7A: Not used CM7B: Not used CM1A: DVM 1: Barrel Toroid voltage 1 CM1B: DVM 2: Compensation voltage 1 CM3A: Not used CM3B: Not used CM4A: Not used CM4B: Not used CM9A: Not used CM9B: Not used CM8A: Not used CM8B: Not used
ACS2 ACS1
DIM6-7: Warnings/Alarms from ACS1 DIM8-9: Warnings/Alarms from ACS2 DIM1-2: External signals DIM3-4: External signals HLM6: ACS1 + ACS2 HLM5: External signal treatment CM1A: DSQD 1: Barrel Toroid SQD 1 CM1B: DSQD 2: Barrel Toroid SQD 2 CM2A: DSQD 3: Current leads - Bus-bar SQD + CM2B: DSQD 4: Current leads - Bus-bar SQD - Ventilator Unit
LCS1
Heat Exchanger APC Ventilator Unit Ventilator Unit Reserved for rack control CM9A: DVM 9: Current lead voltage + CM9B: DVM 10: Current lead voltage - CM2A: DVM 3: Barrel Toroid voltage 2 CM2B: DVM 4: Compensation voltage 2 CM3A: DVM 5: Barrel Toroid voltage 3 CM3B: DVM 6: Compensation voltage 3 CM4A: DVM 7: Barrel Toroid voltage 4 CM4B: DVM 8: Compensation voltage 4
3U 3U
Free
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2.6 Rack lay 2.6 Rack lay-
End End-
cap Toroids Toroids
Power Box
3U 12U 6U 1U 4U 2U 6U 1U 6U 1U 45U
CM6A: DBQD 1: Bridge quench detection 1-1/3 CM6B: DBQD 2: Bridge quench detection 2-1/2 CM7A: DBQD 3: Bridge quench detection 3-2/3 CM7B: DBQD 4: Not used CM8A: Not used CM8B: Not used CM6A: DTM: Current lead temperature + CM6B: DTM: Current lead temperature - CM7A: Not used CM7B: Not used CM1A: DVM 1: Current lead voltage + CM1B: DVM 2: Current lead voltage 2 CM3A: Not used CM3B: Not used CM4A: Not used CM4B: Not used CM9A: Not used CM9B: Not used CM8A: Not used CM8B: Not used
ACS2 ACS1
CM1A: DSQD 1: End-cap SQD 1 CM1B: DSQD 2: End-cap SQD 2 CM2A: DSQD 3: Current leads foot SQD + CM2B: DSQD 4: Current leads foot SQD - Ventilator Unit
LCS1
Heat Exchanger Free Ventilator Unit Ventilator Unit Reserved for rack control
3U
CM2A: Not used CM2B: Not used CM3A: Not used CM3B: Not used CM4A: Not used CM4B: Not used CM9A: Not used CM9B: Not used DIM6-7: Warnings/Alarms from ACS1 DIM8-9: Warnings/Alarms from ACS2 DIM1-2: External signals DIM3-4: External signals HLM6: ACS1 + ACS2 HLM5: External signal treatment API
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2.6 Rack lay 2.6 Rack lay-
Central Solenoid Central Solenoid
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2.6 Rack lay 2.6 Rack lay-
Rack emplacement Rack emplacement
14 Racks Figure 2.6.4.1: Rack emplacement –USA15
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2.7 Electric power supply 2.7 Electric power supply
Due to the need to keep the MSS running at all times, the entire Due to the need to keep the MSS running at all times, the entire system will be powered from a system will be powered from a redundant UPS system supplying 48 VDC when not charging. It will redundant UPS system supplying 48 VDC when not charging. It will follow CERN follow CERN safety safety instructions instructions regarding personal safety, mainly that all tensions higher than regarding personal safety, mainly that all tensions higher than 50 Volt must be cut 50 Volt must be cut in case of emergency stop. in case of emergency stop. Main directives are: Main directives are:
The entire system must be powered from a redundant UPS system
Output voltage level: 48 V DC (~54 VDC when charging)
CERN Safety Instruction No. 5 to be followed
No 230 VAC equipment can be powered
Both input supplies monitored The energy in this system will be sufficient to power vital part The energy in this system will be sufficient to power vital parts of the MSS for 1 hour in the s of the MSS for 1 hour in the “worst “worst-
case” scenario. This duration has been calculated in the paper “Proposed battery back Proposed battery back-
up system for MSS”; see appendix 2.7.1.
