Lambda Lecture at the London School of Economics Mark Carney - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Lambda Lecture at the London School of Economics Mark Carney - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Lambda Lecture at the London School of Economics Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England 16 th January 2017 Monetary policy trade-off Inflation relative to target Output gap 3 Monetary policy trade-off Inflation relative to target
Lecture at the London School of Economics
Lambda
Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England 16th January 2017
Monetary policy trade-off
3
Output gap Inflation relative to target
Monetary policy trade-off
4
Output gap Preferred trade-off Inflation relative to target
Monetary policy trade-off
5
Output gap Preferred trade-off Phillips Curve Inflation relative to target
Monetary policy trade-off
6
Output gap Preferred trade-off Phillips Curve Inflation relative to target
Monetary policy trade-off
7
Output gap Preferred trade-off Phillips Curve Inflation relative to target
Demand shocks imply no trade-off
8
Output gap Preferred trade-off Phillips Curve Inflation relative to target
Demand shocks imply no trade-off
9
Output gap Preferred trade-off Phillips Curve
Disinflationary → looser policy → return to equilibrium Inflationary → tighter policy → return to equilibrium
Inflation relative to target
Demand shocks dominated during the “Great Moderation” (1993- 2007)…
10
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
- 1
- 0.5
0.5 1 Inflation (%) Output gap (%)
… whereas supply shocks have dominated post financial crisis
11
- 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
- 6
- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
1 Inflation (%) Output gap (%)
Demand shocks dominated in US…
12
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5
- 8
- 6
- 4
- 2
2 4 Great moderation Output gap (%) Inflation (%)
United States
Demand shocks dominated in US… and the euro area
13
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5
- 8
- 6
- 4
- 2
2 4 Great moderation Output gap (%) Inflation (%)
United States
8
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 Great moderation Output gap (%) Inflation (%)
Euro area
… including post crisis
14
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5
- 8
- 6
- 4
- 2
2 4 Great moderation Financial crisis and after Output gap (%) Inflation (%) 8
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 Great moderation Output gap (%) Inflation (%)
United States Euro area
… including post crisis
15
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5
- 8
- 6
- 4
- 2
2 4 Great moderation Financial crisis and after Output gap (%) Inflation (%) 8
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 Great moderation Financial crisis and after Output gap (%) Inflation (%)
United States Euro area
Policy problem
16
𝑀𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑢 ≡ 𝜌𝑢 − 𝜌∗ 2 + 𝜇 𝑧𝑢 − 𝑧𝑢
∗ 2
Deviation of inflation from target
Policy problem
17
𝑀𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑢 ≡ 𝜌𝑢 − 𝜌∗ 2 + 𝜇 𝑧𝑢 − 𝑧𝑢
∗ 2
Deviation of inflation from target Output gap
Policy problem
18
𝑀𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑢 ≡ 𝜌𝑢 − 𝜌∗ 2 + 𝜇 𝑧𝑢 − 𝑧𝑢
∗ 2
Deviation of inflation from target Output gap Preference for output stabilisation
Simple optimal policy
19
𝜌𝑢 − 𝜌∗ = − 𝜇 𝜆 (𝑧𝑢 − 𝑧𝑢
∗)
Simple optimal policy
20
𝜌𝑢 − 𝜌∗ = − 𝜇 𝜆 (𝑧𝑢 − 𝑧𝑢
∗)
Deviation of inflation from target Output gap
Simple optimal policy
21
𝜌𝑢 − 𝜌∗ = − 𝜇 𝜆 (𝑧𝑢 − 𝑧𝑢
∗)
Deviation of inflation from target Output gap Slope of the Phillips Curve
Simple optimal policy
22
Output gap Preferred trade-off Slope is −
𝜇 𝜆
Inflation relative to target
Slopes imply 𝝁 around 0.1-0.2 since 1993… or around ¼ since 2008
23
- 2
2 4 6
- 6
- 4
- 2
2 Great moderation Financial crisis and after Output gap (%) Inflation (%)
- 2.0
- 1.5
- 1.0
- 0.5
0.0 0.5 1.0
- 1
- 0.5
0.5 1 1.5 2 Great moderation Financial crisis and after Inflation deviation from target (pp) Cumulative growth, relative to trend (%)
Data outturns MPC forecasts
Slopes imply 𝝁 around 0.1-0.2 since 1993…and around ¼ since 2008
24
- 2
2 4 6
- 6
- 4
- 2
2 Great moderation Financial crisis and after Output gap (%) Inflation (%)
- 2.0
- 1.5
- 1.0
- 0.5
0.0 0.5 1.0
- 1
- 0.5
0.5 1 1.5 2 Great moderation Financial crisis and after Inflation deviation from target (pp) Cumulative growth, relative to trend (%)
Data outturns MPC forecasts
Loss function with financial stability
25
𝑀𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑢 ≡ 𝜌𝑢 − 𝜌∗ 2 + 𝜇 𝑧𝑢 − 𝑧𝑢
∗ 2 + 𝟐𝐺𝑄𝐷𝛾 𝒕𝑢 − 𝒕𝑢 ∗ 2 Deviation of inflation from target Output gap Financial Stability Indicators
No stimulus in August would have meant no weight on output
26
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
- 2
- 1
1 Inflation (%) Output gap (%) August, no stimulus
Preferred trade-off if 𝜇=1 Preferred trade-off if 𝜇=0.1
August stimulus traded off some inflation for more output and lower unemployment
27
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
- 2
- 1
1 Inflation (%) Output gap (%) August, no stimulus August, with stimulus
Preferred trade-off if 𝜇=1 Preferred trade-off if 𝜇=0.1
Trade-off more challenging in November
28
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
- 2
- 1
1 Inflation (%) Output gap (%) August , no stimulus August, with stimulus
Preferred trade-off if 𝜇=1 Preferred trade-off if 𝜇=0.1
November
UK inflation high and volatile during the 1970s and 1980s
30
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28
- 6
- 4
- 2
2 4 6 Output gap (%) Inflation (%)