Long Distance Relay Attack Luigi Sportiello Joint Research Centre - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Long Distance Relay Attack

Luigi Sportiello Joint Research Centre Institute for the Protection and the Security of the Citizen European Commission

Smart Cards

• ˝Something you have˝
• Secure data storage
• Qualify the holder for operations
• Two possible communication technologies
• Contact
• Contactless

Contactless Smart Cards

• Some characteristics:
• quick interactions
• working distance: typically few cm

Contactless Card Reader

Command Response (Slave) (Master)

Reader-Card Communication Protocol

• ISO 14443 (+ ISO 7816-4) common solution for many contactless

smart card

• Some time constraints during the communication

Command Response

Anticollision/Initialization ISO14443 Frame | Encoded Command ISO14443 Frame | Encoded Response APDU: read, write, … ISO14443 ISO7816-4 Response within max ~5s.

Relay Attack Against a Contactless Smart Card

• Two devices are needed:
• Proxy: emulates a contactless smart card
• Mole: acts as reader nearby the victim card
• Communication channel between Proxy and Mole

Command Command Command Response Response Response

Relay Attack: Our Aim

• Relay attacks against contactless smart cards are not new
• Some experiments featured with specific hardware modules
• Lab conditions with short distances
• Our proof of concept:
• Long distance attack (>10Km)
• In dynamic conditions (no constraints on devices positions)

Relay Attack on a Mobile Phone Network

• Off-the-shelf equipment
• Mobile phones with NFC (ISO 14443 compliant) as Proxy and Mole
• Mobile phone network for Proxy-Mole communication
• Data network basically provided by all mobile phone network
• perators

Internet Proxy App NFC NFC

• Card Emulation
• Open Connection
• Msg/Rsp Forwarding

Mole App

• Card Reader
• Accept Connections
• Msg/Rsp Forwarding

IP: X.X.X.X IP: Y.Y.Y.Y Connection Cmd/Rsp Restricted/Private IP Restricted/Private IP: no incoming connections Proxy Mole

Our Relay Attack Architecture

Accept connections from phones Commands/Responses forwarding Open Socket Open Socket Cmd Cmd Rsp Rsp Cmd Rsp Cmd Rsp

Our Relay Attack Architecture: More Details

ISO 14443 communication ISO 14443 communication

Relay Attack on a Geographical Scale

• We successfully relayed a Reader-ePassport communication over several kilometers
• Authentication protocols useless against relay attacks
• No longer possible to assume that a card is physically nearby the reader

15Km 42Km

No Timing Issues

On average, response waiting time ≈ 800ms.

Cmd Rsp

ISO 14443 communication

Live Experiment: Italy-Austria Relay Attack?

• Let’s try!
• (you know, things never go well in these cases... we apologize in advance…)

541Km

Contactless Smart Card Applications

• Government (e.g., identification)
• Banking (e.g., electronic payments)
• Transport (e.g., tickets)
• Access control
• Loyalty programs
• ...

Market Figures

Source:

Conclusions

• Long distance relay attack in dynamic conditions

against contactless smart cards proved

• A ˝botnet of smart cards˝ is possible
• Practical countermeasures:
• Access codes (e.g., MRZ, PIN)
• Shielding

Thank you for your attention!