Two networks for feeding the UPS system will be used:
Normal 230/400 VAC from SIG/EDF
Diesel powered powered 230/400 VAC 230/400 VAC
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2.7 Electric power supply 2.7 Electric power supply
MSS1 P[W] MSS2 P[W] PS1 Power Supply 2P[W] PS2 Power Supply 2P[W]
48VDC Distribution
230/400 VAC from SIG/EDF + Diesel generator 230/400 VAC from SIG/EDF + Diesel generator
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2.8 Quench heaters 2.8 Quench heaters
The direct protection of the magnets is assured by a sub-
system of the MSS called HEC, “Heater Energisation Energisation Circuit”. Circuit”.
When the command “Fast Dump” is emitted from the hard-
wired logic system of the MSS, this security feature is executed by the quench heater system. This i security feature is executed by the quench heater system. This is only in case of an important s only in case of an important default on the magnets. default on the magnets.
The quench heater system is fully described in a separate document, “HEC nt, “HEC – – Heater Heater Energisation Energisation Circuit”. Circuit”.
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2.9 Acquisition systems 2.9 Acquisition systems
2.9.1 Fast acquisition 2.9.1 Fast acquisition
The fast acquisition recorder will be based upon a standard industrial based upon a standard industrial recorder, programmed by the EP recorder, programmed by the EP-
TA3-
IC
the Event Sequence Recorder described the Event Sequence Recorder described in section 2.9.2. in section 2.9.2.
This system system will will enable enable experts to experts to analyze analyze events events occurring
around the the time time
a quench quench, by , by storing storing analogue analogue and and digital values in a digital values in a buffer buffer. . Events Events will will normally normally be be stored stored only
for a certain amount amount of
time, , since since the the buffer buffer is is of
the type “ type “First First In In-
First Out”. A trigger signal Out”. A trigger signal from from the the MSS in case MSS in case of
a quench quench will will freeze freeze the the contents contents of
the buffer buffer, , which which can can then then be be read read by by the the MCS.
Quench as trigger
Histomemory
Storage of MSS events around trig point.
MSS analogue signals.
128 channels-12 bits Sampling rate 100 Hz Memory: 180 s/channel FIFO section | Memory section
:
MCS.
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2.9.2 Event sequence recorder 2.9.2 Event sequence recorder
An event sequence recorder, also called an annunciator annunciator system, will record each event occurring system, will record each event occurring around the magnet and the MSS. This unit will store around the magnet and the MSS. This unit will store events with a time events with a time-
stamp, synchronized with the LHC-
GPS time system, for subsequent MCS analysis. Time discrimination between signals will be in the order of discrimination between signals will be in the order of 10 ms. 10 ms.
The event recorder will be serviced periodically by the MCS, which will store all events on a suitable media. MCS, which will store all events on a suitable media.
This part of
MSS is is essential for essential for recreating recreating the the history history
any problem problem occurring
concerning the the safety safety of
the magnet magnet and and for for analysing analysing the the proper proper reaction reaction of
the MSS MSS itself itself.
Event 5-Time stamp Event 4-Time stamp Event 3-Time stamp Event 2-Time stamp Event 1-Time stamp
Event storage. Emptied periodically by MCS
MSS logical signals.
255 channels Discrimination ~ 1 ms Memory 4 MB Synchronized time LHC - GPS
Annunciator
Permanent storage of MSS events.
.
