Local Interactions in a Market with Heterogeneous Expectations - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Local Interactions in a Market with Heterogeneous Expectations - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Local Interactions in a Market with Heterogeneous Expectations Mikhail Anufriev 1 Andrea Giovannetti 2 Valentyn Panchenko 3 1 , 2 University of Technology Sydney 3 UNSW Sydney, Australia Computing in Economics and Finance 2018 Milano 1 / 17 T HE


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Local Interactions in a Market with Heterogeneous Expectations

Mikhail Anufriev1 Andrea Giovannetti2 Valentyn Panchenko3

1,2University of Technology Sydney 3UNSW Sydney, Australia

Computing in Economics and Finance 2018 Milano

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SLIDE 2

THE SCENE

  • Many non-specialist investors allocate money into pension funds
  • Funds can be classified into a number of types, e.g.,

◮ value (fundamental) ◮ momentum (chartists)

  • Investors are able to switch funds

◮ Every period investors receive performance reports for the past period ◮ Investors talk to their network of friends and may switch to a different fund if it performed better

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SLIDE 3

LITERATURE

Behavioral Asset Pricing

  • Brock and Hommes (JEDC, 1998)

◮ model with switching based on past performance

  • Panchenko, Gerasymchuk and Pavlov (JEDC, 2013)

◮ local interaction in BH asset pricing model ◮ no switching if all neighbors are of the same type ◮ analytic solution for random graph, assuming homogeneous degree ◮ simulations for small world model

Spread of behaviors on networks:

  • Lopez-Pintado (2008, GEB)

◮ related to S-I-S model on network (e.g., Vespignani, 2001) ◮ two types of agents: Susceptible agent becomes Infected if the number of Infected neighbours crosses a threshold

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SLIDE 4

CONTRIBUTION

  • 1. Network is characterized by degree distribution P(k)
  • 2. We can study the market dynamics for general classes of

networks:

◮ regular random networks (same degree k) ◮ Poisson networks ◮ scale free (power-law) networks

  • 3. Analytical results using mean field approximation,

finer approximation than in Panchenko et al. (2013)

  • 4. Our approach can handle broad classes of diffusion mechanisms

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SLIDE 5

BASELINE FRAMEWORK: ASSET PRICING MODEL

Brock and Hommes, 1998, JEDC

  • Large population of traders N = {1, 2, ..., N} trading combination
  • f risk-free bond with return R and risky asset z with stochastic

dividend yt

  • t = 1, 2, ...
  • Agents. Myopic optimizers with CARA preferences in wealth Wi,t:

max

zi,t Ui,t+1(Wi,t+1)

⇔ max

zi,t

  • Eh

t−1 [Wt+1] − a

2V [Wt+1]

  • Agent i selects the trading type hi ∈ H to form expectations on pt.
  • Market Clearing (zero supply of risky asset):
  • h∈H

nh

t

Eh

t−1 [pt+1 + yt+1] − Rpt

aσ2

  • individual mean-variance demand

= 0 ⇒ pt = 1 R

  • h∈H

nh

t Eh t−1 [pt+1] + ¯

y

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SLIDE 6
  • Given the fundamental price p∗, define xt = pt − p∗:

xt = 1 R

  • h∈H

nh

t Eh t−1 [xt+1]

  • Trading Types: h ∈ H ≡ {f, c}

Ef

t−1 [xt+1] = 0

Ec

t−1 [xt+1] = g · xt−1

nc

t ≡ nt proportion of c-type

nf = 1 − nt

  • proportion of f-type
  • Dynamics

         xt = g R · ntxt−1 nt = ∆t = eβπc

t−1

eβπf

t−1 + eβπc t−1

πh

t

= zh

t−1(xt − Rxt−1) − ch

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SLIDE 7

INFORMATION NETWORK

  • As in Panchenko et al. (2013) performance of types h is only

locally observable:

◮ for switching you need information from agents of other types ◮ agent i gathers information from ki other agents - neighbours ◮ P(k) can capture cognitive overload, inattention

Timeline

  • 1. Agents survey their neighborhood
  • 2. Agents select their type hi,t (based on past performance)
  • 3. Demand for risky asset is generated
  • 4. Price pt determined via a Walrasian market clearing
  • 5. Agents portfolios are updated, dividend realizes.
  • 6. Agents observe performance of their strategies

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SLIDE 8

MEAN-FIELD APPROXIMATION

  • Nodes are homogeneous conditional on their own degree k
  • Neighbors types are independent from each other

A random link in the network points to a chartist with probability θt =

  • k

knk,t−1 · P(k)/k, where nk,t−1 fraction of chartists for agents with degree k, and k =

k k · P(k) average degree of the network

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SWITCHING

Let a counts the number of chartists in neighborhood ki,t.

