Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? Lessons from Country Experiences Xiaoyong Wu Monetary and Capital Markets Department Outline of the Paper I. Country experiences with macroprudential instruments II.


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SLIDE 1

Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them?

Xiaoyong Wu Monetary and Capital Markets Department

Lessons from Country Experiences

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SLIDE 2

I. Country experiences with macroprudential instruments

  • II. Effectiveness of macroprudential instruments

Outline of the Paper

  • II. Effectiveness of macroprudential instruments
  • III. Lessons and Policy Messages
  • IV. Next Steps: Remaining Gaps
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SLIDE 3
  • I. Country Experiences with

Macroprudential Instruments

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SLIDE 4
  • 10 of the most frequently used instruments are

examined (mostly prudential)

  • Those capable of addressing systemic risk are

What Instruments are Used?

  • Those capable of addressing systemic risk are

considered macroprudential

Procyclicality (time dimension) Interconnectedness (cross-sectional dimension)

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SLIDE 5
  • Credit-related:

– caps on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio; – caps on the debt-to-income (DTI) ratio; – caps on foreign currency lending; – ceilings on credit or credit growth.

  • Liquidity-related:
  • Risks generated by strong

credit growth and asset price inflation.

  • Systemic liquidity risk.

Instruments and Risks

  • Liquidity-related:

– limits on net open currency positions/currency mismatch (NOP); – limits on maturity mismatch; – reserve requirements.

  • Capital-related:

– countercyclical/time-varying capital requirements; – time-varying/dynamic provisioning; – restrictions on profit distribution.

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  • Systemic liquidity risk.
  • Risks arising from excessive

leverage and the consequent de-leveraging.

  • Risks related to large and

volatile capital flows.

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SLIDE 6

20 40 60 80 100 credit growth/ asset price inflation

Objectives of Macroprudential Instruments

20 excessive leverage systemic liquidity risk capital flows/ currency fluctuation

Caps on LTV Limits on maturity mismatch Limit on net open currency positions/currency mismatch Restrictions on profit distribution

Source: IMF Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy Survey, 2010

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SLIDE 7

Economic Development Stage Size of Financial Sector

What Affects the Choice of Instruments?

Exchange Rate Regime Size of Capital Inflow

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SLIDE 8

Credit-related Liquidity-related Capital-related Economic Development Stage Advanced 43 19 10 Emerging Market 68 93 68

% of Countries in Each Group Using Each Type of Instruments

Stage Market Exchange Rate Flexible 48 55 40 Managed/ Fixed 100 89 56 Size of Financial Sector Large 48 36 20 Small 67 88 67 Size of Capital Inflow Small 58 54 29 Large 56 68 56

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SLIDE 9

45 45 55 64 36 Fixed Targeted Broad-based Multiple Single

How are the Instruments Used?

41 59 92 8 55 45 20 40 60 80 100 No coordination Coordination Discretion Rule Time-varying Fixed (percent)

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SLIDE 10
  • II. Effectiveness of

MacroPrudential Instruments

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SLIDE 11

Dampening procyclicality

  • f credit growth?
  • f credit growth?
  • f leverage?
  • f leverage?

Limiting interconnectedness in exposures

to wholesale funding? to wholesale funding? to foreign funding? to foreign funding?

Effectiveness of the Instruments

1 case study 2 simple correlation 3 panel regression

Three Approaches

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SLIDE 12

Small but diverse group of countries:

China Colombia

Instruments seem to

  • 1. Case Study

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Colombia Korea New Zealand Spain USA Some Eastern European countries

Instruments seem to have achieved, to various degrees, their intended

  • bjectives.
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SLIDE 13

0.0% 0.5% 1.0% t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4

LTV

(y/y change)

  • 1.0%
  • 0.5%

0.0% 0.5% 1.0% t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4

DTI

(y/y change)

Change in Credit Growth After the Introduction of Instruments (average across countries)

  • 2. Simple Approach
  • 1.5%
  • 1.0%
  • 0.5%

Quarterly

  • 3.0%
  • 2.5%
  • 2.0%
  • 1.5%

Quarterly

  • 2.0%
  • 1.0%

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 Quarterly

Reserve Requirements

(y/y change)