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2.9.3 Alarm 2.9.3 Alarm Notifier Notifier
For alerting the maintenance team of possible problems an alarm will be possible problems an alarm will be emitted as an SMS emitted as an SMS – – Short Message Short Message Service Service – – text, immediately directing text, immediately directing the team to the type of problem. This the team to the type of problem. This service will be a function of the MCS, service will be a function of the MCS, taking the relevant data from the Event taking the relevant data from the Event Sequence Recorder (see section 11.2) Sequence Recorder (see section 11.2) and from the MSS Monitoring System and from the MSS Monitoring System (see section 7.3.5). (see section 7.3.5).
An event event judged judged to to need need an an intervention by intervention by the the MCS MCS event event mask mask will will cause an cause an appropriate appropriate alarm alarm text text to to be be send send to to the the Alarm Alarm Notifier Notifier system system, , which which will will then then send send the the message to message to the the maintenance team GSM maintenance team GSM telephones telephones by by means means of
radio waves
. This type of
system system is is an an industrial industrial standard, standard, of
a similar similar type to type to the the system system that that was was used used by by the the LEP GSS LEP GSS equipment equipment. .
Events
MSS Maintenance team
SMS message received
Event mask - Appropriate action
MCS
Radio tower Hub
Notifier
Industrial equipment (Nokia, Siemens) System Monitoring
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3.1 3.1 Norms and References Norms and References
ATLAS Technical Design Reports, notes and publications.
All documents listed in section 4.1: ‘Quality Assurance Plan’
All relevant TIS documents
ISO 9001 where applicable
Quench Propagation and Detection in the Superconducting Bus-
bars of the ATLAS magnets. magnets.
MSS web site: http:// http://cern.ch cern.ch/mss /mss
ATLAS MSS-
MCS web site: http://mss http://mss-
mcs-
atlas.web.cern.ch/mss-
mcs-
atlas/ /
3.2 3.2 Environmental Conditions Environmental Conditions
Normal industrial conditions are foreseen, with no significant levels of radiation or magnetic evels of radiation or magnetic field. field.
3.3 3.3 Safety Safety
CERN Safety notes must always be followed.
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3.4 Information and documentation management 3.4 Information and documentation management
As recommended by the Digital As recommended by the Digital-
Electronics User Group (DUG), archiving of electronics designs is s part of the Quality Recommendations for Electronics Designers. T part of the Quality Recommendations for Electronics Designers. This follows the general his follows the general policy laid out by the technical coordination of the LHC acceler policy laid out by the technical coordination of the LHC accelerator and experiments that ator and experiments that require documentation to be stored in EDMS. require documentation to be stored in EDMS. All documentation will be stored under EDMS following this gener All documentation will be stored under EDMS following this general policy and the “Quality al policy and the “Quality Assurance Plan” described in section 4.1. Assurance Plan” described in section 4.1. The analogue and digital modules will be stored, by the CERN dev The analogue and digital modules will be stored, by the CERN development workshop, with all elopment workshop, with all relevant documentation attached: relevant documentation attached:
Manual
Block diagram
Schematics
Bill of materials
PCB lay-
Manufacturing data
Mechanical parts
Mounting instructions and precautions
Test procedures
Supplier info
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4.1 4.1 Quality Assurance Provisions Quality Assurance Provisions
The ATLAS Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) is based on ISO9001 Quali The ATLAS Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) is based on ISO9001 Quality Systems and must be ty Systems and must be followed throughout the MSS project. As stated in “ATC followed throughout the MSS project. As stated in “ATC-
OQ-
QA-
1010” the MSS Project Leader (PL), see section 7, is responsible for the quality of th Leader (PL), see section 7, is responsible for the quality of the system and will ensure the e system and will ensure the adherence to the ATLAS QAP. The list of corresponding documents adherence to the ATLAS QAP. The list of corresponding documents covering the relevant covering the relevant topics is given in table 4.1.1. topics is given in table 4.1.1.