  • 1. Ft(k, a): probability of f → c given (k, a)
  • 2. Rt(k, a): probability of c → f given (k, a)

(Possibly Rt(k, a) = Ft(k, a)) Probability for a fundamentalist with k links to switch to c: ˜ gk(θt) =

k

  • a=0

Ft(k, a) k a

  • θa

t (1 − θt)k−a

Probability for a chartist with k links to switch to f: ˜ qk(θt) =

k

  • a=0

Rt(k, a) k a

  • θa

t (1 − θt)k−a

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SLIDE 10
  • Different selection mechanisms:
  • 1. Brock and Hommes (1998).

Ft(k, a) = 1 − Rt(k, a) = ∆t, ∀a, k ≥ 0.

  • 2. Panchenko et al (2013).

Ft(k, a) = 1 − Rt(k, a) =    for a = 0 ∆t for 0 < a < k 1 for a = k

  • 3. Generalization - smooth transition from 0 to 1 depending on a

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SLIDE 11

DYNAMICS

                     xt = g R [

k P(k)nk,t] · xt−1

. . . nk,t = nk,t−1 − nk,t−1˜ qk(θt) + (1 − nk,t−1)˜ gk(θt) . . . θt =

  • k

k · P(k) k nk,t−1

  • The economy is described by a system of (k + 2) equations
  • Each nk,t tracks the evolution of c-type traders endowed with k

links

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GENERALIZATION OF PANCHENKO ET AL. 2013

  • With Panchenko et al. diffusion protocol, the LoM is:

nk,t = nk,t−1θk

t +

  • nk,t−1
  • 1 − θk

t

  • + (1 − nk,t−1)
  • 1 − (1 − θt)k

·∆t

  • In equilibrium, the system is described by:

       x = g Rx

k>0 P(k)

  • ∆x((1 − θ)k − 1)

∆x((1 − θ)k − θk) − (1 − θk)

  • θ

=

  • k>0 kP(k)

k

  • ∆x((1 − θ)k − 1)

∆x((1 − θ)k − θk) − (1 − θk)

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SLIDE 13

FUNDAMENTAL STEADY STATES: g < (1 + r)

Consider E = (x, θ) the stationary states of the system.

  • 1. Fundamental s.s. E0 = (0, 0), E1 = (0, 1) always exist.
  • 2. Fundamental s.s. E2 = (0, ¯

θ) exists iff neighboring traders have

  • n average at least one neighbor of either type:

∆0 1 − ∆0 · k2 k

  • avg. deg of neighbor

> 1 and 1 − ∆0 ∆0 · k2 k

  • > 1
  • 3. For β < β1 = ln
  • k2

k

c s.s. E2 exists: Regular Random Scale-Free k2 = k2 k2 = k + k2 k2 = ∞ β1

regular

< β1

random

< β1

scale−free

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SLIDE 14

Fixed Point Analysis vs Simulations: (k = 3, β = 1, g < 1 + r)

  • Simulations match well approximation of analytical mappings.

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AVERAGE PRICE DEVIATION |x| FOR k = 2, g > 1 + r

  • Ordering of primary and secondary bifurcations seems to depend
  • n the network type:

Regular < Scale-Free < Random.

  • Amplitude of |x|: Regular > Scale-Free > Random.

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SLIDE 16

SIMULATIONS: k = 2, β = 1, g > 1 + r

  • Economy is sensitive to network typology for realistic range of k

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SLIDE 17

CONCLUSIONS

  • Analytically tractable model for random networks with P(k)

◮ importance of neighborhood size

  • Major features generated by the BH model are preserved under

various communication structures

  • Importance of the network structures

◮ depending on P(k) faster bifurcations - less stability ◮ short period between primary and secondary bifurcations

  • Future work - other network features, e.g. clustering

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