  • 2.0%
  • 1.5%
  • 1.0%
  • 0.5%

0.0% 0.5% 1.0% t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 Quarterly

Dynamic Provisioning

(y/y change)

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SLIDE 14

Credit Growth vs. GDP Growth

  • 1%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% wth (Percent Quarterly) GDP Growth (Percent Quarterly)

With and Without Caps on Loan-To-Value Ratios

No Caps on LTV (blue) Caps on LTV (red)

  • 1%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% rowth (Percent Quarterly) GDP Growth (Percent Quarterly)

With and Without Caps on Debt-to-Income Ratios

No Caps on DTI (blue) Caps on DTI (red)

  • 2. Simple Approach (cont’d)
  • 5%
  • 4%
  • 3%
  • 2%

Credit Grow

  • 5%
  • 4%
  • 3%
  • 2%
  • 1%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% Credit Growth (Percent Quarterly) GDP Growth (Percent Quarterly)

With and Without Reserve Requirement

No Reserve Requirements (blue) Reserve Requirements (red)

  • 5%
  • 4%
  • 3%
  • 2%

Credit Gro

  • 5%
  • 4%
  • 3%
  • 2%
  • 1%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% Credit Growth (Percent Quarterly) GDP Growth (Percent Quarterly)

With and Without Dynamic Provisioning

No Dynamic Provisioning (blue) Dynamic Provisioning (red)

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SLIDE 15

Reductions in: Procyclicality of Interconnectedness Credit Leverage Foreign funding Wholesale funding Caps on LTV ✔ ✘ Caps on DTI ✔ ✔ Limits on Credit Growth ✔ ✔

  • 3. Panel Regression

Statistically Significant (✔ ✔ ✔ ✔) or Not (✘ ✘ ✘ ✘)

Limits on Credit Growth ✔ ✔ Limits on NOP ✔ ✘ Limits on Maturity Mismatch ✘ ✔ Reserve Requirements ✔ ✔ Time-varying/Dynamic Provisioning ✔ ✔ Countercyclical/Time-varying Capital Requirements ✘ ✔

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SLIDE 16
  • Regression coefficients are:

– Averages of country performances – Not an indication of equal effectiveness in all countries

  • 3. Panel Regression: Caveats

– Not an indication of equal effectiveness in all countries – Affected by small sample size (limited number of

  • bservations)
  • Country-specific circumstances are important for

effectiveness

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SLIDE 17
  • III. Lessons and Policy Messages
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SLIDE 18
  • Many instruments are found to be effective.
  • Effectiveness does not seem to depend on:

– stage of economic development;

Lessons and Policy Messages

– exchange rate regime.

  • As with regulation in general, there are costs involved.

– May lower growth unnecessarily. – May generate unintended distortions. – Benefits should be weighed against costs.

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SLIDE 19
  • use single when risk is well-defined from a single source;
  • use multiple to tackle a risk from various angles but do not
  • verdo.
  • use single when risk is well-defined from a single source;
  • use multiple to tackle a risk from various angles but do not
  • verdo.

Single vs. Multiple:

Using Instruments:

Do’s and Don’ts

  • verdo.
  • verdo.
  • use targeted to minimize cost or distortion;
  • use broad-based to limit the scope of circumvention.
  • use targeted to minimize cost or distortion;
  • use broad-based to limit the scope of circumvention.

Targeted vs. Broad-based:

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SLIDE 20
  • Use fixed to provide a minimum buffer with a low cost
  • Make adjustments with changing circumstances - on sound and

transparent principles

  • Use fixed to provide a minimum buffer with a low cost
  • Make adjustments with changing circumstances - on sound and

transparent principles

Fixed vs. Time-varying:

Using Instruments:

Do’s and Don’ts (cont’d)

transparent principles transparent principles

  • Use rules when risk of inaction is high or risk management

capacity is weak

  • Use discretion when structural changes occur but with constraint
  • Use rules when risk of inaction is high or risk management

capacity is weak

  • Use discretion when structural changes occur but with constraint

Rules vs. Discretion:

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SLIDE 21
  • Deeper analysis of interconnectedness (cross-section

dimension).

– Data availability is a constraining factor

Next Steps

  • Deeper understanding of design and calibration of

instruments.

  • Estimates of cost of implementation: distortions, unintended

consequences.

  • Relationship between macroprudential and microprudential

regulation.

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