Quality Assurance Policy ATC ATC-
OQ-
QA-
1010
Quality Assurance Categories ATC ATC-
OQ-
QA-
2050
Drawing Process-
External Drawings ATC ATC-
OQ-
QA-
5131
Manufacturing and Inspection of Equipment ATC ATC-
OQ-
QA-
5410
Handling of Nonconforming Equipment ATC ATC-
OQ-
QA-
5420
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Prototype production starts
4.2 Quality control 4.2 Quality control
Throughout the development Throughout the development phase the MSS designs in phase the MSS designs in the safety chain have the safety chain have followed the LHC QAP followed the LHC QAP flow flow-
chart for prototypes, shown in figure 4.2.1, as shown in figure 4.2.1, as stated in “ATC stated in “ATC-
OQ-
QA-
5410”. Particularly the analogue signal analogue signal conditioner modules have conditioner modules have passed the result passed the result-
design loop several times, in order loop several times, in order to arrive at a fully to arrive at a fully satisfactory result. satisfactory result.
Design Design review Design OK? Engineering and manufacture Results OK? Participation of common project institutes (RAL, Saclay) No No Prototype conform to specification Critical design review Yes No Inspection and tests Yes Yes Delivery of design documentation Prototype production complete Design stored in CERN’s EDMS
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As As the the prototype phase prototype phase is is finished finished for for most most components, components, the the production production of
individual parts parts will will be be done done on
the basis basis of
the LHC QAP production LHC QAP production quality quality assurance assurance of
the document document mentioned mentioned before before. .
Series production starts Production of components Identification of components, sub- assemblies Results OK? Inspections and test reports stored in EDMS No Results OK? No Inspection-tests of components, sub- assemblies Yes Yes Product ready for installation Production complete Identifiers conform to LHC part identification convention Inspection and tests of product in test-bench Return to supplier Apply non- conformity procedure Repair, reject, return to supplier
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The quality control of MSS modules will be divided in three dist The quality control of MSS modules will be divided in three distinct inct phases: phases:
Manufacture quality control
Reception quality control
Installation quality control The first stage of the quality control process is to verify all The first stage of the quality control process is to verify all parts at the parts at the level of the manufacturer, who will present proof of recognized level of the manufacturer, who will present proof of recognized control procedures. The production must be followed by CERN control procedures. The production must be followed by CERN until delivery. until delivery.
All components for the manufacture will be delivered by CERN to ensure quality and consistency. to ensure quality and consistency.
All printed circuit boards used must undergo electrical tests before mounting. before mounting.
The parts must be delivered with their signed production records and the manufacturers quality control procedures. records and the manufacturers quality control procedures. These documents will be stored under EDMS together with all These documents will be stored under EDMS together with all
reports and maintenance records. reports and maintenance records.
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The reception quality control of the MSS components will be base The reception quality control of the MSS components will be based on d on extensive individual testing of each part upon arrival at CERN. extensive individual testing of each part upon arrival at CERN. For this purpose a test bench has been built for testing all For this purpose a test bench has been built for testing all types of analogue and digital modules. types of analogue and digital modules. The test bench will be an autonomous set The test bench will be an autonomous set-
up consisting of an adapter chassis with hard chassis with hard-
ware connections to the module under test, and a test and a test-
PC running the program for the module validation.
AOM
Test PC
LabView program Interface cards
Workstation DVM DRM DBQD
Signal adapter chassis
Slots for individual types of modules
HLM DIM
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The tests will consist of validation of all blocks of each indiv The tests will consist of validation of all blocks of each individual idual
validate manufacture of modules. validate manufacture of modules. An example of test flow An example of test flow-
chart of an analogue module is shown on the
PC will emit documentation of test results. will emit documentation of test results.
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The The third third stage stage quality quality control control will will intervene intervene at at the the time time of
installation
the parts.
The modules modules will will be be adjusted adjusted individually individually according according to to their their function function in in the the MSS.
