Low-Cost Threshold Cryptography HSM for OpenDNSSEC Francisco - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

low cost threshold cryptography hsm for opendnssec
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Low-Cost Threshold Cryptography HSM for OpenDNSSEC Francisco - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Low-Cost Threshold Cryptography HSM for OpenDNSSEC Francisco Cifuentes francisco@niclabs.cl Problem description To satisfy security needs, DNS operators use Hardware Security Modules. Specialized hardware that have special security


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Low-Cost Threshold Cryptography HSM for OpenDNSSEC

Francisco Cifuentes

francisco@niclabs.cl

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Problem description

  • To satisfy security needs, DNS operators use

Hardware Security Modules.

  • Specialized hardware that have special security

properties.

  • http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf
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SLIDE 3

Problem description

  • HSM are expensive.
  • $50 - $50000
  • FIPS 140-2 level 1 to level 4.
  • High security level implies high price.
  • Small institutions want to deploy DNSSEC but

they can not buy them.

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Problem description

  • What if ...

– we could achieve a good security level without

paying that much?

– we use old and not in use hardware, and we

achieve a good security level not paying at all...

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Low-Cost Threshold Cryptography HSM for OpenDNSSEC

Francisco Cifuentes

francisco@niclabs.cl

Proposed solution:

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Solution description

  • Threshold Cryptography

N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 SD

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SLIDE 7

Solution description

  • Threshold Cryptography

N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 SD

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SLIDE 8

Solution description

  • Threshold Cryptography
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SLIDE 9

Solution description

  • Threshold Cryptography:

– Secure – Fault tolerant – Robust

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SLIDE 10

Solution description

  • HSM basic architecture
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Solution description

  • TCHSM Architecture
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Solution description

OpenDNSSEC Architecture

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SLIDE 13

Solution description

OpenDNSSEC Architecture

TCHSM

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SLIDE 14

Solution description

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Experiments and results

2 Configuration

  • Typical desktop computer
  • Intel dual-core processors at 2.8 GHz
  • 4 MB of memory cache and 1 GB of

RAM

  • (one of them used as DNS server with

OpenDNSSEC)

  • Raspberry PI
  • Broadcom BCM2835 ARM unicore at

700 MHz, 128 KB of memory cache

  • 512 MB RAM

Gigabit LAN with latency lower than 1 second, 8 machines of the same type connected.

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Our Raspberry PI Cluster!

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Experiments and results

Experiment

  • 8 nodes try to sign the zone registry.
  • The signature dealer waits until the first 5 not compromised

nodes sign the zone registry.

  • Measuring the average time of the generation of 1000 RRSIG

signatures.

  • Also measuring the average time of the generation of 1000

RRSIG signatures using the SoftHSM solution made by OpenDNSSEC's developers.

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SLIDE 18

Experiments and results

Results

Key Size 1024 bits 2048 bits Project Cost SoftHSM TCHSM SoftHSM TCHSM Desktop PC 5 ms 69 ms 14 ms 283 ms $0† Raspberry PI 21 ms 382 ms 81 ms 1408 ms $35 x 8 = $280 † We use old computers that were not in use :-)

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Implementation problems

  • Managed systems memory zeroization.
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Future Work

  • Implementation diversity.
  • Full distributed threshold RSA.
  • GPU Usage.
  • Replication / Migration.
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Distributed HSM

Francisco Cifuentes - francisco@niclabs.cl

Links:

  • www.niclabs.cl
  • github.com/niclabs/tscrypto