They will will then then again again pass pass in in the the test test bench bench, , now now testing testing the the individual individual settings settings as as
to the the standard standard settings settings. . The The procedure procedure is is shown shown in in the the figure. figure. After validation of all individual modules the MSS units will be After validation of all individual modules the MSS units will be assembled in the MSS workshop and tested as a complete unit, assembled in the MSS workshop and tested as a complete unit, with all ACS, LCS and APC/API mounted and functioning. with all ACS, LCS and APC/API mounted and functioning. Passed Passed this this test test the the systems systems can can then then be be transported transported to to the the final final destination destination and and be be submitted submitted to to the the tests tests before before approval approval. .
Installation tests starts Results OK? Individualized settings No Yes Product ready for installation Installation complete Inspection and tests of product Repair or reject Inspections and test reports stored in EDMS
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4.2.1 Quality control records. 4.2.1 Quality control records.
All specified tests and measurements carried out during all stages of production, from raw material procurement up to stages of production, from raw material procurement up to delivery and installation, must be recorded. delivery and installation, must be recorded.
Conforming equipment will be recorded as a “Certificate of Conformity” according to the general LHC rules and not the Conformity” according to the general LHC rules and not the specific ATLAS rules. This is due to the organization of MSS specific ATLAS rules. This is due to the organization of MSS parts as a common project pool, with no equipment dedicated parts as a common project pool, with no equipment dedicated to a particular experiment. to a particular experiment.
Eventual non-
conforming equipment will be treated according to the document “Handling of Non to the document “Handling of Non-
conforming Equipment”.
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5.1 Pre 5.1 Pre-
production tests
A series of tests have been carried out to verify the viability of the MSS concept
and to protect the first parts of the ATLAS magnets. and to protect the first parts of the ATLAS magnets.
These tests are continuing, but a run-
down of the most important results is given in the following sections. in the following sections.
5.1.1 ATLAS tests 5.1.1 ATLAS tests
The first tests were performed in Japan on the Central Solenoid magnet. A
complete MSS system of early prototypes was mounted and tested a complete MSS system of early prototypes was mounted and tested at CERN, and t CERN, and then shipped to KEK and put in operation by the team of Dr. Yama then shipped to KEK and put in operation by the team of Dr. Yamamoto. The
system was successfully used for protecting the solenoid during system was successfully used for protecting the solenoid during the verification the verification phase of the magnet. phase of the magnet.
Extensive tests were were then then performed performed on
the B0 B0 magnet magnet in in the the ATLAS test area. ATLAS test area. Various Various MSS analogue modules MSS analogue modules were were used used as protection as protection of
the magnet magnet. . All All tests tests were were positive, positive, even even though though some some noise noise problems problems were were present present in in the the set set-
up. . Some Some improvements improvements of
the modules modules were were carried carried out
following this this. . The The report on report on the the B0 B0 tests tests can can be be seen seen in in appendix appendix 5.1.1. 5.1.1.
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Common Project Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
5.1.2 Preliminary results: 5.1.2 Preliminary results: Four Magnet Safety Systems delivered: Four Magnet Safety Systems delivered:
Central Solenoid for ATLAS – – KEK KEK
November 2000 November 2000 -
January 2001. Estimated number of hours of operation: Estimated number of hours of operation: ~ 2100 ~ 2100
B00 for ATLAS – – CERN CERN
March March -
April 2001. Estimated number of hours of operation: Estimated number of hours of operation: ~ 1500 ~ 1500
B0 for ATLAS – – CERN CERN
Excluding hard Excluding hard-
wired logic June June – – December 2001. December 2001. Estimated number of hours of operation: Estimated number of hours of operation: ~ 5000 ~ 5000
Chimney tests – – CERN CERN
June 2002. June 2002. Estimated number of hours of operation: Estimated number of hours of operation: ~ 500 ~ 500
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Common Project Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
Total number of module hours: Total number of module hours:
Analogue: Analogue: ~ 84 500 hrs ~ 84 500 hrs Digital: Digital: ~ 50 000 hrs ~ 50 000 hrs
Number of failures:
Number of false quenches:
Number of unprovoked quenches detected: 5/5 5/5
All detected by Supra All detected by Supra-
quench Detection modules.
Number of provoked quenches detected: All All
All types of quench detection tested. All types of quench detection tested.
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Common Project Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
5.1.3 EMC tests 5.1.3 EMC tests
An EMC, “Electro-
Magnetic Compatibility”, test of a complete MSS was passed in November vember
disturbances in order to verify its resistance to these. verify its resistance to these.
The test set-
up can be seen in appendix 5.1.3.1 and the resulting report in appendix 5.1.3.2. ppendix 5.1.3.2.
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Common Project Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Common Project Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Common Project Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Common Project Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
5.2 Service 5.2 Service
The service foreseen for the “Magnet Safety System can be extrac The service foreseen for the “Magnet Safety System can be extracted from the relevant ted from the relevant work package defined for ATLAS: work package defined for ATLAS:
To perform for the maintenance and operation of the magnet systems, i.e. the ms, i.e. the Magnet Control System (MCS), the Magnet Safety System (MSS), the Magnet Control System (MCS), the Magnet Safety System (MSS), the Electrical Electrical System and the Water Cooling System. One team of professional te System and the Water Cooling System. One team of professional technicians for chnicians for all the LHC experiment magnets covers ‘on call’ service and corr all the LHC experiment magnets covers ‘on call’ service and corrective ective maintenance, preventive maintenance, modifications and improveme maintenance, preventive maintenance, modifications and improvements during nts during
Tasks included in this work package: To cover preventive and corrective maintenance during running of To cover preventive and corrective maintenance during running of the systems of the systems of the test facility (MCS, MSS, Electrical System, Water Cooling Sy the test facility (MCS, MSS, Electrical System, Water Cooling System). stem).
To cover ‘on call’ service, preventive and corrective maintenance during operation e during operation and shut down. (MCS, MSS, Electrical System, Water Cooling Syste and shut down. (MCS, MSS, Electrical System, Water Cooling System). m).
To operate
a documentation system system reporting reporting the the action action performed performed, , according according to to the the Operation Operation Manual Manual and and the the Repair Repair/Maintenance /Maintenance Manual Manual. .
10th of April 2003 ATLAS “MSS Specification”
Magnet Safety Systems Magnet Safety Systems – – Magnet Common Project Magnet Common Project
– CERN/EP CERN/EP
6 Cost 6 Cost
The cost of the complete, redundant MSS system including quench heaters has been calculated heaters has been calculated and presented to the ATLAS management. Following explanations an and presented to the ATLAS management. Following explanations and reductions on various d reductions on various points the paper was accepted. points the paper was accepted.
The complete calculation can be seen in appendix 6.1.
Price estimate of the ATLAS Magnet Safety System 1 and 2, based on ATLAS_WG_MSS-01.
Pos. Description Price MSS1-2, Toroid and Cryoring: 1 Chassis 209,032.- 2 Modules 166,785.- 3 Power Boxes 33,600.- 5 Sensor Cabling, including connectors and cables. Cavern installation 49,028.- 6 Racks, including cabling 27,120.- 7 Quench Heaters 259,680.- 8 Transport 1,200.- Total: 746,445.- MSS1-2, Central Solenoid: 9 Chassis 76,936.- 10 Modules 60,625.- 11 Power Boxes 14,400.- 13 Sensor Cabling, including connectors and cables. Cavern installation 24,672.- 14 Racks, including cabling 9,040.- 15 Quench Heaters 19,960.- 16 Transport 400.- Total: 206,033.- Auxiliary Equipment: 17 Fast Acquisition, Histomemory 17,200.- 18 Alarm Notifier 16,000.- 19 Test Equipment 0.- 20 Inhibit System 0.- 21 Monitoring System 0.- 22 Synoptics System 12,000.- 23 Racks, including cabling 15,120.- 24 Transport 1,200.- Total: 61,520.- Electrical System: 25 UPS (Power supplies 48Vdc) 108,000.- Total: 108,000.- Diverse: 26 Margin 0.- Total: 0.- Grand Total: CHF 1,121,998.-
Magnet Safety Systems
1 of 1 19th of July, 2002